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EXOATMOSPHERIC PLOWSHARES:
USING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
FOR PLANETARY DEFENSE AGAINST
AN INCOMING ASTEROID
David A. Koplow*
"They shall bear their swords into plowshares, and their spears into
pruning hooks"
Isaiah 2:4
ABSTRACT
What should be done if we suddenly discover a large asteroid on a
collision course with Earth? The consequences of an impact could be
enormous-scientists believe that such a strike 60 million years ago led to the
extinction of the dinosaurs, and something ofsimilar magnitude could happen
again. Although no such extraterrestrial threat now looms on the horizon,
astronomers concede that they cannot detect all the potentially hazardous
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"near-Earth objects, " and even more striking, they acknowledge that if such
a danger were discerned, there is currently no proven capability for diverting
or destroying it.
One possible response to this type of incipient catastrophe could be to
send into space a nuclear explosive device, hoping the massive blast could
alter the asteroid's trajectory. Indeed, if time were short, that might be the
only effective remedy. But two major nuclear arms control treaties-which
have been joined by most of the leading countries and are widely appreciated
as fundamental to global security-specifically forbid that approach.
This Article examines that critical clash of legal, political, and technical
values, and concludes that the best response would be for the UN Security
Council to adopt a binding resolution pursuant to its powers under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, to deal with the emergency on an expeditious, global
basis. A proposed draft of such a resolution is presented, along with
explanatory annotations.
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. INTRODUCTION
What should be done if we suddenly discover a large asteroid on a
collision course with Earth? The consequences of a major impact could be
extreme: scientists now believe that it was just such a space intruder 60 million
years ago that led to the extinction of the dinosaurs, and something of
comparable magnitude could strike again at any time.
Fortunately, people need not immediately panic about this idea: at the
moment, no such extraterrestrial threat looms on the horizon, and the
statistical odds are heavily stacked against that form of Armageddon any time
soon. But people should also not relax too much: Earth is regularly pummeled
by space rocks of varying size and consequence; astronomers acknowledge
that they are unable to detect every possible such risk; and even more ominous,
the world has virtually no proven capability for intercepting and diverting or
destroying this type of hazard. This scenario presents the classic case of an
event that has a very low probability of occurring at any specific point in time,
but a very high adverse consequence if and when it does occur, and we are not
remotely prepared.
This challenge-which experts in the field label "Planetary Defense" -
lies overwhelmingly within the domain of science and technology, but it
presents important, unresolved legal questions too. This Article explores one
of those legal conundrums: the possible use of a nuclear explosive device
against the galactic invader.
A nuclear explosion would not be the automatic or preferred choice as a
Planetary Defense Frequently Asked Questions, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
https://nasa.gov/planetarydefense/faq [https://perma.cc/UK4J-K7TK] [hereinafter NASA
FAQ]; Planetary Defense Coordination Office, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN,
https://www.nasa.gov/planetarydefense/overview [https://perma.cc/YVR3-4H8S]. The key
tasks of planetary defense include finding and tracking potentially hazardous space objects;
characterizing the trajectory, size, mass and other parameters of those items; warning about
potential effects of a collision; and planning and implementing measures to deflect or disrupt
the object and to mitigate the effects of an impact that cannot be prevented. Id.
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solution to an incoming asteroid. The primary methods-favored on the
grounds of feasibility, cost, and safety-would employ a variety of other less
problematic techniques with more finesse. But those alternative modes have
not been operationally tested and proven, and they would take longer to
operate, requiring lengthy advance notice. If the time interval is short between
the warning and the potential impact (as it may well be), a nuclear explosive
device may become the only available implement, relying upon a relatively
mature technology.
However, international law, in the form of two important, longstanding,
and widely adhered to treaties, specifically forbids that path. The United
States and most other spacefaring countries have emphasized these constraints
as fundamental, not only to the security of space, but also to the preservation
of nuclear stability on Earth.
What should be done to resolve this potential conflict? How can the
world dodge or reconcile the antagonism between the exigencies of planetary
defense, the demands of nuclear security, and the commitment to the rule of
law? This Article explores that interdisciplinary puzzle, contemplates a
variety of potential legal remedies, and recommends the most viable solution,
in the form of a resolution to be adopted by the UN Security Council pursuant
to its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.2 A draft of such a
resolution is provided for consideration.
The Article proceeds as follows. After this Introduction, Part II discusses
the potential asteroid challenge, describing the diverse population of these
cosmic interlopers and the characteristics that make them physically so
problematic. The Earth is constantly bombarded by material from space, most
of it too small to notice or care about. Sometimes, larger fragments manage
to penetrate the planet's protective atmosphere, providing souvenirs for
museums. Occasionally, still larger pieces inflict considerable damage; in the
worst case, a planet-jarring impact could be regarded as an "extinction-level"
event, threatening human civilization. Large asteroids are rare, but
statistically, collisions are inevitable.
Part III addresses the incipient human reaction to this danger. Many
disparate elements in national space agencies, universities, professional
associations, and elsewhere have considered the phenomena, studied the
dangers, and calculated the odds, but they have barely begun to forge a reliable
mechanism capable of reacting effectively. More recently, the world has
begun to coalesce upon a type of collective response, and a shared technical
2 See UN Charter art. 39.
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and political dialogue-nestled within the United Nations system, but largely
independent of it-has arisen. These discussions have identified a variety of
possible (or at least conceivable) mitigation techniques, including kinetic
interceptors, so-called "slow push/pull' techniques, gravity tractors, and in the
extreme case, nuclear detonations.
Part IV turns to the international law of space and nuclear devices,
highlighting two critical bulwarks. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty3 is the
foundational document in the field, establishing widely-accepted principles,
including specific mandates against nuclear weapons in space. The 1963
Limited Test Ban Treaty' includes an express prohibition against
exoatmospheric nuclear explosions of any sort. In addition, several other
vital, widely-respected international agreements restricting nuclear
proliferation also come into play. Here, the Article parses the texts of these
instruments with care to determine exactly which activities are legally
proscribed, and how those constraints might implicate planetary defense
capabilities.
Part V attempts a reconciliation between the specter of asteroid danger
and the insistent demands of arms control and international law. It sketches
possible routes for circumnavigation of the conflict and concludes that a
binding Security Council resolution offers the best way forward. Importantly,
any solution must address three rather different sets of circumstances. The
first is an urgent and certain global emergency, in which an imminent massive
peril could motivate a hasty worldwide agreement to suspend the usual legal
niceties in pursuit of our species' sheer survival. The second case would be a
more contingent or limited crisis, in which the probability of an Earth impact
was high, but not certain, or where the likely harm to be inflicted by the
asteroid was best calculated to be of regional, but not universal, scope. The
third situation arises at a far earlier point, when one or more countries,
apprehending a possible future peril, might seek to develop, test, and deploy
capabilities that could one day be necessary for a planetary defense mission,
but that might also pose a direct and immediate challenge to the nuclear arms
control regime that has for decades underpinned global peace and security.
3 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty or OST].
4 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,
opened for signature Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 6964 (entered into force Oct.
10, 1963) [hereinafter Limited Test Ban Treaty or LTBT]. This treaty is also known as the
Partial Test Ban Treaty.
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Part VI then proffers a draft of a Security Council resolution to address
all those scenarios. The suggested language is explained, and alternative
approaches and formulations are described.
Finally, Part VII tenders some concluding thoughts, including the
acknowledgement that serious analysis and discussion of this topic are fraught
with fundamental cognitive impediments. First, some readers may wholly
disregard a contingency with such low and distant likelihood of occurrence.
If the problem may not arise for thousands or millions of years, why worry
about it today when there are so many other more imminent dangers clamoring
for attention? Humans systematically under-prepare for high-severity/low-
probability events, to our collective peril. Alternatively, some readers may be
skeptical about the relevance of law in a true planetary emergency, reasoning
that if human survival were at stake, people and their governments would
simply tear up any treaties or other constraints that seemed to stand in the way
of an effective response.
This Article is dedicated to the proposition that we should be able to do
better than that. Even an event of very low probability demands attention
when the stakes are so unthinkably high, and prudently attending to planetary
defense need not divert us too badly from other priorities. Likewise, it is not
asking too much to demand that international lawyers help develop a pathway
to vouchsafe our physical security while not wholly dispensing with the rule
of law. We should be able to resist an asteroid and simultaneously preserve
our international legal and security architecture. Advance planning and far-
sighted legal analysis can accomplish that much, and it seriously degrades the
value of treaties today if we blithely assume that we will simply shred the law
when necessary tomorrow.
. NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS
The population of potentially-hazardous near-Earth objects (NEOs)
comprises a marvelously diverse array of characters.5  This Article
' A near-Earth object is usually defined as an asteroid or comet that comes closer to the Sun
than 1.3 times Earth's average distance from the Sun, i.e., about 200 million km. INTERAGENCY
WORKING GROUP FOR DETECTING AND MITIGATING IMPACT OF EARTH-BOUND NEAR-EAR
OBJECTS, U.S. Sci. & TECH. COUNCIL, NATIONAL NEAR-EARTH OBJECT PREPAREDNESS
STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN 2 n.1 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/National-Near-Earth-Object-Preparedness -Strategy-and-Action-
Plan-23 -pages-1MB.pdf [https://perma.cc/YP54-REX5] [hereinafter STRATEGY AND ACTION
PLAN]. Alternatively, sometimes NEO is defined as an object that passes within about 50
million km of Earth's orbit. See NASA OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NASA's EFFORTS TO
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concentrates on asteroids, the millions of small rocky or metallic objects
without atmospheres, orbiting the Sun. They are most plentiful in the belt
between Mars and Jupiter, but as they jostle each other, and as they experience
competing gravitational forces from miscellaneous objects, they may be found
in a variety of other locations and trajectories.6 A meteoroid is now widely
defined simply as a small asteroid, less than one meter in diameter.' A comet,
in contrast, is composed of ice, rock, and dust; it often follows a more extreme
elliptical path around the Sun, and is typically accompanied by a bright trailing
stream when it is in proximity to the Sun.'
This Part describes what is known, and some important unknowns, about
the congregation of NEOs; what the consequences of an Earth impact have
been in the past and may be in the future; and what the probability estimates
are for various types of incidents and catastrophes. 9
IDENTIFY NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS AND MITIGATE HAZARDS 1 (2014),
https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-14-030.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8A7-8Y7M] [hereinafter AUDIT
REPORT]; NASA FAQ, supra note 1. If the object passes within 8 million km and is large
enough to reach the surface of the Earth, it is regarded as "potentially hazardous." Id.; NAT'L.
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN., NEAR-EARTH OBJECT SURVEY AND DEFLECTION ANALYSIS
OF ALTERNATIVEs 7 (2007), https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/1 71331 mainNEO report march07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U7WD-FNEN] [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES].
6 See NASA FAQ, supra note 1; ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 5; NEAR-EARTH
OBJECT SCIENCE DEFINITION TEAM, NAT'L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN., UPDATE TO
DETERMINE THE FEAS1BILITY OF ENHANCING THE SEARCH AND CHARACTERIZATION OF NEOs 9-
10 (2017), https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/doc/2017_neosdt final e-version.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6FJA-GGVM] [hereinafter DEFINITION TEAM]. An asteroid is also referred to
as a type of minor planet. Id.
7 IAU Commission Fl, Definitions of Terms in Meteor Astronomy, INT'L ASTRONOMICAL
UNION (Apr. 30, 2017),
https://www.iau.org/static/science/scientific bodies/commissions/fl/meteordefintions appro
ved.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX65-DBRK]; Alan E. Rubin and Jeffrey N. Grossman, Meteorite
and Meteoroid: New Comprehensive Definitions, 45 METEORITICS & PLANETARY ScI. 114, 114
(2010). A "meteor" is an asteroid or meteoroid that enters Earth's atmosphere and glows as a
"shooting star." A "meteorite" is a fragment of a meteor that survives the descent through
Earth's atmosphere and reaches the surface. IAU Commission Fl, supra note 7; Meteors &
Meteorites, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/asteroids-
comets -and-meteors/meteors -and-meteorites/in-depth/ [https://perma.cc/7VV8-648W].
See Comets, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/asteroids-
comets -and-meteors/comets/in-depth/ [https://perma.cc/7WKD-55VG]; DONALD K. YEOMANS,
NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS: FINDING THEM BEFORE THEY FIND Us 7 (2013) (noting that the
difference between an asteroid and a comet is not precise). There are far fewer comets near
Earth, and they are not the focus of this Article. DEFINITION TEAM, supra note 6, at 1, 12-15
(noting that 16,000 asteroids, but only 106 comets, have been identified to date).
9 This Article addresses the dangers from natural objects in space, such as asteroids. A separate
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A. Asteroids
Asteroids vary greatly in a number of parameters that can strongly
influence the ability to detect, track, divert, and destroy them, and the amount
of damage they would inflict in an Earth strike:' 0
* Size: One asteroid (Ceres) is nearly 1,000 km across, and two
problem concerns the proliferation of human-made orbital debris, such as defunct satellites,
spent booster rockets, and other detritus from human space missions. Although not presenting
the risk of potentially cataclysmic impact on Earth that larger asteroids carry, that type of
artificial debris can pose a significant impediment for safe space operations, and states have
undertaken significant efforts to mitigate its further accumulation. See Donald J. Trump, Space
Policy Directive - 3, National Space Traffic Management Policy Sec. 3 (c), WHITE HOUSE
(June 18, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-3-
national-space-traffic-management-policy/ [https://perma.cc/ANW9 -9ADS] (recognizing that
"[o]rbital debris presents a growing threat to space operations."). See generally FRANCIS LYALL
& PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAw: A TREATISE 270-80 (2018); Peter Stubbe, State Accountability
for Space Debris, 12 STUD. SPACE L. 534 (2017); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
Active Debris Removal-An Essential Mechanism for Ensuring the Safety and Sustainability
of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2012/CRP.16 (2012); INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS
COORDINATION COMMITTEE, IADC SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES (2007)
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdfspacelaw/sd/IADC-2002-01-IADC-Space Debris-
Guidelines -Revisionl.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACP5-Y9QJ] [hereafter IADC Guidelines]; U.N.
OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE (2010),
http://www.unoosa.org/pdfpublications/st space_49E.pdf [https://perma.cc/ULR9-Z2U9];
Frans G. von der Dunk, Defining Subject Matter under Space Law: Near Earth Objects Versus
Space Objects, 51 PROC. INT'L INST. SPACE L. 293 (2008); J.-C. Liou,NAT'L AERONAUTICS &
SPACE ADMIN., U.S. SPACE DEBRIS ENVIRONMENT, OPERATIONS, AND RESEARCH UPDATES
(2018), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/stsc/2018/tech-I 4E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4DNY-SVH2].
to See generally, NAT'L ACAD. OF SC., COMM. To REVEw NEAR-EARTH-OBJECT SURVEYS
AND HAZARD MITIGATION STRATEGIES, DEFENDING PLANET EARTH: NEAR-EARTH-OBJECT
SURVEYS AND HAZARD MITIGATION STRATEGIES 51 (2010) [hereinafter NAS SURVEYS AND
STRATEGIES]; NASA FAQ, supra note 1; Steve Eckersley, D7.5.1: Trade Offs of Viable
Alternative Mitigation Concepts (Sept. 12, 2012), in NEOSHIELD, A GLOBAL APPROACH TO
NEAR-EARTH OBJECT IMPACT THREAT MITIGATION (Steve Eckersley ed., 2013) 1, 16
http://www.neoshield.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/NEOShield D7.5 Trade-Offs-of-
Viable-Alternative-Mitigation-Concepts.pdf_[hereinafter NEOSHIELD]; INTERAGENCY
WORKING GROUP FOR DETECTING AND MITIGATfNG THE IMPACT OF EARTH-BOUND NEAR-EARTH
OBJECTS (NEOs)(DAMIEN), U.S. NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, NATIONAL NEAR-EARTH
OBJECT PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY 9 (2016) [hereinafter DAMIEN STRATEGY] (observing that
the population of asteroids is diverse, that the effects of an impact with Earth are not well
understood, and that efforts to track and catalogue asteroids are relatively new); STRATEGY AND
ACTION PLAN, supra note 5.
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others are larger than 500 km, but most are much smaller." Until
more is known about the mass, composition, and other variables,
size is frequently cited as the leading shorthand indicator of the
degree of harm an asteroid would inflict in a collision with
Earth. 12
* Location and flight path: The orbits of most asteroids never
intersect that of the Earth, but as elaborated infra, there are many
for which the paths do eventually cross. Calculating with
accuracy the far-future trajectory of an asteroid is extremely
complex; often only a rough estimate is possible and substantial
uncertainty will long persist.' 3
i Asteroids, NASA Sci., https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/asteroids 
-comets-and-
meteors/asteroids/in-depth/ [https://perma.cc/3LZA-79C6] (last updated Mar. 12, 2019); Ceres,
NASA Sc., https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/planets/dwarf-planets/ceres/in-depth/
[https://perma.cc/77XR-FSVP] (last updated Dec. 10, 2018); 4 Vesta, NASA Sci.,
https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/asteroids-comets-and-meteors/asteroids/4-vesta/in-depth/
[https://perma.cc/UZ37-AVG9] (last updated Dec. 8, 2017); Edward F. Tedesco, Pallas,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pallas (last visited Apr. 15,
2019) [https://perma.cc/J9BT-M6FW]. The two largest near-Earth asteroids are Ganymed (32
km in diameter) and Eros (11 km). DEFINITION TEAM, supra note 6, at 9; Rob Landis & Lindley
Johnson, Advances in Planetary Defense in the United States, 156 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 394,
305 n.5 (2019).
12 See Duncan I. Steel et al., Are Impacts Correlated in Time?, in HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS
AND ASTEROIDS 463, 473 (Tom Gehrels ed., 1994) (suggesting that a collision with a cluster of
somewhat smaller asteroids might inflict more damage and might be more common than an
impact with a single larger body).
13 See Richard P. Binzel, The Torino Impact Hazard Scale, 48 PLANETARY & SPACE Sci. 297,
297 (2000) (observing inherent uncertainties in estimating a distant NEO's trajectory, leading
to representations of an "error ellipse" to describe where it might impact Earth); RUSSELL L.
SCHWEICKART ET AL., Ass'N OF SPACE EXPLORERS, ASTEROID THREATS: A CALL FOR GLOBAL
RESPONSE 12, 15 (Jessica Tok ed., 2008) [hereinafter GLOBAL RESPONSE]; INT'L ACAD. OF
ASTRONAUTICS, DEALING WITH THE THREAT TO EARTH FROM ASTEROIDS AND COMETS, 47-49
(Ivan Bekey ed., 2009),
https://iaaweb.org/iaa/Scientific%/`20Activity/Study%/20Groups/SG%/`20Commission%/` 2 O3 /sg 3
5/sg35finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TH9-Y28Q] (identifying categories of NEOs for
which there might be decades, years, or months of warning time); Sentry: Earth Impact
Monitoring, CTR. FOR NEAR EARTH OBJECT STUDIES,
https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/sentry/intro.html [https://perma.cc/ZZ4W-GTSY] ("[A]n object's
orbit is never known perfectly."); David Farnocchia et. al., Orbits, Long-Term Predictions, and
Impact Monitoring, in ASTEROIDS IV 815 (Patrick Michel et al. eds., 2015); Steve Chesley &
Paul Chodas, Impact Risk Estimation and Assessment Scales, in HANDBOOK OF COSMIC
HAZARDS AND PLANETARY DEFENSE 651 (Joseph N. Pelton & Firooz Allahdadi eds., 2015);
Seth D. Baum, Uncertain Human Consequences in Asteroid Risk Analysis and the Global
Catastrophe Threshold, 94 NAT. HAZARDS 759,771 (2018).
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* Composition: Most asteroids fall within three main categories: C-
type (carbon rich, the most common), M-type (metallic, the least
common), and S-type (silicate or stony). In general, the metallic
strain would be the most dense, making them harder to displace,
more likely to penetrate the atmosphere, and more powerful on
impact. 14
* Structure: An asteroid might be a single, solid object; it might
consist of two or more bodies orbiting each other; or it might be
essentially a pile of rubble loosely bound together.' 5 An asteroid
might be roughly spherical, but most are quite irregular in shape.' 6
* Flight characteristics: All asteroids rotate in flight, but they do so
at different rates, and some might be tumbling erratically as they
fly through space.'"
* Reflectivity: Some asteroids have a light-colored or reflective
surface, making them easier to discern and track from afar.'"
* Speed: Asteroids in near-Earth space typically travel at 20 km per
second, although depending upon the angle of impact, the relative
speed of a collision can be twice that rate.19
There are millions of asteroids, but the exact total number is unknown,
even if we concentrate mainly on the inner Solar System, the region between
the Sun and Jupiter. A 2017 NASA survey estimated that there were
14,915,756 NEOs larger than 10 meters in diameter, of which 2,983,151 had
trajectories and other characteristics that classified them as potentially
hazardous to Earth. There were an estimated 10,313 objects between 100
14 Asteroids, NASA Sci., supra note 11; DAMIEN STRATEGY, supra note 10, at 4 (observing
that, in general, rocky asteroids are more likely to explode in the atmosphere, causing damage
over a wide radius, while metallic types would be more likely to impact the ground, causing
more severe but localized harm).
15 Charles Q. Choi, Asteroids: Fun Facts and Information About Asteroids, SPACE (Sept. 30,
2017), https://www.space.com/51 -asteroids-formation-discovery-and-exploration.html
[https://perma.cc/8TDA-SU3B]; Jean-Luc Margot et. al., Asteroid Systems: Binaries, Triples,
and Pairs, in ASTEROIDS IV 355 (Patrick Michel et al. eds., 2015).
16 Choi, supra note 15. For convenience, the key measurement of the size of an asteroid is
sometimes spoken of as its "diameter," but since most asteroids are irregularly shaped, rather
than round, the size given is roughly an average or representative distance across the object.
See STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN, supra note 5, at 2 n.2.
17 Choi, supra note 15.
18NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 15, 52, 128.
19NASA FAQ, supra note 1.
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meters and 126 meters (2,063 of them potentially hazardous), and 403
between 1 km and 1.26 km (81 potentially hazardous).20
The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 required the agency to implement
a program to "detect, track, catalogue, and characterize the physical
characteristics of near-Earth objects equal to or greater than 140 meters in
diameter" and to create a roster containing 90 percent of such objects by
2020.21 The program has succeeded in identifying hundreds of previously-
unknown asteroids each year, including virtually all of the biggest ones, but is
currently not expected to reach the statutory goal-meaning that there is still
a substantial number of unaccounted-for NEOs, some of them large enough to
be of grave concern.22
As of January 1, 2018, NASA's bookkeeping reported having discovered,
identified and tracked some 17,460 near-Earth asteroids (plus 107 comets),
1,877 of which were predicted to come within 7.5 million km of Earth's orbit.
Just under half of these objects were gauged to be greater than 140 meters in
diameter and nearly 1,000 were greater than 1 km. Some 2,053 asteroids were
discovered in 2017 and the bulk of the total inventory had been discovered
since 2010, with fewer than 1,000 predating 2000.23 By some estimates, the
task of surveying the entire population of near-Earth asteroids may now be
90% complete for objects larger than 1 km; 50% complete for objects in the
140 meter range; and less than 10% complete for objects smaller than 100
meters in diameter. On average, 40 new NEOs are discovered each week. 24
20 DEFINITION TEAM, supra note 6, at 27; see generally NASA FAQ, supra note 1.
21 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
155, 119 Stat. 2895, 2922 (2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16691 (2010)). See
generally, James C. Howe, US Space Policy and Planetary Defense, SPACE REV. (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2612/1 [https://perma.cc/RX2W-H2DH] (reporting the
evolving history of U.S. planetary defense activities); Landis & Johnson, supra note 11, at 397.
22 See STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN, supra note 5, at 4; NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra
note 10, at 1-2, 29-50; AUDIT REPORT, supra note 5, at ii, 2-3.
23 See LINDLEY JOHNSON, INT'L ASTEROID WARNING NETWORK (IAWN) STATUS REPORT TO
STSC 2018, 5-6, (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/stsc/2018/tech-
15E.pdf; NASA FAQ, supra note 1.
24 LINDLEY JOHNSON, INT'L ASTEROID WARNING NETWORK (lAWN) STATUS REPORT TO STSC
2016, 7 (Feb. 16, 2016),
https://www.cosmos.esa.int/documents/336356/932894/IAWN+Report+STSC+2016.pdfbcla
8020-fe59-4c8c-8431-9085d533373a [https://perma.cc/WR2D-XRAD];_Twenty Years of
Tracking Near-Earth Objects, JET PROPULSION LAB. (July 23, 2018),
https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/news.php?feature==7194 [https://perma.cc/K7KR-ME5V]. See
also Asteroid Hazards: The View from Space, MINOR PLANET CTR.,
https://minorplanetcenter.net/asteroid-hazard videos [https://perma.cc/GZ68 -357B], for video
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NASA maintains an ongoing roster of NEOs, punctiliously tracking and
publicizing close approaches. 25  Near misses (at least on the scale of
astronomical events) are common. Asteroid 2005 YU 55, for example, with
a diameter of 350 meters, passed closer to Earth than the Moon in November
201 1.26 Even more dramatic, an asteroid now named Apophis, approximately
370 meters in diameter, and discovered only in 2004, is projected to come
within 31,000 km of Earth (i.e., closer than geosynchronous satellites) on
April 13, 2029. In fact, until refined measurements were taken in 2013, it
appeared that Apophis's 2029 fly-by might fit into a small "keyhole," in which
the Earth's gravity would alter the asteroid's future orbit sufficiently to create
a collision in 2036-but it is now projected to miss by a wide margin. It is
also noteworthy that because of its proximity to the Sun, Apophis could not
be observed from Earth for several years.2 7 At the moment, the highest risk
of Earth impact by a major known asteroid is from a 160-meter object
designated as 2009 FD, which has a 1 -in-714 chance of striking the planet in
2185.28
Even more startling is the frequency of surprise in this enterprise, when
astronomers discover a new celestial body only when it is quite proximate to
Earth or even when it has just whizzed past-sometimes disconcertingly
closely. Detection is especially challenging if the asteroid is relatively small
and dark, if it comes toward Earth from the general direction of the Sun (which
can obscure observations), or if it is following a trajectory that is tilted off the
plane of most of the Solar System. For example, on October 19, 2017, a
presentations about the abundance and dangers of asteroids.
25 See NEO Earth Close Approaches, CTR. FOR NEAR EARTH OBJECT STUDIES,
https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/ca/ [https://perma.cc/V3E6-VMXT]. See also Close Approaches,
INT'L ASTEROID WARNING NETWORK, http://iawn.net/close -approaches.shtml
[https://perma.cc/ZAT3-S97Q] (last updated Oct. 29, 2016).
26 U.N. Open Forum on Near-Earth Objects, Space Mission Planning Advisory Group Report
to STSC 2016, 7 (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdfcopuos/stsc/2016/tech-05E.pdf. This asteroid had been
discovered in 2005.
27 NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 58.
28 NASA FAQ, supra note 1; Did You Know..., NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN,
https://www.nasa.gov/planetarydefense/did-you-know [https://perma.cc/T2QN-HUHS].
Bennu, almost 500 meters in diameter, flies relatively close to Earth every six years and has a
1-in-2700 probability of impact between 2175 and 2189. NASA FAQ, supra note 1. See also
Planetary Defense: The Bennu Experiment, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (Dec. 6,
2018), https://www.nasa.gov/feature/planetary-defense-the-bennu-experiment
[https://perma.cc/5TTG-UBDW].
23 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. (2019)
survey telescope in Hawaii discovered Oumuamua, the first known interstellar
asteroidal object (i.e., one that originated outside our Solar System). The 230-
meter long body was detected five days after it had already flown past Earth,
with a closest approach of 24 million km.2 9 Likewise, the small (4 meter)
asteroid 2008 TC3 was detected only 19 hours before it crashed to Earth in
October 2008, leaving recoverable fragments in the Nubian Desert in northern
Sudan.30
Even when an asteroid is detected, the ability to track it over a sustained
period of time-in order to predict its future trajectory with confidence-may
be erratic. Furthermore, it can be very difficult to discern with accuracy at a
long distance the object's size, composition, and other key characteristics that
would inform and enable an effective planetary defense operation.
B. Impact Damage to Earth
Millions of asteroids and smaller space particles collide with Earth every
day, sometimes in celebrated meteor showers. Almost all of this material
burns up in the atmosphere and the detritus drifts down to the surface without
notice as dust. In fact, the planet grows by an incredible 100 tons per day in
accreted space particles.3 ' Sometimes, an asteroid is sufficiently large and
dense that part of it survives the passage through the atmosphere and crashes
to the surface. Most of the time, of course, it falls into the oceans, but
frequently shards of meteorite are retrieved on land. Very rarely, the incoming
object causes identifiable damage on Earth. No human being is ever known
to have been struck by a celestial fragment,3 2 but there have been numerous
29 Phil Davis, Ten Things: Mysterious 'Oumuamua, NASA Sci. (July 2, 2018),
https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/news/482/ 10-things -mysterious -oumuamua/
[https://perma.cc/TS26-65PL]; Small Asteroid or Comet "Visits" from Beyond the Solar
System, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN, https://www.nasa.gov/feature/jpl/small-
asteroid-or-comet-visits -from-beyond-the-solar-system [https://perma.cc/VF2T-2M8G]; Solar
System's First Interstellar Visitor Dazzles Scientists, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
(Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.nasa.gov/feature/solar-system-s -first-interstellar-visitor-dazzles -
scientists [https://perma.cc/BFV7-ETQM].
30 YEOMANS, supra note 8, at 125-27; NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 14,
49. See also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 9, at 239, n. 73 (noting other examples of asteroids
detected only just before, or after, they had passed Earth).
31 NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 12 (estimating accretion of 50-150 tons
daily); NASA FAQ, supra note 1. Some experts believe that the frequency of large asteroid
impacts on Earth has increased dramatically in the past 300 million years, compared to the early
days of the universe. See Sara Mazrouei, et. al., Earth and Moon Impact Flux Increased at the
End of the Paleozoic, 363 SCIENCE 253 (Jan. 18, 2019).
32 Michael B. Gerrard & Anna W. Barber, Asteroids and Comets: U.S. and International Law
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dramatic instances of asteroid impacts, some of which are noted below in
roughly increasing scale of the harm inflicted.
1. Chelyabinsk, Russia, 2013. On February 13, 2013, an asteroid
approximately 20 meters in diameter entered the atmosphere at about 19
km/sec over Chelyabinsk, a city in southern Siberia. Approaching at a shallow
angle from the horizon (rather than plummeting vertically downward), it
exploded at approximately 30 km altitude, with a force now estimated as
equivalent to 400-500 kilotons of TNT (i.e., approximately 30 times the power
of the 1945 Hiroshima nuclear detonation). The blast inflicted $30 million in
damage to 7,200 buildings over six cities in the region, and 1,500 people were
injured (mostly by flying shards of glass from shattered windows).
Remarkably, the asteroid had been completely undetected prior to its arrival,
because its origin radiant had been close to the Sun.33
2. Tunguska, Russia, 1908. A century earlier, by coincidence also in
Siberia, a larger asteroid (variously estimated at 30-100 meters) exploded in a
similar airburst fashion about 5-10 km above the Earth's surface. There were
few eye witnesses in that sparsely populated region and no contemporaneous
investigations, but it appears that 80 million trees were flattened over 2,000
square kilometers. The explosive force has been estimated as equivalent to
10-50 megatons (roughly 1,000 times the Hiroshima blast).3 4
and the Lowest-Probability, Highest Consequence Risk, 6 N.Y.U ENV'T L. J. 4 (1997); NAS
SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 26. But see EvanR. Seamone, Note, When Wishing
on a Star Just Won't Do: The Legal Basis for International Cooperation in the Mitigation of
Asteroid Impacts and Similar Transboundary Disasters, 87 IOWAL. REV. 1091, 1102-03 (2002)
(collecting reports of human casualties caused by space objects).
33 Natalia A. Artemieva & Valery V. Shuvalov, From Tunguska to Chelyabinsk via Jupiter, 44
ANN. REV. EARTH & PLANETARY Sci. 37 (2016); Don Yeomans and Paul Chodas, Center for
Near Earth Object Studies, Additional Details on the Large Fireball Event over Russia on Feb.
15, 2013, CTR. FOR NEAR EARTH OBJECT STUD. (Mar. 1, 2013),
https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/news/fireball130301.html_[https://perma.cc/76LE-R276]; Olga P.
Popova et. al., Chelyabinsk Airburst, Damage Assessment, Meteorite Recovery, and
Characterization, 342 SCIENCE 1069 (2013),
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/342/6162/1069.full [https://perma.cc/78T6-579P];
WILLIAM E. BURROWS, THE ASTEROID THREAT: DEFENDING OUR PLANET FROM DEADLY NEAR-
EARTHOBJECTS 13-31 (2014).
34 Artemieva & Shuvalov, supra note 33; Melissa Hogenboom, In Siberia in 1908, A Huge
Explosion Came Out of Nowhere, BBC NEWS (July 7, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20160706-in-siberia-in-1908-a-huge-explosion-came-out-of-
nowhere [https://perma.cc/CW3F-7CJV]; Luca Gasperini et al., The Tunguska Mystery--100
Years Later, Sci. AM. (June 30, 2008), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-
tunguska-mystery-100-years-later/_[https://perma.cc/WM74-2E2E]. See also Arnaud Mignan
23 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. (2019)
3. Barringer Meteor Crater, Arizona. Approximately 50,000 years ago,
a 40-50-meter nickel-iron asteroid plunged into what is now north-central
Arizona at 13 km/sec. It immediately excavated a crater that, despite erosion,
still measures 1.2 km in diameter and 170 meters in depth. The impact energy
has been estimated at 10 megatons, sufficient to devastate the Ice Age ecology
and the nearby mammals.35
4. Chicxulub Crater, Mexico. Most infamously, a collision with a 10-15
km asteroid 66 million years ago is thought to have gouged the enormous
crater (150 km in diameter and 20 km deep) at the tip of what is now the
Yucatan Peninsula. The global sequelae included sustained environmental
changes widely deemed responsible for the sudden extinction of up to 70% of
the Earth's plant and animal species, including most dinosaurs.3 6
An asteroid's destructive mechanisms. A major asteroid impact would
trigger a variety of kill mechanisms on Earth, depending on its size, mass,
speed, angle, and other characteristics. The location of the strike would
obviously be another important factor-if the Tunguska airburst event, for
example, had occurred over a major city instead of over unpopulated
hinterlands, the results would have been catastrophic. Because only a small
fraction of the Earth's surface is densely populated, the statistical odds
disfavor that particular scenario. However, many population centers are
located on ocean coastlines, rendering them vulnerable to a massive sea surge
et al., Risk Assessment of Tunguska-Type Airbursts, 56 NAT. HAZARDS 869, 869 (2011)
(calculating that if the Tunguska event had occurred over modern New York City, it would
have caused 3.9 million fatalities and $1.5 trillion in property losses).
35 METEOR CRATER, http://meteorcrater.com/ (last visited March 25, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/NXN9-M2DA]; James Tobin, Meteor Crater Arizona, METEORITE
EXCHANGE, https://www.meteorite.com/meteor-crater/ (last visited March 25, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/G9AL-LZJZ]; NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 13;
BARRINGER CRATER Co., https://www.barringercrater.com/the-crater/ (last visited March 25,
2019) [https://perma.cc/G5LY-9W7N]; John S. Lewis, RAIN OF IRON AND ICE: THE VERY REAL
THREAT OF COMET AND ASTEROID BOMBARDMENT 30-36 (1996).
36 About the Chicxulub Crater, CHICXULUB CRATER, http://www.chicxulubcrater.org/_(last
visited March 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/88PP-CARR]; EDWARD BRYANT, TSUNAMI: THE
UNDERRATED HAZARD 169, 178-80 (3d ed. 2008); Roff Smith, Here's Wat Happened the Day
the Dinosaurs Died, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (June 11, 2016),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/06/what-happened-day-dinosaurs-died-chicxulub-
drilling-asteroid-science/ [https://perma.cc/W2KB-V8N7]; Maddie Stone, What Killed the
Dinosaurs Was More Devastating Than an Asteroid, GIZMODO (Oct. 1, 2015),
https://gizmodo.com/what-killed-the-dinosaurs -was -more-devastating-than-an- 1733831989
[https://perma.cc/95CQ-Z57R].
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should an asteroid impact the ocean.
If a large asteroid did hit Earth on land, the collision would first
traumatically carve a giant crater, ejecting an enormous quantity of rock, soil,
and other materials. The larger pieces would crash down relatively nearby,
but the smaller debris would ascend into the atmosphere and be carried aloft
for great distances and durations. A powerful shock wave would incite
massive winds, flattening buildings and trees. The abundance of superheated
rock and metal ejected from the crater would ignite firestorms, both near the
impact site and at some distance away. The colossal shock wave could trigger
massive earthquakes and volcanoes worldwide, and tsunamis would
propagate-if the Chicxulub event had occurred in deep water, the resulting
megawave could have been 4.6 km tall. Perhaps most damaging, the dust,
ash, and soot that percolated into the atmosphere could remain suspended for
years, obscuring sunlight, cooling the planet, and choking off photosynthesis;
after only a couple of aborted growing seasons, global famine would ensue.37
Notably, in these circumstances, any response that would break the
incoming asteroid into pieces could both alleviate and exacerbate the
destruction the asteroid would cause. If a planetary defense intervention, such
as a nuclear detonation, succeeded in blowing the NEO apart, some of the
fragments would probably be thrown into askew trajectories, and they would
miss Earth altogether; the fragmentation would also expose more of the
asteroid's surface area to the atmosphere, increasing the fraction that would
37 YEOMANS, supra note 8, at 110-14; RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE
3, 24-27 (2004); NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 20-21; Smith, supra note
36; Bryant, supra note 36, at 172-80 (calculating that if the Chicxulub asteroid had fallen into
deep water, it could have generated a tsunami 4.6 km high; in reality, it was probably 200 meters
tall); CARL SAGAN, PALE BLUE DOT: A VISION OF THE HUMAN FUTURE IN SPACE 311-12 (1994);
John C. Kunich, Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival, 41 A.F.L. REV. 119, 123-
25 (1997) (describing diverse catastrophic effects of large asteroid impacts); Clemens M.
Rumpf et al., Asteroid Impact Effects and Their Immediate Hazards for Human Populations,
44 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 3433 (2017); Clark R. Chapman and David Morrison, Impacts
on the Earth by Asteroids and Comets: Assessing the Hazard, 367 NATURE 33 (1994); DEALING
WITH THE THREAT TO EARTH FROM ASTEROIDS AND COMETS, supra note 13, at 24-32; J. Lewis,
supra note 35 at 176-82 (listing reports of property damage, injuries and deaths due to meteorite
falls); Vitaly V. Adushkin & Ivan V. Nemchinov, Consequences of Impacts of Cosmic Bodies
on the Surface of the Earth, in HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS 721 (Tom Gehrels
ed., 1994); Mark Boslough, Airburst Modeling, in HANDBOOK OF COSMIC HAZARDS AND
PLANETARY DEFENSE 665 (Joseph N. Pelton and Firooz Allahdadi eds., 2015); Souheil M.
Ezzedine & Paul L. Miller, Water Impact Modeling, in HANDBOOK OF COSMIC HAZARDS AND
PLANETARY DEFENSE 693 (Joseph N. Pelton and Firooz Allahdadi eds., 2015); Baum, supra
note 13, at 761.
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burn before impact. However, the larger effect of the explosion would likely
be adverse-it would create multiple simultaneous strikes over an even larger
area, resulting in greater total devastation than a single, larger blow.38
C. Assessing the Probabilities
The following NASA charts summarize many of the key variables
affecting planetary defense strategy.39
38 NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 84; POSNER, supra note 37, at 28; Mark
Strauss, Helpful Tips for Nuking an Asteroid, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 3, 2015),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/08/150803-space-nasa-asteroids-comets-nuclear-
weapons-defense/ [https://perma.cc/6XSF-WJ7W]; Bong Wie, Hypervelocity Nuclear
Interceptors for Asteroid Disruption, 90 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 146 (2012); SAGAN, supra note
37, at 317; Clay Dillow, How It Would Work: Destroying an Incoming Killer Asteroid with a
Nuclear Blast, POPULAR Sci., Apr. 9, 2012, https://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2012-
04/how-it-would-work-destroying-incoming-killer-asteroid-nuclear-blast
[https://perma.cc/566U-SNJF]; BONG WIE ET. AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT OF ANIAC PHASE
2 STUDY: AN INNOVATIVE SOLUTION TO NASA's NEO IMPACT THREAT MITIGATION GRAND
CHALLENGE AND FLIGHT VALIDATION MISSION ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 108-10 (2014),
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/BongWi FinalReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F77J-ZS9K]; DEALING WITH THE THREAT TO EARTH FROM ASTEROIDS AND
COMETS, supra note 13, at 53-54. Notably, as an additional danger, if the fragmentation of the
asteroid was the result of a nuclear explosion, then the dispersed pieces would carry hazardous
radioactivity over a large area. But see Nahum Melamed & Andre Brochier, Planetary Defense
Far and Near: NASA GNC Webcast, AEROSPACE CORP. (June 20, 2018), https://mediaex-
server.larc.nasa.gov/Academy/Play/96d8662a3 1 a0427cbb5fb96d324c5bd1 1 d (proposing a
short-range kinetic intercept, to fracture an incoming asteroid that is discovered only very close
to Earth, in order to disperse its effects); Peter Garretson, Now We Can Start to Defend Planet
Earth, OVER THE HORIZON J. (July 27, 2018), https://othjournal.com/2018/07/27/now-we-can-
start-to-defend-planet-earth/_[https://perma.cc/88X8-4ZN9].
39 Chart 1 is from AUDIT REPORT, supra note 5, at 2; Chart 2 is from STRATEGY AND ACTION
PLAN, supra note 5, at 2.
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Table 1. Approximate Impact Frequencies and Consequences from
Near-Earth Objects
Diameter of Object Impact Energy Average Impact
'ivpe oflErent (nieters) (rneyatonsy ner t(yas
HiF h altitude break-up <30 <5 1 50
Tunukaikevent >30 >5 250 500
Re Ional e(ent 140 -0150 .
sub-lobal event >300 -2000 25,00
Low lobal effect >600 30,00 70000
Medium goba efft > 1 >100,0 1 million
High loba effect :> 5V000 > 10 million 6 million
Extinction-class event >110,000 M o00 ilion 100 million
A mcgaton is a unit fmasurement describing the amount ofe released from an exphion. One mcgaton
equals the am n ofene reeasd from one million ts of TNT.
Surce: NASA.
The first graphic indicates, for example, that events roughly comparable
to the Chelyabinsk asteroid might occur once every 50 years, while the bigger
Tunguska-like strike might be a once-in-250- or 500-year phenomenon. A
regional event, which could endanger tens ofthousands of square miles, would
be expected every 5,000 years. At the high end of the spectrum, an extinction
class occurrence, such as Chicxulub, would be anticipated on average, every
100 million years.40
The second chart depicts NASA's progress in identifying NEO threats. It
suggests that nearly all of the largest asteroids (more than 1 km in diameter)
have been detected, but that the survey is barely 50% complete for objects in
the range of 150 meters, and that in accounting for smaller-but still
potentially quite important-asteroids, a great deal more remains to be done.
40 See also Igor Ashurbeyli Protecting Planet Earth from Military and Non-Military Space
Threats, in McGILL MONOGRAPH SERIES V: CONFLICTS IN SPACE AND THE RULE OF LAw 3, 7
(Maria Manoli and Sandy Belle Habchi, eds., 2018) (estimating that in the past 600 million
years, Earth has been struck about 60 times by asteroids 5 km or larger; collisions with asteroids
up to a kilometer in size occur every 10 or 100 thousand years; objects up to hundreds of meters
in diameter strike at intervals between tens and thousands of years; and during the past 100
years, four celestial bodies of between 40 and 60 meters have hit); SAGAN, supra note 37, at
314 (calculating that there is about a one-in-two-thousand chance that a catastrophic asteroid
collision will occur within the lifetime of a baby born today; Michael R. Rampino & Bruce
Haggerty, Extraterrestrial Impacts and Mass Extinctions ofLife, in HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS
& ASTEROIDS 827 (Tom Gehrels ed., 1994) (observing that there have been multiple
catastrophic extinction-level impacts by asteroids).
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In response to these dangers, the two leading international planetary
defense bodies, the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG) and
the International Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN) have begun to develop
a series of threshold criteria for responding to possible NEO strikes. In
simplified form, these standards identify three levels of action:
* If an impact with an object greater than 10 meters in size is more than
1% probable, a global warning will issue.
* If the incoming object is greater than 20 meters in size and the
probability of impact is greater than 10% within 20 years, terrestrial
preparedness planning should begin.
* If the object is greater than 50 meters in size and the probability of
collision is greater than 1% within 50 years, planning should begin
for an eventual space mission to intercept the asteroid.4 '
41 INT'L ASTEROID WARNINGNETWORK, SMPAG ACTION ITEM 5.1: RECOMMENDED CRITERIA&
THRESHOLDS FOR ACTION FOR POTENTIAL NEO IMPACT THREAT (2017),
https://www.cosmos.esa.int/documents/336356/1503750/SMPAG 5.1_Report NASA.pdf/f3
99e4eb-5947-867c-2422-b9dcb7e3649c; Romana Kofler et al., International Coordination on
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With today's limited technologies, if an incoming asteroid is smaller than
approximately 100-140 meters in diameter, the primary response would likely
have to be solely terrestrial. The logical protocol could include mass
evacuation of the to-be-afflicted area (or region), sheltering of the population,
preparation of first responders and other civil authorities, and assembly of
relief and response supplies-comparable, in some respects to the actions
undertaken in anticipation of a very large hurricane.42 If the threat is much
larger than that, however, earthbound responses alone would not suffice, and
a space mission would be undertaken, as discussed in the next Part.
II. RESPONSE TO DATE
A growing cadre of national space agencies, university observatories,
non-governmental associations, hobbyists, and others have immersed
themselves in the tasks of detecting, observing, tracking, and characterizing
NEO dangers-and now, in beginning to develop plausible response
strategies. While NASA and its U.S. associates have bankrolled the lion's
share of the effort to date-now up to $50 million per year-important
contributions have come from many foreign azimuths too.43
Planetary Defense: The Work of the IAWN and the SMPAG, 156 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 409
(2019). See also Jet Propulsion Laboratory Center for Near Earth Object Studies, Torino
Impact Hazard Scale, https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/sentry/torino-scale.html
[https://perma.cc/Z2GN-SDVA] (describing the Torino Scale, adopted by the International
Astronomical Union in 1999 as a method for assessing the danger of an asteroid, depending
upon its size and location); David Morrison et al., Impacts and the Public: Communicating the
Nature ofthe Impact Hazard, in MITIGATION OF HAZARDOUS COMETS AND ASTEROIDS (Michael
J.S. Beltonet al. eds., 2004); see also Palermo Technical Impact Hazard Scale, JET PROPULSION
LABORATORY CENTER FOR NEAR EARTH OBJECT STUDIES
https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/sentry/palermoscale.html [https://perma.cc/2W2P-78T8]
(describing another system for classifying the risk posed by an asteroid).
42 NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 66-70. See generally, I. Waddington et
al., J- Value Assessment of Remediation Measures Following the Chernobyl and Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accidents, 112 PROCESS SAFETY &ENVTL. PROJECTION 50 (2017)
(doubting the efficacy of evacuation as a response to a mass disaster).
43 DAMIEN STRATEGY, supra note 10, at 4 (presenting U.S.' current leadership in dealing with
asteroid dangers and identifying the need for further international cooperation); STRATEGY AND
ACTION PLAN, supra note 5, at 7, 13-14 (describing NASA as the global leader, but seeking
enhanced international cooperation); Landis & Johnson, supra note 11, at 394 (asserting that
since 1998, "NASA-funded efforts have discovered more than 98% of the 16,000 NEOs
currently known"); SECURE WORLD FOUND., NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS: RESPONDING TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE 8, 12 (2014), https://swfound.org/media/170684/swf neos-
responding to the international challenge 2014.pdf (describing contributions from
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Two institutional frameworks-SMPAG and IAWN-have arisen to
focus and coordinate these international NEO efforts. Each was inaugurated
in 2014 after endorsement by the UN General Assembly and specifically by
the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,44 but both are essentially creatures of the states
and other organizations that founded them. They report annually to the
Subcommittee, but retain their autonomy.
The mandate of IAWN includes to discover, monitor, and characterize the
NEO population; to provide a recognized international clearinghouse for
processing information from diverse sources; to coordinate campaigns for
close observation of space objects identified as potentially hazardous; to
establish criteria and thresholds for warning and action; and to develop an
agreed data base of potential impact consequences. Thirteen space institutions
from the United States, Europe, Russia, China, and elsewhere are official
participants, and they collected nearly 22 million observations of asteroids and
comets in 2017.45
numerous countries and entities); Adam Mann, B612 Plans Asteroid Hunt with Fleet of Small
Satellites, 360 SCIENCE 842 (2018) (describing the efforts of the private organization B612 to
improve the discovery and tracking of asteroids). As of 2010, NASA was spending
approximately $4 million per year on efforts to detect NEOS and approximately $1 million
annually on developing mitigation techniques. NAS Surveys and Strategies, supra note 10, at
1, 30-34. The NASA budget allocation for planetary defense has risen sharply, to $50 million
in 2018, much of which is devoted to the DART mission, discussed infra, text accompanying
note 52. See Landis & Johnson, supra 11, at 397; Bryan Bender, NASA's Asteroid Defense
Program Aiming for More Impact, Politico, Sept. 21, 2018 (noting a proposed increase in the
budget of the NASA planetary defense office from $60 million to $150 million).
44 Kofler et al., supra note 41; SECURE WORLD FOUND., supra note 43, at 17-20. The
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has been the primary vehicle for pursuit of
broad international cooperation in the exploration and use of space. It was created by the UN
General Assembly in 1959 and has helped broker the major developments in space law and
policy. See generally Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER
SPACE AFFAIRS
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html_[https://perma.cc/TD6H-EXCR].
See G.A. Res. 68/75, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, ¶ 8 (Dec.
11, 2013) (endorsing IAWN and SMPAG); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status
Report by the International Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN) and the Space Mission
Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG) to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2017/CRP.25 (Feb.
3, 2017).
45 INT'L ASTEROID WARNING NETWORK, STATEMENT OF INTENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ASTEROID WARNING NETWORK (2014),
http://iawn.net/documents/iawn statement of intent.pdf; Membership, INT'L ASTEROID
WARNING NETWORK, http://iawn.net/about/members.shtml [https://perma.cc/5GVK-4QLC];
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The companion institution SMPAG exists to help "prepare for an
international response to a NEO impact threat through the exchange of
information, development of options for collaborative research and mission
opportunities, and NEO threat mitigation planning activities."46 SMPAG has
23 members and observers,47 and is addressing, inter alia, recommendations
for planetary defense techniques, mitigation measures, and mission
scenarios.48 SMPAG has also chartered an ad hoc lawyers' working group to
advise it about the international law implications of potential courses of
action.49
The SMPAG and IAWN participating groups have undertaken a variety
of NEO-related activities, including marshalling an ever-widening array of
observation capabilities, and some national space agencies have initiated or
planned operational space missions of various sorts. For example, JAXA, the
Japanese space agency, is conducting the Hayabusa2 mission to land on
asteroid 162173 Ryugu, survey it for a year and a half, collect samples, and
return them to Earth in 2020.0 The European Space Agency's Gaia satellite
Kofler et al., supra note 41.
46 Terms of Reference for the Near-Earth Object Threat Mitigation, SPACE MISSION PLANNING
ADVISORY GROUP, https://www.cosmos.esa.int/web/smpag/terms-of-reference-vO
[https://perma.cc/PQ5Q-55PE] [hereinafter SMPAG Terms of Reference]; Kofler et al., supra
note 41.
47 Members, EuR. SPACE AGENCY, https://www.cosmos.esa.int/web/smpag/smpagmembers
[https://perma.cc/58EK-3ES4].
48 SMPAG Terms of Reference, supra note 46, ¶ 3; Space Mission Planning Advisory Group,
Work Plan, Doc. No. SMPAG-PL-001/1.3 (October 2017),
https://www.cosmos.esa.int/documents/336356/336472/SMPAG-PL-
001_1_3_WorkplanllOctober 2017.pdfe09d002c-3112-acf6-2422-b05e56d07d3b.
49 Space Mission Planning Advisory Group, Terms ofReference for the Space Mission Planning
Advisory Group's Ad Hoc Working Group on Legal Issues (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.cosmos.esa.int/documents/336356/336472/ToRSMPAGAdhocWorkingGr
oup on Legal-Issues_1_0_2017-10-11.pdf2bb8d5cl-cOlc-dcaO-2b25-1ffcecblc270; Kofler
et al., supra note 41. The author has served as a member of this ad hoc legal working group,
as a part-time consultant to NASA.
50 Asteroid Explorer "Hyabusa2, " JAPAN AEROSPACE EXPLORATION AGENCY,
http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sas/hayabusa2/ [https://perma.cc/PDB6-XSMS] Dennis Normile,
Asteroid Mission Faces "Breathtaking" Touchdown, 363 SCIENCE 16 (2019); Elizabeth
Howell, Hayabusa2: Japan's 2nd Asteroid Sample Mission, SPACE.COM (October 23, 2018),
https://www.space.com/40161-hayabusa2.html [https://perma.cc/Z7FJ-DTS5]; Hayabusa-2:
Asteroid Exploration Mission, SPACEFLIGHT 101,
http://spaceflightl01.com/spacecraft/hayabusa-2/ [https://perma.cc/2XL9-TA9V]. See also
Namrata Goswami, China in Space: Ambitions and Possible Conflict, 11 STRATEGIC STUD. Q.
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maps the Solar System's asteroid population, providing more detailed
modelling of the bodies and surveying swaths of the sky not already studied."
NASA's Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) will be the first
experiment to assess the kinetic impact method (described infra) to
measurably modify the trajectory of a small asteroid (actually a 150 meter
moonlet circling the larger asteroid Didymos) 11 million km from Earth in
2022.52
Nonetheless, despite this impressive and growing array of research and a
surging interest in planetary defense, the actual operational capability to
deflect a large incoming asteroid is still starkly limited. If a massive,
proximate NEO were detected today, the world has shockingly little in situ
capability for mounting any tested and well-established response. There are
theories, concepts and drawing board illustrations, but no one could have
sufficient confidence in the efficacy of any of the proffered schemes. What
follows are thumbnail descriptions of a few of the leading candidates for
arresting a threatening asteroid, each of which may have advantages and
disadvantages in particular circumstances or against selected categories of
targets-but none of which has been validated or even rigorously attempted
and measured. 3
74, 85 (2018) (discussing China's planetary defense activities and interests); Space Mission
Planning Advisory Group, Roadmap of Relevant Research for Planetary Defense, Doc.
SMPAG-RP-001 (Oct. 2017) (compiling a roster of NEO research activities undertaken by
space agencies and others around the world); M. Antonietta Barucci et al., The Flybys of
Asteroids (2867) Steins, (21) Lutetia, and (4179) Toutatis, in ASTEROIDS IV 433, 448 (Patrick
Michel et al. eds., 2015).
51 Challenges Closer to Home: Gaia's Asteroids, EuR. SPACE AGENCY (last updated Feb. 9,
2017), http://sci.esa.int/gaia/58562-challenges-closer-to-home-gaia-s-asteroids/
[https://perma.cc/SD27 -YKH4].
52 Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) Mission, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
https://www.nasa.gov/planetarydefense/dart [https://perma.cc/J2N2-U278] [hereinafter
NASA's DART Interceptor]; Landis & Johnson, supra note 11, at 407; see also, United States
and Russia Sign Agreement to Further Research and Development Collaboration in Nuclear
Energy and Security, ENERGY.GOV (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.energy.gov/articles/united-
states-russia-sign-agreement-further-research-and-development-collaboration-nuclear
[https://perma.cc/WBM2-BRWB] (describing planned bilateral collaboration in several fields,
including "defense from asteroids"); Jeffrey Lewis, Armageddon 2: The Supremely Bad U.S.-
Russian Plan to Nuke Asteroids, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 24, 2013,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/24/armageddon-2/ [https://perma.cc/QZ6T-PMBA]
(critiquing the concept of using nuclear explosions against asteroids).
53 See generally NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 4, 70-79; Asteroid and
Comets Watch, Overview, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
https://www.nasa.gov/missionpages/asteroids/overview/index.html (last updated Aug. 3,
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Kinetic impactor. The simplest concept, and perhaps the most well
developed, would be to launch a spacecraft (the more massive the better) to
intersect the asteroid and ram into it at high velocity. A head-on collision
could slow the asteroid a bit; an engagement from the rear could speed it up.
Either way, the concussion could disrupt the timing of the asteroid's projected
conjunction with Earth's orbit. Whether this sort of perturbation would alter
the NEO's pathway sufficiently to miss our planet altogether would depend
on multiple factors, such as the relative mass, speed, porosity, and trajectory
of the two objects, but it might not take much of a shove to have the desired
effect. A NASA study has assessed that a series of kinetic impactors could
succeed in diverting an asteroid up to 1 km in diameter over a period of
decades. The notion of kinetic interception has been confirmed, albeit to a
very limited extent, by NASA's 2005 Deep Impact spacecraft, which released
a small probe to collide with comet Tempel 1. However, this concept would
be less applicable to an asteroid that consisted of multiple small bodies (e.g.,
a rubble pile bound only loosely by gravity).5 4
2017) (observing that "no government agency, national or international, has been tasked or
accepted the responsibility to stop such an asteroid"); YEOMANS, supra note 8, at 140-48;
NEOSHIELD, supra note 10, at 22; J.P. Sanchez et. al., Multicriteria Comparison Among
Several Mitigation Strategies for Dangerous Near-Earth Objects, 32 J. GUIDANCE CONTROL &
DYNAMICS 121 (2009) (comparing six deflection strategies); STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN,
supra note 5, at 11-12 (establishing a national goal of developing improved technologies for
NEO deflection and disruption); ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 3-4, 19-23;
DEALING WITH THE THREAT TO EARTH FROM ASTEROIDS AND COMETS, supra note 13, at 51-66;
Alan W. Harris et. al., Asteroid Impacts and Modern Civilization: Can We Prevent a
Catastrophe?, in ASTEROIDS IV 835 (Patrick Michel et al. eds., 2015). Some countries' military
forces have demonstrated some capacity for intercepting and shooting down satellites or
incoming missile warheads in near-Earth space, but those operations are quite different from
the problem of dealing with an incoming asteroid. See generally, BRIAN WEEDEN & VICTORIA
SAMSON, GLOBAL COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES: AN OPEN SOURCE ASSESSMENT (2018); TODD
HARRISON ET AL., SPACE THREAT ASSESSMENT 2018: A REPORT OF THE CSIS AEROSPACE
SECURITY PROJECT (2018).
54 See NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 5, at 4, 73-76; Brent W. Barbee et. al.,
Options and Uncertainties in Planetary Defense: Mission Planning and Vehicle Design for
Flexible Response, 143 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 37 (2017); Wie, supra note 38, at 151;
NEOSHIELD, supra note 10, at 23-24, 82; DEALING WITH THE THREAT TO EARTH FROM
ASTEROIDS AND COMETS, supra note 13, at 55, 56; David P.S. Dearborn & Paul L. Miller,
Defending against Asteroids and Comets, in HANDBOOK OF COSMIC HAZARDS AND PLANETARY
DEFENSE 733 (Joseph N. Pelton and Firooz Allahdadi eds., 2015). See also Thomas Drake
Miyano, Moon-BasedPlanetary Defense Campaign, 5 J. SPACE SAFETY ENGINEERING 85 (2018)
(advocating building kinetic interceptors on the Moon, and launching against asteroids from
there, as a less expensive alternative).
23 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. (2019)
Gravity tractor. In this scenario, a relatively large spacecraft would
rendezvous with the NEO, but instead of colliding, would travel alongside it
on a parallel course. The conceit is that the microgravity attraction between
the asteroid and the spacecraft would pull them toward each other; as the
spacecraft continues to power itself incrementally away, the asteroid would
(very minutely) follow. The amount of deflection would be infinitesimal
(depending on the relative mass of the two objects) but over a long period of
time (likely many years or even decades) it could result in a margin of safety
for an Earth fly-by. This concept could succeed even on an asteroid that was
rotating or that comprised multiple objects, but it would require a relatively
massive and long-lived spacecraft."
Propulsion. The mission concept here would be to land softly onto the
asteroid and emplace some sort of engine, which would exert a direct
propulsion, to nudge the asteroid in a desired direction. Alternatively, the
lander could undertake to mine fragments of the asteroid and fling them into
space, with the reverse thrust from that operation moving the asteroid subtly
in the opposite direction. Again, these approaches -part of a group known
collectively as "slow push-pull" methods-would work less efficiently with
an unstructured clump of space material, or with an asteroid that is rapidly
spinning or tumbling in space.56
Ion beam shepherd. Here, a hovering interceptor spacecraft would
continuously shoot a column of high-velocity neutral particles (xenon or
other) at the asteroid. The plasma would strike the asteroid, slowly pushing it
forward. The spacecraft would require another propulsion system, to maintain
its own position relative to the asteroid and shepherd it along, but no docking
with the asteroid would be necessary."
Laser ablation. A planetary defense mission could place a compact high-
* Daniel D. Mazanek et al., Enhanced Gravity Tractor Technique for Planetary Defense (4th
IAA Planetary Defense Conference, IAA-PDC-15-04-11 (Apr. 13-17, 2015),
https://selenianboondocks.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/IAA-PDC-15-04-11_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DWM-H9WU]; Edward T. Lu& Stanley G. Love, Gravitational Tractor for
Towing Asteroids, 438 NATURE 177 (2005); Claudio Bombardelli & Jesus Pelaez, lon Beam
Shepherdfor Asteroid Deflection, 34 J. GUIDANCE CONTROL & DYNAMICS 1270 (2011); NAS
SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 72-73; NEOSHIELD, supra note 10, at 29-32; Karl
Atkinson & Steve Eckersley, D7.5.4: lon Beam Shepherd Deflection Concept (July 7, 2012),
in NEOSHIELD, supra note 10; Sanchez, supra note 53, at 131-34; DEALING WITH THE THREAT
To EARTH FROM ASTEROIDS AND COMETS, supra note 13, at 58-59.
5 6 NAS Surveys and Strategies, supra note 10, at 72; Lu & Love, supra note 55; Sanchez, supra
note 53, at 126-30; Russell L. Schweickart et. al., The Asteroid Tugboat, 289 Sci. AM. 54
(2003).
57 Bombardelli & Pelaez, supra, note 55; NEOSHIELD, supra note 10, at 32.
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energy laser onto a spacecraft and use the laser beam's energy to flash-
vaporize particles on the asteroid's surface. As those particles sublimate off
the object, they impart a reverse thrust, which, repeated many times, could
slowly nudge the asteroid in the opposite direction. Again, this concept would
be most applicable to a relatively coherent, non-spinning NEO."
Albedo change. Here, the concept is to paint the asteroid (or part of it)
with white or light-colored powder or fine chalk, altering its albedo (its light
reflectivity or brightness). The new surfacing material would reflect sunlight
more than the dark sections of the asteroid, which would therefore absorb
more solar energy. As the asteroid spins in flight and re-radiates the energy,
those differences in energy transfers would slightly alter its flight path.59
Explosions. Multiple possible strategies are implicated here, involving
one or more conventional or nuclear explosions near, on, or inside the asteroid,
to take advantage of different types of physical effects. A surface detonation
would tend to thrust the asteroid somewhat in the opposite direction.
Alternatively, the goal might be to fracture the object; for that purpose, a
subsurface explosion would be more effective. To reach the interior of the
asteroid, a drilling operation might be conducted, or a sequence of penetrating
impactors could be launched against the same specific location on the asteroid,
with each boring further to deposit its energy.
A more plausible and deft scenario would call for a nuclear detonation at
some short distance from the asteroid, using the explosion principally as a
source of energy that could gently nudge the asteroid. The radiated x-rays and
neutrons from the explosion would quickly excite volatile molecules on the
object's surface. That heating would cause materials to evaporate or
sublimate and fly off the asteroid; as they do so, they impart an opposite
momentum to the body.
In all these scenarios, nuclear explosions are hundreds of times more
efficient than ordinary high explosives. Fission and fusion reactions impart
5 NEOSHIELD, supra note 10, at 33-34; Steve Eckersley & Alistair Wayman, D7.5.5: Laser
Ablation Deflection Concept (Aug. 6, 2013 report), in NEOSHIELD, supra note 10; Sanchez,
supra note 58, at 130-31; DEALING WITH THE THREAT TO EARTH FROM ASTEROIDS AND COMETS,
supra note 13, at 60; Philip Lubin & Gary B. Hughes, Directed Energy for Planetary Defense,
in HANDBOOK OF COSMIC HAZARDS AND PLANETARY DEFENSE 941 (Joseph N. Pelton & Firooz
Allahdadi eds., 2015).
59 D.C. Hyland et. al., A Permanently-Acting NEA Mitigation Technique via the Yarkovsky
Effect, 48 CosMIC RES. 430 (2010); Rebecca Boyle, NASA's Bold Plan to Save Earthfrom Killer
Asteroids, NBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2017); David Vokrouhlicky et al., The Yarkovsky and YORP
Effects, in ASTEROIDS IV 509 (Patrick Michel et al. eds., 2015).
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enormously more energy per weight than any conventional explosive could
offer, and would likely be the only efficacious method for dealing with a large
object (500 meters in diameter or bigger) within a short time (a few years).60
Again, to emphasize, none of these contrivances (with the partial
exception of an experiment with the kinetic interceptor model) has ever been
attempted in any operational mode; we are dealing, at this early stage, with
raw concepts and untested hypotheses. It is possible that experiments in future
decades can validate or exclude some candidates; for the interim, it may be
worth pursuing multiple approaches. If an emergency arose today, operators
might attempt multiple technologies, tools, and techniques, not knowing
which method would be most efficacious; redundant and fallback concepts
might have to be marshalled.6 '
But it is also clear, even now, that in some scenarios, a nuclear explosive
device would carry unique advantages. Especially if the available time is short
and the NEO is large-meaning that many of the gentler methods might not
be effective-recourse might be had to the favorable weight-to-yield power
6 0 NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 76-79; M. Bruck Syal et al., Nuclear and
Kinetic Approaches to Asteroid Defense: New Numerical Insights (46th Lunar and Planetary
Science Conference, 2015); WIE ET AL., supra note 38; YEOMANS, supra note 8, at 145-48;
NEOSHIELD, supra note 10, at 25-27, 42, 85, 137-38; Sanchez, supra note 53, at 123-26;
DEALING WITH THE THREAT TO EARTH FROM ASTEROIDS AND COMETS, supra note 13, at 63-66;
Robert B. Adams et. al., Near Earth Object (NEO) Mitigation Options Using Exploration
Technologies 14-15, 32-34 (2007 Planetary Defense Conference Paper),
http://space.nss.org/media/2007-Near-Earth-Object-Mitigation-Options-Using-Exploration-
Technologies.pdf_[https://perma.cc/3R5S-6FAB] (finding that a package of nuclear devices
could divert a 100-500 meter asteroid within two years); R. Ryan C. Clement, et al., Impact
Hazard Mitigation: Understanding the Effects of Nuclear Explosive Outputs on Comets and
Asteroids (Sept. 2009), https://amostech.com/TechnicalPapers/2009/Astronomy/Clement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B67U-VV92]; WIE ET AL., supra note 38 (proposing a subsurface nuclear
explosion as the most effective means for dealing with an incoming asteroid if only a short
warning time is available). In the near-vacuum of space, the blast (mechanical shock) effects of
a nuclear explosion, which normally predominate in Earth-borne detonations, are virtually
eliminated; conversely, the radiation effects, which are attenuated by the atmosphere, would be
magnified in space. Nuclear Weapon Effects in Space, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
https://history.nasa.gov/conghand/nuclear.htm [https://perma.cc/T6QL-WBVG]. A nuclear
explosion in space in the vicinity of Earth would generate electromagnetic effects that could
damage or destroy satellites even at a substantial distance. 9 July 1962: 'Starfish Prime, ' Outer
Space, PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY
ORG., https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/9-july-I 962starfish-prime-outer-space
[https://perma.cc/TM32-8KSS] (describing a U.S. nuclear test in low space that damaged
several satellites).
61 NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 86 (emphasizing uncertainties in any
mitigation procedure and the consequent desirability of developing multiple approaches).
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of nuclear energy. However, international law imposes substantial special
impediments to this option, as discussed in the next Part.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
SPACE
Any use of a planetary defense mechanism would pose significant and
diverse legal challenges.6 2 Concerns about environmental protection, 3 tort
62 Note that the concept and mission of planetary defense are quite distinct from those of the
similar-sounding planetary protection. Planetary protection is concerned with the avoidance of
contamination via space missions-either accidentally carrying life forms from Earth to another
celestial body, or the reverse. See Office of Planetary Protection, NAT'L AERONAUTICS &
SPACE ADMIN., https://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/ [https://perma.cc/3UDA-4M95]; Review
and Assessment of Planetary Protection Policy Development Processes, NAT'L ACADEMIES OF
ScI. ENGINEERING & MED. (2018), https://www.nap.edu/read/25172/chapter/1#ii
[https://perma.cc/2PM7-PYMQ]; Jeff Foust, A New Era of Planetary Protection, SPACE REV.
(Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3483/1 [https://perma.cc/52SG-
ZV6D].
63 Numerous aspects of international environmental law are relevant for space missions,
including planetary defense operations. For example, the importance of avoiding the creation
of unnecessary long-lived debris in orbital space has given rise to widely-accepted international
standards. See IADC Guidelines, supra note 9. In addition, the Outer Space Treaty requires
parties to avoid "harmful contamination" of space and celestial bodies. OST, supra note 3, art.
IX. International law also imposes on a state a duty to avoid allowing its territory to be used in
a way that strongly adversely affects others. See Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary
Harm from Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries, Rep. of the Int'l L. Comm'n 146, 53d
Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; President of the Int'l Court
of Justice Ronny Abraham, Address to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly (Oct. 28,
2016), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/press-releases/0/19280.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PT3-7JRA]
(president of ICJ citing cases for the proposition that "the existence of the general obligation of
States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of
other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law
relating to the environment.") More generally, the Precautionary Principle holds that even in
cases of doubt or incomplete information, care should be taken to avoid harmful environmental
effects. See generally U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12,
1992), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl51/aconfl 5126-lannex1.htm
[https://perma.cc/3FTH-36B4]; Evan R. Seamone, The Precautionary Principle as the Law of
Planetary Defense: Achieving the Mandate to Defend the Earth Against Asteroid and Comet
Impacts While There Is Still Time, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing that the
precautionary principle requires governments to take action against threatening asteroids, even
if the degree and timing of the possible harm is uncertain); Paul B. Larsen, Application of the
Precautionary Principle to the Moon, 71 J. AIR L. & CoM.295 (2006); Hope M. Babcock, The
Public Trust Doctrine, Outer Space, and the Global Commons: Time to Call Home ET, 69
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liability for unfavorable outcomes,64 and other issues 65 would be daunting, but
are generally outside the scope of this Article. Moreover, international law
has relatively little to say about the choice among most of the various
planetary defense concepts described above. The selection of a gravity tractor,
albedo change, or conventional explosion would pose immense challenges
and require complex decision-making about tradeoffs for the scientific
community, but most of the contemplated techniques are essentially
indistinguishable from the perspective of international law. 66
On the other hand, the possible employment of a nuclear explosive device
is much more fraught under international law. Two principal treaties, as well
as a number of others, seem diametrically opposed to the deployment and
operation of nuclear weapons in space, and it is very difficult to finesse a
nuclear planetary defense mission around these legal impediments. None of
these international documents was crafted with anything like the asteroid
Syracuse L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019). See also Gerrard & Barber, supra note 32, at 22-31
(contemplating the possibility that an anti-asteroid activity could require review under the
National Environmental Policy Act).
64 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972,
24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (hereinafter Liability Convention) presents an important set
of related issues beyond the scope of this Article. Under that treaty, a party launching a space
object is legally responsible to compensate victims for damage done by that object: the liability
is "absolute" for damage inflicted on the surface of Earth or to aircraft in flight, and for "fault"
if the damage is done to another state's objects in space. Id. arts. II, III. This potential liability
could be enormous for an incompletely successful planetary defense operation (i.e., an
intervention that succeeded in altering the trajectory of an asteroid, but did not suffice to cause
it to miss Earth entirely, so it impacted a different location from where it would have otherwise
struck). That potential liability could constitute an important deterrent to any state
contemplating a planetary defense mission, and a Security Council resolution such as that
proposed infra, Part VI, that authorized the operation would likely have to address the liability
aspect in some fashion.
65 For example, any program entailing an important degree of international cooperation in high-
technology areas such as space flight and nuclear weapons would require addressing the
concerns of national and international export controls and technology transfers. See Overview
of U.S. Export Control System, DEP'T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/ strategictrade/overview/
[https://perma.cc/R4JU-GNFY]; Compliance with U.S. Export Control Law, Regulations and
Policies, Acquisition Guide, in DEP'T OF ENERGY, AcQuisITION GUIDE ch. 25.001 (June 2016),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/Acq%/`2OGuide%/`2025 -
0010%20Compliance%20with%20US%20Export%20Control%20Laws%20June%202016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C4JP-LLAL].
66 This Article addresses mitigation measures that would be undertaken in space; in addition,
terrestrial actions, such as sheltering in place, evacuations of regions that might be impacted,
training and equipping of various types of first responders, and general civil defense
programming, would be vitally important.
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problem in mind; the negotiators were concerned, instead, with the imperative
of avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the radioactive
contamination of the environment, or the extension into space of the perilous
terrestrial nuclear arms race.67 Nonetheless, a plain reading of the texts of
these long-standing and widely adhered to agreements poses a substantial
bulwark against the kinds of prophylactic planetary defense measures now
being contemplated.
This Part addresses first the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the foundational
instrument for all of space law; then the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty and its
successors, which address nuclear explosions in various environments; and
then a congeries of nuclear non-proliferation agreements which may impede
possible patterns of international collaboration in a future nuclear planetary
defense operation. As a framing matter, it should be understood that a future
planetary defense mission might be undertaken by a single state (perhaps
especially by the United States 68 ), by a coalition of states (some of whom may
not be parties to all of the relevant treaties described below), or by a
consortium of states and non-state actors (such as private corporations or
supra-national organizations which would not be directly bound by the
treaties, but for whom the international requirements are still relevant).
A. The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the cardinal instrument of space law,
containing several key provisions of "constitutional" significance. 6 9 It has
67 See Fabio Tronchetti, International Legal Consideration of Cosmic Hazards and Planetary
Defense, in HANDBOOK OF COSMIC HAZARDS AND PLANETARY DEFENSE 1027, 1029 (Joseph N.
Pelton & Firooz Allahdadi eds., 2015) (observing that it is not surprising that it took some time
for international law to begin to address planetary defense issues, because "The space treaties
were formulated when the primary goal of their drafters was not to address hypothetical threats
coming from outer space but to lay down basic rules enabling all States to participate in the
exploration and use of outer space and prevent outer space from becoming an area of conflict.");
Gerrard & Barber, supra note 32, at 38 (concluding that the OST "was clearly concerned with
protecting the Earth from threats of an Earthly origin and did not contemplate the need to use
weapons to protect Earth from potential impacts by asteroids or comets.").
68 See STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN, supra note 5, at 5 (asserting that the United States must be
prepared to act independently in all aspects of planetary defense); NAHUM MELAMED & AVISHAI
MELAMED, CTR. FOR SPACE POL'Y AND STRATEGY, PLANETARY DEFENSE AGAINST ASTEROID
STRIKES: RISKS, OPTIONS, AND COSTS 2 (Jan. 2018),
https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2018 -05/NEO-Defense_0.pdf_[https://perma.cc/29WN-
W7XE].
69 See generally LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 9, at 49-73; Paul G. Dembling & Daniel M.
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been joined by virtually all the leading spacefaring states, and its central
mandates have been generally accepted as customary international law,
thereby binding even non-parties.70 The treaty stipulates, for example, that
space "shall be free for exploration and use by all States"," that activities in
space "shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries",7 and that parties are to conduct their space activities "in
accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security".73
For present purposes, article IV - especially its first sentence - contains
the passages of greatest interest: 74
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the
Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies,
or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 419 (1967); FRANS VON
DER DUNK (rapporteur), LEGAL ASPECTS OF NEO THREAT RESPONSE AND RELATED
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: FINAL REPORT (Feb. 9, 2010), https://docplayer.net/49 137464-Legal-
aspects-of-neo-threat-response-and-related-institutional-issues -final-report.html
[http://perma.cc/26Z8-QC5L ] [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES]; Raymond L. Garthoff, The
Outer Space Treaty: 1967 to the Present, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT 877 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993); Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the
Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. REV. 1 (2000).
70 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 9, at 63-73; Stubbe, supra note 9, at 77-78; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES § 1.02 n.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Bolivia, Columbia, Iran, and Malaysia, among others, have
signed, but not ratified the OST; Cambodia, Latvia, and Liechtenstein are among those who
have not signed. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of International
Agreements Relating to Activities in Out Space as at 1 Jan 2018, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/2018/CRP.3 (Apr. 9, 2018),
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/AC105_C2_2018_CRPO3E.pdf
[http://perma.cc/UWF4-2R5U].
71 OST, supra note 3, art. I, para. 2.
7 2 Id. art. I, para. 1.
73 Id. art. III.
74 This Article sets aside the question of whether an effort to divert an incoming asteroid would
constitute "appropriation" of that celestial body in contravention of article II of the OST. See
id. art. II; see also Paul B. Larsen, International Regulation of Near Earth Objects (NEOs),
GER. J. AIR & SPACE L. 104 (2018); FRANS G. VON DER DUNK, BLACK HOLES BV, REPORT ON
LEGAL PARAMETERS FOR AN ASTEROID DEFLECTION DEMONSTRATION MISSION AS PART OF THE
EADP 22 (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.black-holes.eu/resources/EADP_Report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GQY5 -ZS99].
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The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States
Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The
establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the
testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers
on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel
for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be
prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful
exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be
prohibited.7 1
A careful parsing of the first sentence reveals three distinct verbs that must
be considered for evaluating a nuclear planetary defense mission: OST parties
are forbidden: 1) to place a nuclear weapon in orbit around Earth; 2) to install
such a weapon on a celestial body; and 3) to station such a weapon in space.
The following Subparts scrutinize each element in sequence, as well as
elaborating other key terms of art contained in that text.
First, however, a brief commentary about interpretive methodology:
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a document is to be
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose." 76 At the same time, "a special meaning shall be given to a term if it
is established that the parties so intended."7 7 As a supplementary means of
interpretation, recourse may be had to the "preparatory work of the treaty and
the circumstances of its conclusion," if the standard procedure "[1]eaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or [1]leads to a result which is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable." 7 8
75 OST, supra note 3, art. IV; see LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 9, at 456-69 (parsing the content
of OST art. IV); Dembling & Arons, supra note 69, at 432-35 (history of negotiation of art.
IV); Christopher M. Petras, The Debate over the Weaponization of Space - A Military-Legal
Conspectus, 28 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 171, 182-86 (2003).
76 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter VCLT]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 325. See generally,
Richard Gardiner, The Vienna Convention Rules on Treaty Interpretation, THE OXFORD GUIDE
To TREATIES 475 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012); Julia Neumann, An Interpretation of the Outer
Space Treaty After 40 Years, in INT'L INST. SPACE L., PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 431 (2007); Rudolf Bernhardt, Interpretation in
International Law, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1416 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed.,
1995).
77 VCLT, supra note 76, at art. 31.4.
78 VCLT, supra note 76, at art. 32. Note, however, that this supplementary procedure serves
only to allow interpreters to consult the negotiating history (the travauxpreparatoires) and the
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1. Place in Earth Orbit
This first clause poses only modest constraints upon the most plausible
planetary defense missions, but it might still impede some conceivable
options. Most likely, for safety reasons, a mission to intercept an incoming
asteroid would aim for a far-distant rendezvous, not in Earth orbit or other
near-Earth space. The defensive spacecraft might be placed into an orbit
around the Sun, but its trajectory would probably escape Earth's gravity
altogether.7 9
In principle, it might be advantageous in some situations to pre-deploy the
nuclear device temporarily into a near-Earth orbit, from which point it could
be quickly dispatched to an intercept, or to have it loiter in orbit, while other
elements of a coordinated planetary defense mission were being assembled.
But that sort of advanced placement does not provide a major benefit, and
would probably not be imperative.so
Similarly, sometimes, it is technically advantageous in terms of speed or
cost for a spacecraft to circle the Earth a few times in a "transfer orbit," before
ascending to a more distant flight path, but that approach would not be
required here." In some other instances, a spacecraft might seek a "gravity
boost" by adopting a flight path that whipped it partially around Earth,
enabling it to achieve higher speeds for a long-distance mission, but again,
social context of the instrument in order to determine its meaning; art. 32 does not provide any
general permission to alter or avoid the clear terms of a treaty that might be considered
burdensome or unduly inhibitory. See Active Debris Removal, supra note 9, at 31 (arguing that
"the provisions of the existing UN space treaties must, as a matter of necessity, be interpreted
and applied in the most useful way in order to achieve optimal results.")
79 See 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAw 79 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter
COLOGNE COMMENTARY] (discussing OST provisions regarding placing nuclear weapons in
Earth orbit). This Article does not discuss the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, which has attracted only
18 parties, and does not include the major space powers. That treaty recapitulates or expands
some of the OST provisions addressed in this Article, including a prohibition against placing
nuclear weapons into orbit around, or on a trajectory toward, the Moon or other celestial bodies
within the Solar System. Id. arts. 1, 3.3.
so See Jason Mick, Russia, U.S. Eye Team-up to Build Massive Nuke to Save Planet from an
Asteroid, DAILY TECH (Oct. 17, 2013),
http://www.dailytech.com/Russia+US+Eye+Teamup+to+Build+Massive+Nuke+to+Save+Pla
net+from+an+Asteroid/article33569.htm [(reporting early proposal from Edward Teller to
place in orbit anti-asteroid nuclear explosives).
" Robert A. Braeunig, Orbital Mechanics, http://www.braeunig.us/space/orbmech.htm
[http://perma.cc/9SPQ-2KB3]; David Doody, Basics of Space Flight, NASA (2017),
https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/basics/chapter4-1/ [http://perma.cc/S3TR-389X].
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that is not an essential element, and it does not require the full Earth orbit that
the treaty proscribes. 82
2. Install on a Celestial Body
The OST does not define the term "install," but it is generally agreed that
this provision was not intended to bar a nuclear device that merely "transits"
space, such as while being transported by an ICBM en route to its target.8 3 In
a similar vein, a planetary defense mission that directly ascended from Earth
to an asteroid and immediately detonated the nuclear device upon impact with
its target (or, depending upon the specific mission concept, detonated it in
space in proximity to the asteroid) would not be constrained by this aspect of
the treaty.
More complicated are scenarios in which the explosive lands on the
asteroid prior to detonation. Such a maneuver might be advantageous for
several reasons. For example, if the objective were to blast the asteroid into
fragments (rather than to divert its pathway) a subsurface explosion would be
more effective.84 This sort of mission profile could require drilling a borehole
and lowering the device some meters below the asteroid's surface-that
process looks more like "installing" it."
82 See ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 2 (noting advantages of a planetary gravity
assist swingby trajectory). See also Garthoff, supra note 69, at 882-83 (describing the legality
under the OST of a "fractional orbital" system, under which a nuclear weapon would complete
a partial, but not complete, orbit of Earth); 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 79
(arguing that the OST applies even to space objects placed into a partial orbit); Vladlen S.
Vereshchetin, Limiting and Banning Military Use of Outer Space: Issues ofInternational Law,
in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHs 671, 674 (Jerzy
Makarczyk ed., 1984); Rex Zedalis & Catherine Wade, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967, 8 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 454, 463-65 (1978).
83 Bill Boothby, Space Weapons and the Law, 93 INT'L L. STUD. 179,202-03 (2017); Garthoff,
supra note 69, at 878; Kunich, supra note 37, at 130-31; JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: A
GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 119-202 (1994) (observing that nuclear weapons
in orbit would not be especially advantageous as a military matter); 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY,
supra note 79, at 79-80; Neumann, supra note 76, at 436 (observing that the OST does not
include definitions of any of its key terms, and for many of those terms, the ordinary meaning
is difficult to assess, so "Quite a lot of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty thus require
recourse to additional means of interpretation.")
84 ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES, supra note 5, at 20 (reporting that a nuclear detonation below
the surface of an asteroid would be 10 to 100 times more efficient than an explosion above the
surface); Dillow, supra note 38; WIE ET AL., supra note 38, at 5.
8 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 80 (discussing whether simply placing an object
onto a celestial body constitutes "installing" it). If the mission profile included a great deal of
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Alternatively, the concept of operations might be to emplace one or more
nuclear explosives on the surface of the asteroid and detonate them in an
optimal salvo-and it might be advantageous to deposit them in advance, so
they would be ready to fire immediately, if other ongoing planetary defense
attempts failed. Whether "placing" a nuclear device onto an asteroid amounts
to "installing" it may be debatable, but if the space object's spin and weak
gravity required some mechanical tethering or affixing of the devices, the
treaty provision would seem to be triggered.86
3. Station in Space in Any Other Manner
The verb "station" is also undefined, and may be even more imprecise; it
has not been subject to authoritative interpretation in practice by political or
judicial bodies. Perhaps the negotiators intended the term to connote a
permanent placement, at a fixed location-as if connected to the word
"stationary."" However, in space, nothing is truly stationary-everything is
moving at breathtaking speed-and one object may be said to be fixed in
location only in reference to some other object. As an illustration of this
linguistic puzzle, is the International Space Station stationed in space?"
construction or other activity on the surface of the asteroid, then the second paragraph of art.
IV of the OST could also become relevant. That passage prohibits the "establishment of
military bases, installations and fortifications" on a celestial body. OST, supra note 3, art. IV;
see also Id. at 84. See also Stephen Gorove, Arms Control Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty
A Scrutinizing Reappraisal, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 114, 118 (1973) (questioning whether a
very small asteroid would qualify under the OST as a celestial body).
6 Note that this analysis applies equally to a "test" and to an operational application of a nuclear
explosive device on an asteroid. As discussed infra, text accompanying note 179, before using
a nuclear device for planetary defense, it would be optimal to gain some practical experience
with the techniques. But OST art. IV specifically prohibits "the testing of any type of weapons"
on celestial bodies. Infra text accompanying note 101.
87 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 80 (suggesting that "'station' implies that the
weapons are assigned a position in outer space for a certain period of time."). Cf the second
paragraph of art. IV, which bans the "establishment of military bases, installations, and
fortifications" on the Moon and other celestial bodies (emphasis added). OST, supra note 3,
art. IV.
8 See Gorove, supra note 85, at 117 (commenting on the uncertain meaning of the OST's
adoption of the word station); Zedalis & Wade, supra note 82, at 461-63. Ordinary usage of
the term "station" is also ambiguous in this regard. For example, sometimes we might say that
a ship is stationed in the Mediterranean Sea, even though it moves a great deal through the area.
Likewise, if a satellite is dedicated to a particular mission with a specific orbit, maybe it would
be considered to be stationed along that entire corridor. In a similar sense, the term "station-
keeping" is routinely used to describe the maneuvers a satellite must occasionally undertake in
order to maintain its assigned orbital trajectory.
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If a planetary defense spacecraft were to intercept an asteroid and then,
instead of crashing into it, fly alongside it (as with the microgravity tractor
concept described supra), it might be appropriate to consider the spacecraft as
being "stationed" in space, with respect to the asteroid, even while both were
traveling in parallel at high speed. Such an expansive interpretation might be
warranted by the OST's emphasis of a prohibition against stationing a nuclear
device in space "in any other manner."89 This sort of synchronized flight path
might be contemplated if, for example, there were multiple types of planetary
defense concepts being attempted simultaneously, and the operators wanted
to be able to employ the nuclear explosive promptly as a last recourse, if other
attempts at diversion proved futile.
The prohibition against stationing would also seem to apply to any
strategy that would insert a nuclear explosive device into a Lagrange point.
These are the handful of specific locations in space where the gravitational
pulls from two celestial bodies (such as the Sun and the Earth) are in
equipoise, so the object can maintain its location indefinitely, at minimal
energy cost. A spacecraft occupying a Sun-Earth Lagrange point does not
orbit Earth, but is plausibly "stationed" in space, in a way that might have
some conceivable advantages for a planetary defense mission; however, the
OST would prohibit this option.90
4. Nuclear Weapons or Any Other Kinds of Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Next, we must evaluate whether a nuclear explosive device that was
employed for a planetary defense mission constitutes a "weapon" for purposes
89 OST, supra note 3, art IV, para. 1. See Charge d'affaires a.i. of Italy to the United Nations,
Letter dated Sept. 9, 1968, addressed to the Secretary-General of the UN General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/7221 (Sept. 10, 1968) (asserting that OST art. IV would not prohibit a nuclear
weapon contained in a space probe moving toward deep space; such a device is not "stationed");
U.N. GAOR 23rd. Sess., 175th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/7250/Add.1 (Oct. 17, 1968)
(representatives of United States, U.S.S.R., and United Kingdom maintain that the OST
language does prohibit placing a nuclear weapon into orbit around the Moon or another celestial
body, and placing a nuclear weapon aboard a vehicle launched into deep space.)
90 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 9, at 155; 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 80;
Claudio Maccone, Planetary Defense from Space: Part I - Keplerian Theory, 55 ACTA
ASTRONAUTICA 991 (2004) (proposing locating planetary defense missiles at two Earth-Moon
Lagrangian points); Claudio Maccone, Planetary Defense from the Nearest 4 Lagrangian
Points Plus RFI-Free Radioastronomy from the Farside of the Moon: A Unifed Vision, 50
ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 185 (2002); DAVID WRIGHT ET AL., THE PHYSICS OF SPACE SECURITY: A
REFERENCE MANUAL 45-46 (2005) (discussing Lagrange points).
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of article IV of the OST. If it does not, then all the above provisions are simply
irrelevant. Unfortunately, the treaty is, once again, bereft of definitional
assistance. 9 '
Some might argue that as germane for planetary defense, a nuclear
explosive device should not be regarded as a weapon, because it is not being
used for hostile or warlike purposes; it is not intended to inflict pain, damage,
or harm upon enemy people or their property. 9 2 Many implements can be
91 See James D. Rendleman & Brian D. Green, Space Weapons According to Stewart, in
MONOGRAPH SERIES V: CONFLICTS IN SPACE AND THE RULE OF LAW 173 (Maria Manoli and
Sandy Belle Habchi eds., 2018) (assessing that there is no generally accepted definition of
"space weapon"); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 9, at 461 (suggesting that the drafters of the
OST may not have contemplated a scenario involving a use of a nuclear device for planetary
defense purposes); Fabio Tronchetti, A Soft Law Approach to Prevent the Weaponisation of
Outer Space, in SOFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 361, 363-64 (Irmgard Marboe, ed., 2012) (observing that the term
"space weapon" is not defined in any space treaty or domestic legislation); Michael Mineiro,
The United States and the Legality of Outer Space Weaponization, 33 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE
L. 441, 446-48 (2008) (surveying various definitions of space weapon); Cord-Georg
Hasselmann, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Article IV Outer Space Treaty, and the
Relationship to General Disarmament, in INT'L INST. OF SPACE LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQURIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, SEPTEMBER 27-OCTOBER 2, 1982,
PARIS, FRANCE 101 (1983). See also Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in
Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, June 10, 2014, art. I(b),
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/cd/2014/documents/PPWT2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/49H3-NLDK] (draft treaty, referred
to as PPWT, proposed by Russia and China, which defines the term "weapon in outer space" as
any "outer space object or its component produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt
normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth's surface or in the air, as well as to
eliminate population, components of biosphere important to human existence, or to inflict
damage to them by using any principles of physics.")
92 Recourse to various standard or legal dictionary definitions of the term "weapon" does not
provide great insight here. Those sources variously refer not only to implements that are used
(or designed to be used, or suitable for use) in combat to harm people or property, but also more
generally to various means of gaining advantage (citing usages such as "a weapon against
cancer" or "laughter can be a great weapon.") See, e.g., Weapon, GOOGLE DICTIONARY,
https://www.google.com/search?q=definition+of+weapon&rlz=1C1AVUCenUS733US746
&oq=definition+of+weapon&aqs=chrome..69i57j015.4065j 1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
(last visited Sept. 17, 2018) (denoting a thing designed or used for inflicting bodily harm or
physical damage; a means of gaining an advantage or defending oneself in a conflict or contest);
Weapon, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2018), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/weapon (last visited Sept. 17, 2018) (something (such as a club,
knife, or gun) used to injure, defeat, or destroy; a means of contending against
another); Weapon, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY (2018),
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/weapon (last visited Sept. 17, 2018) (a thing
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wielded in multiple modes. A knife, for example, is properly understood to
be a weapon when it is used to stab a person, but not when it is used to slice a
loaf of bread; dynamite is a weapon when it is applied in combat to blow up
an enemy's bridge, but not when it is applied in a peacetime mining operation.
In like fashion, a nuclear explosive device can be a weapon (indeed, since the
inception of the nuclear age in 1945, that is almost the only role that these
implements have played93 ), but here it would be employed as a tool for global
good.94
designed or used for inflicting bodily harm or physical damage; a means of gaining an
advantage or defending oneself in a conflict or contest); Weapon, Cambridge Dictionary (2018),
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/weapon (last visited Sept. 17, 2018)
(an object used in fighting or war, such as a gun or a bomb, or something used against
someone; even laughter can be used as a weapon); Weapon, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1910) (an instrument used in fighting ; an instrument of offensive or defensive combat).
Notably, a weapon can be used against an animal or against the environment (such as poisoning
a river or setting oil wells on fire). In addition, there are various "non-lethal" weapons, which
are devices intended to control, restrain, or capture, rather than to kill or inflict serious injury;
DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy, Directive 3000.03E
(Apr. 25, 2013), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000 03.pdf; Boothby, supra note 83, at 182
(adopting a definition of weapon as a device "that is used, intended or designed to cause injury
or damage to an adverse party in an armed conflict."); 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note
79, at 75-77 (observing that typically a "weapon" is used against an "enemy," and a non-human
opponent could be an "enemy"); Anne Dienelt, The Shadowy Existence of the Weapons Review
and Its Impact on Disarmament, Sec. & Peace (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3190285 (evaluating the meaning of
"weapon" in article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions); Joan Johnson-
Freese, Space and National Security, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
435, 438 (Derek S. Reveron et al. eds., 2018) (describing "a plethora of attempts to define a
space weapon" and observing that "any definition that requires a determination of intent is
problematic"); WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 4-5, 346
(2d ed. 2016) (defining "weapon," for purposes of the law of armed conflict, as "an offensive
capability that can be applied to a military object or enemy combatant" and as a device that is
used, is intended to be used, or that has been designed for use to cause injury or damage to an
adverse party); Weaponeering, DoD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, (Aug.
2018) (defining "weaponeering" as the process for determining the "means required to create a
desired effect on a given target"); Hannes Mayer, Is a Special Legal Regime for Planetary
Defence Measures Necessary? (4th IAA Planetary Defense Conference, Paper IAA-PDC-15-
06-06, 2015) (asserting that an explosive device is not necessarily a weapon).
9 See infra text accompanying note 112 (discussing Peaceful Nuclear Explosions).
94 Perhaps it could be argued that the nuclear device deployed in space for a planetary defense
mission should not be characterized as a weapon if it would be incapable of being used for an
attack against a target on Earth - such as if the device were contained in a space object that did
not have the shielding necessary to withstand re-entry through Earth's atmosphere. But even
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It must be acknowledged that for some purposes, the classification of a
particular device as a weapon or as something else (e.g., as a tool or a shield)
can reasonably depend upon the employment to which it is put or the intention
of the designer or user. Nonetheless, some items, such as nuclear explosives,
are inherently and permanently regarded as weapons, regardless of their
intended immediate application. This Article maintains that the better view
of the OST is that the treaty applies to all nuclear explosive devices in space,
however they may be labeled or against whatever types of objects they may
be directed. 95 To decide otherwise would rob the treaty of much of its effect,
enabling facile circumvention by any party who could simply claim that all of
its orbiting nuclear devices were valid because they were intended for
beneficent purposes. 96 The treaty's fundamental object and purpose in article
then, the explosive could potentially be used against an enemy's satellites, and perhaps it could
have military value as a "high-altitude nuclear explosion" delivering electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) effects. See INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, supra note 69, at 25 (noting "the general
impossibility of building a device which is only capable of exercising force against a NEO and
not against another space object, or indeed against a target on Earth.") (emphasis in original);
Wilmot N. Hess, NASA Technical Note, The Effects of High Altitude Explosions (1964),
http://www.futurescience.com/emp/Hess-Wilmot.pdf Ihttps://perma.cc/V3EY-HT94]
(discussing the effects of nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere or low in space); EMP
COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES FROM
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) ATTACK: VOLUME 1: EXECUTIVE REPORT (2004), available at
http://www.empcommission.org/docs/empcexec rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/29BJ-KZQY];
Yousaf M. Butt, The EMP Threat: Fact, Fiction, and Response (Part 1), SPACE REV (Jan. 25,
2010), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1549/1_ [https://perma.cc/P9XG-HAL6];
Kunich, supra note 37, at 138-43 (arguing that a nuclear device used in space for planetary
defense should not be considered a weapon under the OST); Baum, supra note 13, at 768-69.
95 See INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, supra note 69, at 26; 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 79,
at 76-77 (presenting the debate about whether the intended use of a nuclear device controls its
designation of a weapon, and concluding that for nuclear devices, "A 'weapon' thus remains a
'weapon' irrespective of whether it may be used for civilian uses.") See also Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean art 5, Feb. 14, 1967, 634
U.N.T.S. 326 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1968), [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco] (defining a
nuclear weapon as "any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled
manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike
purposes."); Eilene Galloway, International Institutions to Ensure Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, 9 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 303, 311 (1984) (differentiating between the "purpose" of
a device, which focuses on the psychological motivation of the user and the "use" of the device,
which can be assessed by its actual application, and critiquing the OST for using those two
terms interchangeably); Justin McClelland, The Review of Weapons in Accordance with Article
36 of Additional Protocol 1, 85 IRRC 397, 404 (2003) (defining a weapon as "an offensive
capability that can be applied to a military object or enemy combatant."); Bond v. United States,
572 U.S. 844, 860-62 (2014) (discussing the definition of "chemical weapon.")
96 Note in response to the examples cited in the previous paragraph that if someone attempted
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IV, to prevent (at least specified aspects of) an arms race in space, would be
frustrated if parties could evade its force by donning the garb of dual capability
for a nuclear device. 9 7
The parties to the OST have not authoritatively elaborated any shared
interpretation of this provision of article IV, but it is conspicuous that no state
has ever placed a nuclear explosive device into space and claimed justification
based upon its purpose, size, or function.98 Moreover, this restrictive
to board an airplane or enter another type of secure area while carrying a knife, it would not
suffice to explain that he or she intended to use the knife while in flight only to slice a loaf of
bread or to open envelopes. The knife would surely be regarded as prohibited due to its inherent
nature.
Even if the focus were to be on the intent (or design or purpose) of a nuclear device, rather than
on its inherent nature, would we look at the original intent of those who first created the device,
the intent of those who adapted it for its current application, or the intent of their future
successors, who might have other purposes in mind?
97 An important precursor for this aspect of art. IV was adopted in UN General Assembly
Resolution 1884 on October 17, 1963, which unanimously expressed the members'
determination "to take steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space," welcomed
the expressions by the U.S.S.R. and the United States of their intention not to station nuclear
weapons in space, and called upon states to refrain from that activity and from causing,
encouraging, or in any way participating in that conduct. The preamble to the OST recalled
resolution 1884. G.A. Res. 18/1884 (Oct. 17, 1963); OST, supra note 3, preamble, para. 7; see
also Dembling & Arons, supra note 69, at 427; Garthoff, supra note 69, at 880. See also
Statement by the President Announcing the Reaching of an Agreement on an Outer Space
Treaty, 1966 PUB. PAPERS 1441 (Dec. 8, 1966) (in announcing the concluson of negotiations
on the OST, U.S. presidential statement refers to the treaty as incorporating a "no bombs in
orbit" resolution and highlights the importance of the OST as an arms control measure); Treaty
on Outer Space: Hearings Before the S. Comm. On Foreign Rel., 90th Cong. 1 (1967)
(statement of Cyrus Vance) (asserting the importance of the treaty as a measure that "prevents
the spread of new weapons systems into new areas now.")
Nuclear materials also present another dimension of the dual capability problem. That is, highly
enriched uranium may be useful both for nuclear weapons and for generating electrical power
for long-duration space missions, potentially including those undertaken for planetary defense.
Allowing the peaceful use of these materials while ensuring they cannot covertly be converted
to military applications is a challenge the UN General Assembly addressed in its 1992
Resolution on Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, G.A.
Res. 47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992); Harrison Tasoff, NASA Pushes for Nuclear-Powered Space
Missions, Sci. Am. (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nasa-pushes-
for-nuclear-powered-space-missions/ [https://perma.cc/79BK-8YEJ]. See also, NEOSHIELD
D7.5.3: NTP Kinetic Impactor Deflection Concept Report 6-7 (July 19, 2013 report); 1
COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 76 (discussing controlled nuclear explosions for
spacecraft propulsion).
98 See MICHELLE BENTLEY, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND US FOREIGN POLICY: THE
23 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. (2019)
interpretation is reinforced by the fact that, as a practical matter, if a nuclear
device were today to be employed for a planetary defense mission, the device
itself would have to be withdrawn from a weapon stockpile (or from a reserve
roster of retired devices previously dedicated to weapons applications). All
nuclear explosive devices currently held in any country's active inventory
were designed, developed, and tested as weapons; there are no existing types
that were originally conceived for any other peaceful purposes. 99 It would ill
STRATEGIC USE OF A CONCEPT 56-57 (2014) (reporting that during the negotiation of the OST,
U.S. military authorities had recommended that the treaty should ban "weapons of mass
destruction," but not "nuclear weapons" in orbit, because that formulation would allow the
deployment of very small nuclear anti-satellite weapons, which could have such localized
effects that they did not create "mass" destruction. Ultimately, the United States did not assert
that position, but maintained that all nuclear weapons, regardless of size, should be prohibited);
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-1963, at 892 (David
W. Mabon & David S. Patterson eds., Glenn W. LaFantasie gen. ed., 1995); 1 COLOGNE
COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 76.
The second paragraph of OST article IV adds a further linguistic conundrum, by restricting the
use of the Moon and celestial bodies (but not of space) exclusively to "peaceful purposes."
Some authorities have asserted that "peaceful" in this context should be understood to mean
"non-military," but the dominant interpretation is "non-aggressive," which allows defensive
military activities. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 9, at 468-69; Stephan Hobe, The Meaning of
"Peaceful Purposes" in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, 40 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 10
(2015); Kubo Ma6Ak, Silent War: Applicability of Jus in Bello to Military Space Operations,
94 INT'L L. STUD. 1, 15-19 (2018); Dembling & Arons, supra note 69, at 432-35; Garthoff,
supra note 69, at 881; 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 82-84; Kunich, supra note
37, at 131-38; Gorove, supra note 85, at 119-20. But see Bin Cheng, Military Use of Outer
Space: Article IVof the 1967 Space Treaty Revisited, in THE UTILIZATION OF THE WORLD'S AIR
SPACE AND FREE OUTER SPACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 305 (Chia-Jui Cheng & Doo Hwan Kim
eds., 1997) (arguing that the proper interpretation of "peaceful" in the OST is "non-military");
Vereshchetin, supra note 82, at 680-81.
9 See Tim Fernholz, The Strange But True Reason the US Isn't Destroying Its Old Nukes,
DEF. ONE (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.defenseone.com/business/2014/10/strange-true-reason-
us-isnt-destroying-its-old-nukes/9556 1/ [https://perma.cc/8T3X-YZW4] (reporting that the
Department of Energy is retaining some nuclear weapons that were originally slated for
destruction, in order to preserve them as an "irreplaceable national asset" for possible use
against an asteroid). Note that even if an entirely new type of nuclear device were to be created
for planetary defense (rather than simply removing a weapon from military stockpiles and re-
labeling it) it would in all likelihood be designed, tested, and assembled at the same facilities
that manufacture the weapons - there are no other suitable capabilities in the United States or
elsewhere (especially if time were short). See David C. Trimble, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO MODERNIZE NUCLEAR
INFRASTRUCTURE AND ADDRESS MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES, GAO-18-374T (2018)
(describing the facilities at which the United States develops and processes nuclear weapons);
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY 379-93 (Oct. 5, 2017) (assessing
the challenges confronting the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise); OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
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serve the treaty-makers to now allow a party to escape the OST by merely re-
labeling and re-purposing a fearsome weapon.' 00
Other potential planetary defense devices, on the other hand, could truly
be considered dual-purpose and subject to categorization according to their
immediate application. The gravity tractor device, for example, would not be
a weapon if it were employed to try to divert an asteroid from Earth impact.
But if a state were to attempt, hypothetically, to apply the same technology to
steer a NEO toward Earth, to create a devastating shock upon its terrestrial
enemy's territory, that employment would make it a weapon.' 0 '
ASSISTANT SEC. OF DEF. FOR NUCLEAR MATTERS, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure, in 2016
NUCLEAR MATTERS HANDBOOK 47-56 (2016).
https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nmhb/docs/NMHB2016_Ch4_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RE8W-MQTW].
Carl Sagan, among others, has pointed out that a nuclear device in space would be inherently
capable of multiple applications: it could be employed for planetary defense, it could be used
to threaten or attack enemy locations on Earth or on satellites, and it could potentially be applied
to re-route an asteroid to strike targets on Earth. SAGAN, supra note 37, at 314-26 (asserting
that the danger of misuse of a deflection capability as an offensive weapon is much greater than
the danger of an imminent natural asteroid impact); Carl Sagan & Steven J. Ostro, Long-Range
Consequences of Interplanetary Collisions, 10 ISSUES ScI. & TECH. 67, 70 (1994); Alan W.
Harris, et al., The Deflection Dilemma: Use Versus Misuse of Technologies for Avoiding
Interplanetary Collision Hazards, in HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS 1145 (Tom
Gehrels ed., 1994). See also Gerrard & Barber, supra note 32, at 19-20 (reporting concerns
about the possible application of planetary defense capabilities for attacking an enemy). But
see Russell L. Schweickart, The Real Deflection Dilemma (2004),
http://research.dynamicpatterns.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/The-Real-Deflection-
Dilemma-Schweickart.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN79-96P3] (discounting the feasibility of
weaponizing an asteroid).
'oo See infra, text accompanying note 112, (discussing Peaceful Nuclear Explosions).
101 See generally S. Nozette et al., DoD Technologies and Missions of Relevance to Asteroid
and Comet Exploration, in HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS 671 (Tom Gehrels ed.,
1994) (discussing the crossover between military and civilian space technology).
Note that the first sentence of OST art. IV does not mention weapons other than nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction, so conventional high explosives, non-nuclear planetary
defense equipment, or other types of devices and techniques are not restricted in Earth orbit or
in the void of space. 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 71, 78. However, the second
paragraph of art. IV prohibits "testing of any type of weapons" on a celestial body. NASA 's
DART interceptor, supra note 52, is intended to ram into an asteroid, to test the ability to alter
the asteroid's trajectory. If DART were loaded with explosives, instead of instrumentation, this
activity might be regarded as a test of a weapon. If the explosion were done at standoff distance
(rather than directly on the surface of the asteroid), but was designed to affect the asteroid,
would that qualify as a test "on" a celestial body? (Le., does "on" refer to the site where the
testing hardware is located, or to the location where the effects are to be felt?) See Gorove,
23 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. (2019)
5. Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Do any of the other, non-nuclear planetary defense options (such as a
high-energy laser, discussed supral0 2 ) constitute weapons of mass
destruction? If so, they would be subject to the same OST article IV
limitations elaborated above. Here, again, the OST fails to define one of its
critical terms, but other particles of international law supply sufficient
guidance.
There is no official or globally-accepted all-purpose definition of a
weapon of mass destruction, but the core of the concept traditionally refers to
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (and often radiological weapons,
too).' 03 Some authorities have adapted the vocabulary to embrace additional
tools or tactics that cause widespread disruption (such as cyber weapons), as
contrasted with destruction, or that are, generally speaking, extraordinarily
powerful (such as some modern conventional weapons, which can exceed the
force of a small nuclear explosion).1 04 But extending the term so broadly
would deprive the concept of weapons of mass destruction of its core function,
supra note 85, at 121 (observing that the OST prohibits testing, but not use, of weapons in these
circumstances); Gerrard & Barber, supra note 32, at 34 (arguing that the OST would preclude
a party "from testing anyNEO destruction system even on the smallest, most remote asteroid.");
Marcia Smith, Japan Lands Two Tiny Rovers on Asteroid Ryugu, SPACE POLICY ON LINE (Sept.
23, 2018), https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/japan-lands -two-tiny-rovers -on-asteroid-ryugu/
[https://perma.cc/PS52-RTVS] (describing a forthcoming experiment in which a Japanese
spacecraft will drop a copper impactor onto an asteroid at high speed, to create a crater, in order
to allow access to materials beneath the asteroid's surface, in a test for planetary collision
science).
102 See supra text accompanying note 58.
103 Comm. for Conventional Armaments, Resolutions Adopted by the Commission at Its 13th
Meeting, 12 August 1948, and a 2nd Progress Report of the Commission, U.N. Doc.
S/C.3/32/Rev.1, 12 (Aug. 12, 1948) (defining weapon of mass destruction as including atomic
explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, and lethal chemical and biological weapons;
G.A. Res. 51/37 (Dec. 10, 1996); G.A. Res. 63/36 (Jan. 13, 2009); W. Seth Carus, Defining
"Weapons ofMass Destruction" (Ctr. for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional
Paper No. 8, Jan. 2012) (describing multiple alternative definitions of weapon of mass
destruction, and noting (at 39) that some of those definitions would require that the device
inflict substantial human casualties); BENTLEY, supra note 98, passim; 1 COLOGNE
COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 77-78;Hasselmann, supra note 91, at 106-07.
104 See Robert J. Bunker, Weapons of Mass Disruption and Terrorism, 12 TERRORISM & POL.
VIOLENCE 37 (2000) (examining the effects of cyber and other weapons); Fred Burton, Dirty
Bombs: Weapons of Mass Disruption, STRATFOR (Oct. 5, 2006),
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/dirty-bombs-weapons-mass-disruption
[https://perma.cc/2HDA-S8XN]; BENTLEY, supra note 98, at 14-17; Hasselmann, supra note
91, at 101-02.
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and the OST here is best understood as intending to differentiate between the
three or four most deadly implements and all others.' A laser or a non-
nuclear high explosive would therefore not constitute a weapon of mass
destruction under the treaty.1 06
In sum, while the interpretation is not free from ambiguity, the best
reading of the OST would apply the prohibitions to a nuclear explosive device
(but not to a laser, a conventional explosion, or other contemplated tools)
employed for a planetary defense purpose. The treaty would permit a direct-
ascent mission and a prompt interception and nuclear explosion, but would
not allow the device to orbit Earth, to linger in space, to hover near the
asteroid, or to land upon it and drill down.
B. Limited Test Ban Treaty
The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) is one of a series of instruments that
deal with the detonation of nuclear explosive devices; for this purpose, it may
be regarded as complementary to the Outer Space Treaty, which regulates the
placement or deployment of the mechanisms.
Article I of the LTBT specifies:
Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent,
and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other
105 Some commentators argue that the term weapon of mass destruction is a misnomer, because
the three or four devices have so little in common. Spencer Ackerman, Let's All Stop Saying
'Weapons of Mass Destruction' Forever, WIRED (Mar. 29, 2013),
https://www.wired.com/201 3/03/weapons-of-mass-destruction/ [https://perma.cc/99PS-ASC2]
(arguing that the weapons included in the term weapon of mass destruction are so diverse that
it is misleading to categorize them together); JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL., DEADLY ARSENALS:
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL THREATS (2d ed. 2005) (concluding that nuclear
weapons are the only true WMD); BENTLEY, supra note 98, at 9-14.
106 BENTLEY, supra note 98, at 53-57 (reporting internal U.S. debates during the OST
negotiations about what types of weapons the treaty should address); Garthoff, supra note 69,
at 881. But see Zedalis & Wade, supra note 82, at 465-67. The WMD-related resolutions of
the UN General Assembly cited supra note 89 also explicitly contemplate the possibility that
new types of WMD might be created in the future, and would be embraced by the same legal
analysis and restrictions. G.A. Res. 32/84 (Dec. 12, 1977); UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR
DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, New Types and Systems of WMD: Consideration by the CD (May
2011); Carus, supra note note 103, at 14-18; BENTLEY, supra note 98, at 63-66. No new
categories of WMD have yet emerged, but perhaps if someone were able in the future to capture
an asteroid and direct it toward Earth to devastate an enemy, that might qualify as a new WMD.
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nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in
the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space . . . .107
As its name suggests, the LTBT was crafted principally to deal with
"tests" of nuclear weapons, to interdict the next spin in the arms race by
inhibiting the process of creating, refining, and validating new types of
weapons. But it expressly also applies to "any other nuclear explosion," in
order to ensure coverage of all other detonations, regardless of their function,
type, or characterization. The debate recorded supra, about whether the OST
applies fully to devices other than "weapons," based upon the purpose to
which they are put, is thus inapplicable to the LTBT; 08 planetary defense
enjoys no possible interpretive escape hatch here.1 09 The LTBT also prohibits
107 LTBT, supra note 4, art. I.1. The treaty also prohibits nuclear explosions under water and
allows them only underground where radioactive debris will not spread outside the territory of
the testing state. Id. See Garthoff, supra note 69, at 879 (noting that the LTBT negotiators
focused on the problem of nuclear testing underground or in the atmosphere, and devoted
relatively litte attention to testing in space).
"o Because the LTBT text from 1963 was available to the drafters of the OST in 1967, there
may be an inference that the decision not to use a phrase like "nuclear weapon or any other
nuclear device" in the OST was a deliberate choice not to prohibit non-weapon nuclear devices
in the newer treaty. That would be a weak inference, because the 1967 drafters did partially
follow the LTBT model, by addressing nuclear weapons and other WMD - the 1967 sentence
construction does follow the rhythm of the 1963 text. Probably, the 1967 drafters simply did
not contemplate space applications of nuclear devices that were not weapons - there had been
no discussion of possible peaceful nuclear explosions in space. See Dembling & Arons, supra
note 69, at 423 (citing LTBT as a precedent for the OST); 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra
note 79, at 73-74 (considering the precedents consulted in negotiating OST art. IV). Note also
Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968,21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S.
169 [hereinafter NPT] (article V of the NPT concluded in 1968, contemplated that nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes would be made available on a non-discriminatory and
inexpensive basis, but again there is no indication that states contemplated conducting those
activities in space. See infra, text accompanying note 112 (regarding peaceful nuclear
explosions).
109 But see Kunich, supra note 37, at 144-50 (arguing that the LTBT should be interpreted to
allow nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, such as planetary defense). Under the LTBT
text, art. I, there could be a debate about whether a state has "jurisdiction" over the location in
space or on the asteroid where it was detonating a nuclear device, since the OST precludes
national appropriation, via assertions of sovereignty or otherwise, in space and on celestial
bodies. But the concepts of jurisdiction, control and sovereignty are not identical. If the state
lands its nuclear device on the asteroid, it does have "control" over that location while it is
conducting the explosion; similarly, the state enjoys the relevant degree of control if it detonates
the device at a standoff distance in unoccupied space near the asteroid. See Gerrard & Barber,
supra note 32, at 35 (arguing that the term "jurisdiction and control" was included in the LTBT
in order to extend its coverage to a party's non-self-governing territories, but not to locations
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its parties from "causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in" a
prohibited nuclear explosion that might be conducted by some other state. 110
The LTBT has beenjoined by 126 parties, but the roster does not include some
states of special interest here, notably France and China."'
In this connection, it is noteworthy that many people, throughout the
1950s and 1960s (and even thereafter) had championed the concept of
"nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes," also known as "peaceful nuclear
explosions" (PNEs). These activities, pursued in the United States under the
caption of Project Plowshare, would have employed the high-power
detonations for major civil engineering functions, such as digging a canal,
excavating an underground storage cavern, or stimulating the recovery of oil
and gas. PNEs were eventually discarded due to considerations of cost and
environmental protection, but the overlap between PNEs and weapons
development activities was problematic, too. In particular, countries feared
that a rival's conduct of a PNE could constitute weapons testing in disguise-
so any treaty restrictions on weapons tests had to apply fully to all manner of
nuclear explosions, regardless of the avowed purposes. The discussion at the
time did not mention planetary defense, but the logic applies in full; the LTBT
can be read only as banning all nuclear explosions of all types in space.1 2
under enemy control); OST, supra note 3, art. VIII (specifying that a state shall retain
"jurisdiction and control" over an object that it launches into space).
110 LTBT supra note 4, art. 1.2.
.. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,
Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm#signatory
[https://perma.cc/K842-E82T] (see Signatory List). This Article does not address the
possibility that key provisions of the LTBT have become customary international law, binding
even on non-parties. See Petras, supra note 75, at 178. The LTBT would not apply to nuclear
explosions in war. Kunich, supra note 37, at 147-48.
112 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREPARATORY
COMMISSION [hereinafter CTBTO], https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-
testing/peaceful-nuclear-explosions/ [https://perma.cc/S3NW-JEKH] (last visited Sept. 18,
2018) (noting that approximately seven percent of the world's nuclear explosions were
conducted for peaceful purposes); Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/non-power-nuclear-
applications/industry/peaceful-nuclear-explosions.aspx [https://perma.cc/BY3E-D4A9 ] (last
updated July 2010); Milo D. Nordyke, The Soviet Program for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Explosions, 7 Sci. & GLOBAL SEC. 1 (1998); Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions, 17 INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY BULL. 53 (1975); Treaty on Underground
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (and Protocol Thereto), U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 28,
1976, 15 I.L.M. 891, 1714 U.N.T.S. 387 [hereinafter PNE Treaty],
https://www.state.gov/t/isn/5182.htm [https://perma.cc/8GNE-S9K6] (observing that "There is
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The LTBT would be reinforced by the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), which would extend the prohibition to cover all nuclear
explosions (both weapon tests and "any other nuclear explosion") at any
location and in any environment." 3 The CTBT has been signed by 183 states
and ratified by 166, but has not yet entered into force." 4 Nonetheless, the UN
Security Council has affirmed that the conduct of a nuclear explosion by a
signatory would already be illegal, as an action that would defeat the object
and purpose of the CTBT prior to its entry into force." 5
no essential distinction between the technology of a nuclear explosive device which would be
used as a weapon and the technology of a nuclear explosive device used for a peaceful purpose."
Therefore, when the United States and the U.S.S.R. subsequently concluded a treaty that limited
the size of underground nuclear weapons tests, they also had to conclude a companion
instrument to limit PNEs in a similar fashion, to avoid an easy circumvention of the limits);
Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (and Protocol Thereto),
U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 28, 1976,15 I.L.M. 891, 1714 U.N.T.S. 387 [hereinafter PNET]; Threshold
Test Ban Treaty, U.S.-U.S.S.R., July 3, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 906 [hereinafter TTBT]. Regarding a
possible nuclear planetary defense mission, the PNET and TTBT would supplement the
obligations of the LTBT, for the United States, Russia, and other successor states to the
U.S.S.R., by requiring that nuclear explosions be conducted only underground and be smaller
than 150 kilotons yield. See also Kunich, supra note 37, at 147 (noting that because it was
impossible to differentiate between peaceful nuclear explosions and weapons tests, the LTBT
negotiators included language to ban both).
113 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty art. 1.1., Sept. 24, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-
28, 35 I.L.M. 1439, (not yet in force) [hereinafter CTBT]; CTBT parties would also undertake
"to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." Id. at art. 1.2. This prohibition
effectively includes a complete ban on PNEs, but article VIII of the CTBT contemplates that a
Review Conference may in the future return to the question of allowing underground PNEs. Id.
at art. VIII; CTBTO, supra note 112.
114 The CTBT contains a highly unusual provision specifying that it will not enter into force for
any state until it has been ratified by all forty-four countries named in its Annex II. CTBT,
supra note 113 art. XIV. 1. Thirty-six of those states have ratified, including France, Russia,
and the United Kingdom. China and the United States have signed, but not ratified. Status of
Signature and Ratification, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG. PREPARATORY COMM.,
https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/ [https://perma.cc/3MRJ-
QW99] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018).
115 Under article 18 of the VCLT, supra note 76, during the interval between signature of a
treaty and its entry into force, signatories are required to refrain from acts that would defeat the
treaty's object and purpose. On September 15, 2016, the members of the UN Security Council
declared that a nuclear test by any country would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT.
Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Nuclear-Weapon States, U.S. Department of State (2016),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/201 6/09/261993.htm [https://perma.cc/CBR9-3DLZ];
S.C. Res. 2310 (Sept. 23, 2016).
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These restrictions on nuclear explosions remain of fundamental
importance for international security and diplomacy. Although the LTBT is
now 65 years old, it retains its vitality as a mainstay against a revivified
nuclear arms race. President Bill Clinton referred to the CTBT as "the longest-
sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control,"1 6 and the world
would not lightly countenance any diminution of these treaties' effects.
In sum, the LTBT and the nascent CTBT constitute a blunt and all-
encompassing prohibition against all nuclear explosions in space, regardless
of their purpose. While the treaties were crafted to address problems vastly
different from planetary defense, their coverage is unambiguous and loophole-
free." 7
C. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties
Finally, this Part addresses a collection of other international agreements
that restrict the spread of nuclear weapons and associated materials and
capabilities, doing so in a manner that might disrupt some possible patterns of
international cooperation in a planetary defense mission.
Foremost among these instruments is the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which segregates parties into "nuclear weapon states" (NWS),
who already possessed nuclear weapons, and "non-nuclear weapon states"
(NNWS), who have agreed never to obtain those devices." The concept is
to permit (even to encourage) cooperation between NWS and NNWS on the
non-weapons applications of nuclear energy, while interdicting transfers that
could further disseminate nuclear weapons or control over them. 119 The NPT
116 Bill Clinton, President of the United States, Remarks to the 52nd Session of the UN General
Assembly (Sept. 22, 1997), https://1997-
2001.state.gov/global/arms/ctbtpage/president/excerpt.html [https://perma.cc/K2LH-XTUE].
117 The LTBT and CTBT have nothing to say about the various non-nuclear planetary defense
concepts described above; these treaties are relevant only to the use of a nuclear explosion.
118 NPT, supra note 108, arts. I, II.
119 The NPT is often said to rest on "three pillars," comprising non-proliferation (avoiding the
spread of nuclear weapons to additional states), disarmament (reducing the nuclear arsenals of
the states possessing them), and peaceful uses (encouraging collaboration regarding the non-
weapons applications of nuclear energy). See DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. DELEGATION TO THE 2010
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE, TREATY ON THE NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2010),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141503.pdf-[https://perma.cc/A2RC-AT8A];
TOBY DALTON ET AL., TOWARD A NUCLEAR FIREWALL: BRIDGING THE NPT's THREE PILLARS
(Mar. 2017),
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_301_Dalton et al Firewall Final Web.pdf
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identifies only five NWS: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States; all other parties (including several whose participation in a
planetary defense mission could be quite valuable) are NNWS.' 20 In addition,
four countries having some measure of nuclear and space capabilities-India,
North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel (which has not acknowledged possession of
nuclear weapons)-are not parties to the NPT.121
Establishing and enforcing a clear demarcation between permitted and
prohibited NWS-NNWS collaboration is challenging, precisely because of the
dual-purpose character of so much nuclear material, equipment, and
technology. Repeated controversies arise regarding the sharing of nuclear
power reactors and access to the associated elements of the nuclear fuel
cycle.1 22  Even more intense (but largely shrouded from public scrutiny)
questions arise regarding patterns of interactions within a military alliance,
such as NATO. The precise alignment of national responsibilities regarding
a possible use of a nuclear weapon can be fraught: if a German aircraft, flown
by a German pilot, for example, might have the authority to drop a U.S.
nuclear weapon in wartime, how does that arrangement satisfy the NPT?1 23
[https://perma.cc/6CGG-28HM]; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
Jul. 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/
[https://perma.cc/KB69-K996] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018). Notably, the NPT contemplates
that the NWS will provide PNE services to NNWS on a non-discriminatory basis and at a low
fee. NPT, supra note 108, art. V.
120 NPT, supra note 108, art. IX.3.
121 Nuclear Weapons: no Has What at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat [https://perma.cc/L27R-
XGNQ] (last updated June 2018); Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, Nuclear Notebook:
Nuclear Arsenals of the World, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/ [https://perma.cc/6EN9-LE4P] (last visited Sept. 18,
2008); David S. Jonas, Variations on Non-Nuclear: May the "Final Four" Join the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States hile Retaining Their Nuclear
Weapons?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 417 (2005).
122 Pierre Goldschmidt, The Proliferation Challenge ofthe Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Non-Nuclear
Weapon States, INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (Apr. 26, 2004),
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/proliferation-challenge-nuclear-fuel-cycle-non-
nuclear-weapon-states [https://perma.cc/2TUQ-L4UH]; Jackie O'Halloran Bernstein, The NPT
at 50: Successes, Challenges, and Steps Forward for Nonproliferation, 48 ARMS CONTROL
TODAY 12 (June 1, 2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/201 8-06/features/npt-50-successes-
challenges -steps-forward-nonproliferation [https://perma.cc/48Q3-USX3]; David S. Jonas &
Ariel E. Braunstein, Wat's Intent Got to Do with It? Interpreting "Peaceful Purpose" in
Article IV1 of the NPT, 32 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 351 (2018).
123 See Andrea Shalal, Germany Wants to Know If the US Will Let It Carry Nuclear Weapons
on Its New Fighter Jets, Bus. INSIDER (June 20, 2018, 9:44 AM),
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Similar questions might arise in a peacetime planetary defense mission that
was undertaken jointly by NWS and NNWS-who would have to be
precluded from executing which particular actions regarding the nuclear
explosive device that was to be detonated against the asteroid?'2 4
Other treaties also impinge further upon some states' legal competence
for undertaking actions related to nuclear weapons. Five geographically-
specific treaties establish regional "nuclear-weapon-free zones," within which
the parties have assumed special commitments that supplement the NPT.1 25
The content of these treaties varies, but the Latin American agreement is
typical in requiring parties to refrain from "engaging in, encouraging or
authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any other way participating in the
https://www.businessinsider.com/r-germany-presses-us-on-potential-eurofighter-nuclear-role-
2018-6 [https://perma.cc/UXZ8-4FXY] (noting that under NATO agreements, Germany allows
the United States to station nuclear weapons in Germany, and Germany operates several
Tornado aircraft that are equipped to carry and deliver U.S. nuclear bombs): Holly Ellyatt,
Russia's Lavrov Says the U.S. Is Training Europe to Use Nuclear Weapons Against It, CNBC
(last updated Feb. 28, 2018, 7:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/28/russias-lavrov-says-
us-breaching-nuclear-arms -agreement-ifax.html [https://perma.cc/ES8F-DZPT]_(describing
Russia's objection to NATO's joint nuclear missions); Tim Street, ORG Explains #5: NATO
Nuclear Sharing, OXFORD RES. GROUP (June 29, 2018),
https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF-4c84f37f-1 9f0-
4001-alf2-bl3dadf348f0 [https://perma.cc/9FHJ-NFFG]; OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 232.
Letter from the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense Clfford, Apr.
10, 1968, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and
Disarmament, eds. Evans Gerakas, et. al. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1997)
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frusl 964-68v11 /d232_[https://perma.cc/P4N8-
73GM]; Jeff King, Chris Lindborg, and Philip Maxon, NATO Nuclear Sharing: Opportunity
for Change? BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL, 9 BASIC GETTING TO ZERO
PAPERS (Oct. 2008), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/92368/gtz09.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M93-
KXFJ]; William Alberque, The NPT and the Origins of NATO's Nuclear Sharing
Arrangements, 57 IFRI PROLIFERATION PAPERS, (Feb. 2017),
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/alberque nptoriginsnato_nuclear 2 0 1 7 .p
df [https://perma.cc/6D2F-BPMC].
124 Note that the NPT deals with "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices," arts. I,
II, so even a PNE would be explicitly covered. In this respect, the language of the NPT is
similar to that of the LTBT, and unlike that of the OST. See supra text accompanying notes
107-09.
125 See THOMAS GRAHAM JR., THE ALTERNATE ROUTE: NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES (2017);
Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zones U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF.,
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/nwfz/ [https://perma.cc/8JJ4-LZRJ] (last
visited Sept. 18, 2018); Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance, ARMS CONTROL
Ass'N, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nwfz [https://perma.cc/JET8-V6G4] (last
updated July 2017).
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testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear
weapon." 2 6 A future planetary defense mission that sought to enlist multiple
countries in an operation involving a nuclear weapon against an asteroid
would have a difficult time slipping through those prohibitions.
Finally, the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons would
impose yet additional constraints on participants' engagement with nuclear
devices.1 27 This treaty has not yet entered into force, and most of the countries
that are most active in space have not supported it, but a large roster of other
states has endorsed it.1 28  The treaty prohibits parties from possessing,
transferring, or using nuclear weapons and from allowing any stationing,
installation, or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices on their territory.1 29 In addition, it commits each party "never under
any circumstances" to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited to a party under the treaty.130 Again, such
sweeping prohibitions would pose a significant challenge for international
collaboration in any planetary defense mission involving a nuclear device.
In sum, the family of nuclear non-proliferation treaties would also inhibit
close international cooperation in a planetary defense mission. Some of the
most successful and sustained space missions have involved intimate
collaboration among multiple states, as they pool their resources, expertise,
and facilities in pursuit of goals that none of them could as readily accomplish
or afford unilaterally."' Artificially disentangling these spacefaring states,
126 Treaty of Tiatelolco, supra note 95, art. 1.1(a).
127 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Sept. 20, 2017, 52 I.L.M. 347
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/tpnw-info-kit-v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ENV-8ALJ] [hereinafter TPNW].
128 Signature/Ratification Status of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, INT'L
CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, http://www.icanw.org/status-of-the-treaty-on-the-
prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/ [http://perma.cc/E84Q-XZEW]; Positions on the Treaty, INT'L
CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, http://www.icanw.org/why-a-ban/positions/
[https://perma.cc/27PN-UG9Q] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting that 122 states voted in
favor of adopting the TPNW, 60 states have signed it, and 14 have ratified). The countries that
possess nuclear weapons, and their close allies, have declined to support the treaty.
129 TPNW, supra note 127, at art. 1.1.a, b, d.
130 TPNW, supra note 127, at art. 1.Le.
131 See, e.g., International Cooperation, NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
https://www.nasa.gov/missionpages/station/cooperation/index.html_[https://perma.cc/LD5P-
Q5N4]_(last visited Sept. 18, 2018); Elizabeth Howell, International Space Station: Facts,
History & Tracking, SPACE.COM (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.space.com/ 16748-international-
space-station.html [http://perma.cc/N2J8-JPMU]J; D.A. Broniatowski et al., The Case for
Managed International Cooperation in Space Exploration (CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD.,
126
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impeding their interaction because of differential status under other treaties,
would therefore likely impose a cost on mission performance, but that is what
international law requires. The states that have legally foresworn possession
of nuclear weapons might have to be completely excluded from the operation;
certainly, the degree of their engagement in the aspects related to the nuclear
explosion would be greatly constrained.' 32
IV. LEGAL WORK-AROUNDS
Even if the OST, the LTBT, and the collection of nuclear non-
proliferation treaties greatly impede some, or all, states' abilities to employ a
nuclear explosive device for planetary defense, there are some legally
available solutions. This Part surveys several options, beginning with those
that are contained within the familiar repertoire of standard treaty law. Next,
the Part addresses a more novel concept, reliance upon the extraordinary
prescriptive authority of the UN Security Council, and concludes that the
powers arising under Chapter VII of the UN Charter offer the most
advantageous path forward.
Finally, this Part addresses the more general, philosophical question of
how much international law does, and should, matter in this type of situation.
If humanity were truly facing an existential crisis, in the form of an onrushing
asteroid that could not be abated in any other way, perhaps the constraints of
the nuclear treaties should simply be peremptorily waived or disregarded.
That sort of logic has some irresistible appeal, but this Part concludes that the
world can, and must, develop a more capacious response, both for true
emergencies and for the preparatory actions that might prudently be
undertaken far in anticipation of a future, but not currently certain or
imminent, crisis.
A. Treaty Law
1. Amendment
One obvious option, when a treaty's terms stand in the way of a set of
2006).
132 For example, Kazakhstan, from where many space missions are launched, is a non-nuclear-
weapon state under the NPT, a party to the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty,
and a signatory and leading proponent of TPNW. Accordingly, Kazakhstan could not possess
a nuclear device or allow one on its territory, and could not assist, encourage, or induce the use
of a nuclear device.
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actions that might be vital to global security, would be to alter the treaty. Each
of the treaties cited above contains individualized provisions for
amendment.' 3 3
However, the amendment procedure is frequently cumbersome and time-
consuming; most of the treaties discussed here have never, or very rarely, been
amended. The NPT, for example, specifies that an amendment cannot become
effective for any party until it has been approved by a majority of all parties,
all of the NWS, and all of the other parties that are members of the Board of
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Even then, the
amendment is operational only for the states that agree to accept it, creating a
distinct possibility that the reformed rules could be applicable to some of the
NPT parties, while others continued to cling to the original terms of the
treaty. 134
The LTBT is a bit easier to amend. There, an amendment requires support
from a majority of all parties, including unanimity among the three "Original
Parties" (Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) who retain veto
power. Once approved by that process, the amendment enters into force for
all parties, including those who did not support it.' 35
An alternative to formal amendment would be for the parties to the treaty
to issue an authoritative joint statement of interpretation (or re-interpretation)
of it, through which they could, by consensus, propound a revised meaning of
the relevant terms. Parties could similarly supersede the instrument's text via
their concerted behavior, effectively displacing some of the original
obligations, including via customary international law.' 36 Again, however, a
lack of unanimity would be troubling: what if some, but not all, parties to the
treaty agreed to alter its meaning in the context of a planetary defense mission?
133 See generally, VCLT, supra note 76, arts. 39-41. See also Jutta Brunnee, Treaty
Amendments, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIEs 347 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012).
134 NPT, supra note 108, art. VIII.
135 LTBT, supra note 4, art. II.
136 VCLT, supra note 76, art. 31.3(b) (in construing a treaty, authorities should take into account
"any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation." See, e.g., Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties
to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Additional
Understandings and Agreements Reached by Previous Review Conferences Relating to Each
Article of the Convention, UN Doc. BWC/CONF.VII/INF.5, (Sept. 28, 2011) (collecting the
authoritative statements of interpretation agreed to by parties to the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention).
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2. Withdrawal
Besides amendment, another option is withdrawal. Each of these treaties
(in somewhat varying terms) allows a party to exit the treaty if it determines
that extraordinary events related to the treaty have jeopardized its supreme
national interests. The withdrawal cannot be accomplished immediately: the
LTBT and the NPT each requires three months' notice; the OST requires one
year's notice. 137
Obviously, withdrawal from a treaty of such consequence would be a
momentous event; no party has ever withdrawn from the LTBT or the OST,
or even publicly threatened or discussed the option.' 3 8 Only North Korea has
withdrawn from the NPT, triggering profound international condemnation and
sanctions. 3 9 Withdrawal by a leading country-and afortiori, a simultaneous
exit from multiple treaties by multiple primary actors-would provoke a
137 OST, supra note 3, art. XVI; LTBT, supra note 4, art IV; NPT, supra note 108, art. X.1. As
a variation, the parties could terminate the entire treaty by unanimous consent at any time,
without a waiting period, under VCLT, supra note 76, art. 54. See generally, RESTATEMENT,
supra note 70, sec. 332; Laurence R. Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO
TREATIES 634 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012).
138 See Lt. Col. Peter Garretson, Re-Opening the American Frontier: Recent Congressional
Hearings on Space, SPACE REv. (July 3, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3275/1
lhttp://perma.cc/KE4L-UKMA]; Jeff Foust, Is It Time to Update the Outer Space Treaty?,
SPACE REv. (June 5, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3256/1
[http://perma.cc/F773-EVHT]; John Hickman, Still Crazy after Four Decades: The Case for
Withdrawing from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, SPACE REv. (Sept. 24, 2007),
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/960/1 [http://perma.cc/22VP-ZPDJ].
Note that presumably a withdrawal must be justified by the withdrawing state's own supreme
national interests; the provisions do not contemplate a good Samaritan exiting a treaty in order
to serve some other state's supreme interests. In addition, note that the withdrawing state would
still be bound by the parts of the relevant treaty that have become customary international law.
OST art. IV is probably customary international law, while the status of relevant provisions of
the LTBT or NPT is not clear. See OST, supra note 3, art. IV; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note
9, at 53 (explaining that a state that withdrew from the OST would still be bound by those treaty
provisions that have passed into customary international law).
139 Frederic L. Kirgis, North Korea's Withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonprolferation Treaty,
Am. SOCY OF INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Jan. 24, 2003),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/2/north-koreas-withdrawal-nuclear-
nonproliferation-treaty [http://perma.cc/EU9H-J7Y2]; Chronology of U.S.-North Korean
Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron [http://perma.cc/M53A-36LV] (last
updated Sept. 14, 2018); John Gershman & Wade L. Huntley, North Korea & the NPT, IST. FOR
POL'Y STUD. (Oct. 2, 2005), https://ips-dc.org/north korea the npt/ [http://perma.cc/T49S-
YZGM].
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crisis.1 4 0  But perhaps a withdrawal done for the specific purpose of
undertaking a vital planetary defense mission could be tolerated - especially
if the affected state(s) promptly re-join the treat(ies) once the mission was
successfully concluded.141
3. Novation
Another option could be novation-the negotiation and conclusion of a
new treaty dealing in a different way with some or all of the subject matter of
the existing accords. The replacement instrument could then supersede the
original documents, displacing their older rules with newer provisions
precisely tailored to the exigency of planetary defense. However, the creation
of a successor agreement would likely be a difficult and time-consuming
diplomatic activity, and even if successful, it would establish the new
provisions only for states that voluntarily became parties to the new
arrangement; a state that decided to cling only to the original instrument would
not have its treaty rights and responsibilities altered.1 42
4. Action by Non-Parties
Another strategy would be to arrange to have the planetary defense
activities undertaken only by states that have not joined the particular treaty
140 Some important treaties permit more finesse: a temporary and partial suspension of selected
provisions of the treaty, rather than a complete withdrawal. Treaties on human rights, for
example, sometimes allow a derogation in emergency circumstances. See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (allowing a party to derogate from certain
provisions of the treaty in a time of officially declared public emergency that threatens the life
of the nation); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations
from Human Rights Treaties, 65 INT'L ORG. 673 (2011). None of the treaties under
consideration in this Article contains that sort of provision. In addition, some provisions of the
LTBT and other treaties might well be regarded as suspended during a time of international
armed conflict, but not under the circumstances of a planetary defense danger.
141 The withdrawing state could even re-join the treaty immediately, without waiting until after
it had completed the planetary defense mission, if it submitted a reservation to exclude or
modify the provisions of the treaty related to the mission it was about to undertake, and if other
parties accepted the reservation. VCLT, supra note 76, arts. 2.1(d), 19-23. See INSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES, supra note 69, at 27 (suggesting that in a planetary defense emergency, an expedited,
temporary withdrawal from a treaty may be tolerated).
142 See generally, VCLT, supra note 76, arts. 30, 59; RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, sec. 323.
See also Liara M. Covert, Before Celestial Bodies Collide - Enhanced Dialogue and
Coordination: Precursors to a Treaty for Effective Near Earth Object (NEO) Response, 46
PROC. OF THE INST. OF SPACE L. 276 (2003).
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in question.1 43 As noted supra, France and China have never signed, ratified,
or acceded to the LTBT; a few spacefaring states are outside the OST; and
India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan have stayed away from the NPT.
Accordingly, those states would be legally unconstrained about planetary
defense activities regulated by those respective instruments.1 4 4 However, this
artifice does not readily circumvent all the relevant treaties for any of the
leading states, and as a political matter, certain key global actors (particularly
Russia and the United States) might be unwilling to stand by and delegate
nuclear planetary defense responsibility to others. In addition, treaty
provisions that restrict parties from "assisting, encouraging, or in any way
participating in" nuclear explosions would also disrupt collective action, and
would even hinder indirect support.
5. Excuse the Non-performance
Finally, there is the important possibility that the leading states might
simply violate the relevant treaties and the other parties might forgive or
tolerate (or even welcome) that action. The states conducting the planetary
defense operation might overtly acknowledge that they are departing from
important legal commitments by employing nuclear explosive devices for the
mission, and frankly admit that they are not pursuing a lawfully-prescribed
path. They might then assert that the extreme conditions of an incoming
143 It might also be possible to have the planetary defense mission be undertaken by a non-state
actor, such as a private corporation or an international organization (such as the United Nations
or the European Space Agency) that would build or receive nuclear and space launch
capabilities, but was not a party to any of the relevant treaties. But individual states would still
be involved in the program, at least as assisting, encouraging or inducing the activities, which
could violate those states' treaty obligations. Notably, transferring a nuclear weapon "to any
recipient whatsoever" would be a violation of the NPT. NPT, supra note 108, art. I. Moreover,
each party to the OST is responsible for the space activities of its nationals, and for activities
conducted via international intergovernmental organizations. OST, supra note 3, arts. VI, XIII.
See Kiernan Tinkler, Rogue Satellites Launched into Outer Space: Legal and Policy
Implications, JUST SEC. (June 7, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/57496/rogue-satellites-
launched-outer-space-legal-policy-implications/ [http://perma.cc/GF73-AJ74]; Tronchetti,
supra note 67, at 1035-36; George D. Kyriakopoulos, Legal Challenges Posed by the Action of
Non-State Actors in Outer Space, in McGILL MONOGRAPH SERIES V: CONFLICTS IN SPACE AND
THE RULE OF LAw 273 (Maria Manoli & Sandy Belle Habchi eds., 2018).
1" States that have declined to join the relevant treaty would nonetheless be bound by any
provisions that have become customary international law, such as OST art. IV. See OST, supra
note 3, arts. IV.
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asteroid constituted "circumstances precluding the wrongfulness"'4 5 of their
interventions, invoking the acknowledged principles of distress, necessity,
and consent.'4 6
Distress establishes a justification or excuse for temporary non-
compliance with a treaty obligation when there is "no other reasonable way"
to save human life.1 4 7 The companion concept of necessity applies when an
otherwise-unlawful act is "the only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril," which does not necessarily
jeopardize human lives.1 48 These criteria are stringent. They are not intended
to allow states to wiggle too easily out of binding legal commitments-it
would have to be a scenario in which a nuclear explosion objectively became
the only viable mechanism for avoiding a catastrophe on Earth. 149 A state may
not invoke distress if the situation is due, in part, to its own conduct'
(including, perhaps, its delict in not pursuing alternative non-nuclear remedies
early enough) or if the act in question is likely to create a comparable or
145 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
Commentaries 169, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10,
2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), G.A. Res. 56/83 (Dec. 12,
2001), corrected by A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4 [hereinafter ILC]. See Stubbe, supra note 9, at 72-
74 (describing the status of the ILC draft articles).
146 The related concept of force majeure would not quite be applicable for a planetary defense
mission. That excuse applies when an irresistible force compels a state to violate a legal duty,
such as when a severe storm causes a state's ship or aircraft to navigate into a location it is
legally forbidden to enter. Force majeure is not available when a state voluntarily undertakes
an action; only when the state is physically unable to perform its obligations. In the context of
planetary defense, an asteroid striking Earth may create conditions under which an impacted
state would subsequently find it simply impossible to comply with some of its legal
commitments under other treaties (such as an obligation to pay money or to export specified
materials), but it would not justify departing from treaty obligations before the impact, by
voluntarily using nuclear devices to prevent the asteroid collision. ILC, supra note 145, at art.
23.
147 ILC, supra note 145, at art. 24. The distinguishing feature of distress, in this context, is that
the state actor is motivated to save his or her own life or the lives of people entrusted to his or
her care, regardless of nationality; it is not aimed at more general emergencies, as necessity can
be. Id., cmt. 1, 7.
148 ILC, supra note 145, at art. 25. Necessity may be invoked to protect a wide variety of critical
interests, including preserving the environment or ensuring the safety of a population. Id., cmt.
14.
149 ILC, supra note 145, at art. 25, comment 15 (a plea of necessity is excluded if the illegal act
can be avoided by pursuing other available legal options that are simply more expensive or less
convenient). See Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung,/Slovak.), 1997 I.C.J. 4, at 39-46 (Sept.
25, 1997) (denying a claim of necessity).
15o ILC, supra note 145, at art. 24.2(a), comment 9.
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greater peril for others'' (including, perhaps, if a nuclear explosion would
shatter the asteroid, rather than divert it, generating even more grievous,
widespread harm). Necessity, likewise, applies only to extreme cases; it is not
available if the danger is merely possible, distant, or contingent,' 52 and the
acting state cannot be the sole judge of how imperative the motivation is.' 53
Consent can also be a circumstance that precludes wrongfulness. That is,
any state that requests, participates in, or otherwise supports a nuclear
planetary defense mission would effectively waive its objection to the
violation of the relevant treaties. Widespread multilateral engagement or at
least endorsement for the anti-asteroid nuclear activity would therefore carry
legal significance. However, states that affirmatively object or that passively
decline to consent would not be precluded from complaining about the breach
of their legal rights. 15
151 ILC, supra note 145, at art. 24.2(b), comment 10 (citing an illustration of a military aircraft
carrying explosives that might cause a disaster in making an illegal emergency landing at a
civilian airport, so it might not be able to invoke the distress doctrine).
152 ILC, supra note 145, at art. 25, comments 15-16 (noting that a peril that will occur in the
distant future might nonetheless be considered imminent as soon as it is discovered, if a long
lead time would be required to counteract it).
153 ILC, supra note 145, at art. 25, comment 16 (noting that informed experts might have
different views about how grave and imminent a peril is, and about whether the proposed
response is the only effective step available).
154 LC, supra note 145, at art. 20. See I.C. MacGibbon, The Scope of Acquiescence in
International Law, 31 BRIT.Y.B. INT'LL. 143 (1954) (assessing how to construe state inaction).
Since a planetary defense operation would be so prominent and conspicuous, it might be fair to
construe silence and inaction as consent - but there could still be states that affirmatively object.
See also Tronchetti, supra note 67, at 1039 (observing that under the non-legally-binding
International Charter on Space and Major Disasters, art. 5(4), signed October 20, 2000, states
have agreed that no liability shall accrue for actions or inactions undertaken under the charter).
See INT'L CHARTER SPACE & MAJOR DISASTERS,
https://disasterscharter.org/web/guest/home;jsessionid=09E2940249756FFE5E1 29EE1 B 1FE
E467jvml [http://perma.cc/YB87-6SWT] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018). Similar cross-waivers
of liability exist for many space operations, such as among participants in the International
Space Station under the Agreement Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space
Station, Jan. 29, 1998, T.I.A.S. 12927 (entered into force Mar. 27, 2001); International Space
Station Legal Framework, EuRo. SPACE AGENCY,
https://www.esa.int/OurActivities/Human Spaceflight/International Space_Station/Internati
onalSpaceStation legal framework [http://perma.cc/RBJ9-2X2B]_(last updated Nov. 19,
2013). See generally Vonder Dunk, supra note 74, at 15-16 (reviewing liability waivers). Note,
however, that a party to a treaty like the LTBT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco is also obligated not
to encourage or induce a state to undertake any action inconsistent with the treaty; such
provisions would preclude the party from consenting or acquiescing to actions of that sort.
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Another related alternative could be to invoke the doctrine about a
"fundamental change of circumstances" to suspend the operation of the
relevant treaties. Under international law, a party may dodge a treaty's
provisions if the relevant conditions have been altered in a way that is
unforeseen, affects an "essential basis" for the parties' joining the treaty, and
radically transforms the obligations.' This escape hatch might initially seem
applicable in a planetary defense scenario, but modern international law has
established a tough standard for employing it. In particular, the
"unforeseeability" criterion would be problematic here.'5 6
Finally, the doctrine of individual and collective national self-defense
might also be thought applicable here, because it is preserved as an "inherent
right" of sovereigns under article 51 of the UN Charter. '5  However, this
particular right of self-defense applies only in the event of an "armed attack,"
and the relevant portions of the Charter address provocations amounting to a
"use of force" or an "act of aggression," not natural phenomena such as an
asteroid impact. 5  That important body of law, therefore, is essentially
irrelevant to planetary defense, despite the similarity of some of the rhetoric.1 59
LTBT, supra note 4, art. 1.2; Treaty of Tiatelolco, supra note 95, art. 1.2.
155 VCLT, supra note 76, art. 62.
156 See Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 149, at 64-65 (denying a claim of changed
circumstances);. BARRY E. CARTER, ALLEN S. WEINER, & DUNCAN HOLLIS, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 118-19 (7th ed., 2018) (discussing how modern international law has deliberately
narrowed the availability of this excuse for non-performance of treaty obligations).
157 U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 51.
158 Id arts. 51, 2.4, 39. See Tronchetti, supra note 67, at 1033.
159 In its 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the
International Court of Justice famously determined that it could not conclude definitively
whether a use of nuclear weapons "would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of
self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake." Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 266 ¶ 105(2)(E) (July 8). See
also id. ¶ 96 (affirming "the fundamental right of every State to survival, and thus to its right to
resort to self-defence"). The jeopardy to a state's very survival might be present in a planetary
defense scenario, so it might be thought that this paragraph of the advisory opinion represents
legal authority in support of the possible use of a nuclear device in self-defense against an
asteroid. However, the ICJ's analysis and conclusions are pervasively grounded in the context
of international humanitarian law (the body of law relevant to armed conflict, also known as
the law of war), id. ¶¶ 42, 51, 78, 85, and 96 (tying the right of self-defense to article 51 of the
UN Charter, where the right is triggered by an "armed attack.") An incoming NEO would
hardly qualify as an "armed attack," so the self-defense provisions of art. 51, and the entire
Advisory Opinion, are largely irrelevant to the present legal analysis. The use of a nuclear
explosive device in response to an asteroid might well constitute a "use of force," but it would
not be a use of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," so
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B. UN Security Council Action
Instead of any of these options, this Article concludes that the wisest, most
reliable choice to establish an avenue for using a nuclear device in planetary
defense in a manner consistent with international law would be to proceed via
the UN Security Council. The UN Charter affords the Security Council
extraordinary authority for maintaining international peace and security.
Pursuant to its Chapter VII responsibility, the Security Council may
"determine the existence of any threat to the peace," and "decide what
measures shall be taken" in response.1 6 0 All United Nations members agree
to "accept and carry out" the decisions of the Security Council,16' and to "join
in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by
the Security Council."1 62  In particular, states have undertaken to "make
available to the Security Council, on its call . . . armed forces, assistance, and
facilities . . . necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security."1 63  A binding Security Council resolution therefore provides
international law's surest, most effective measure for uniting and compelling
all states to support and assist a planetary defense measure, and for relieving
them of potentially conflicting legal obligations.1 64
article 2(4) would be irrelevant. In fact, as the court noted, id. ¶ 39, "A weapon that is already
unlawfulper se, whether by treaty or by custom, does not become lawful by reason of its being
used for a legitimate purpose under the Charter." See also Macak, supra note 98; Gerrard &
Barber, supra note 32, at 39-40 (arguing that a claim of self-defense should be justifiable in a
planetary defense situation, because the use of weapons there would be a "victimless activity,
harming no one and causing no violation of another nation's sovereignty."); INSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES, supra note 69, at 10-11, 28 (arguing that self-defense is valid against any threat).
Another legal theory, not explored here, could argue that a very general right of national self-
defense, against all types of threats, constitutes a "general principle of law," untethered to article
51 and independently applicable to a national response to an asteroid as well as to military
dangers. See generally Martins Paparinskis, General Principles and the Other Sources of
International Law: Conclusions, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND THE COHERENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw (Mads Andenas, et al. eds., forthcoming 2018); Tronchetti, supra note 67,
at 1033 (asserting that every state has the right of self-defense to protect its population against
any threat, subject to its compliance with international law); ILC, supra note 145, art. 21
(discussing self-defense under the UN Charter as a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness
of a state's action); U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 51 (referring to self-defense as an "inherent
right.")
"sOld art. 39.
161 Id. art. 25.
162 Id. art. 49.
163 Id. art. 43.
164 See Tronchetti, supra note 67, at 1031 (stressing that ordinarily, "no State can be forced to
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Of course, the Security Council has never had the occasion to impose its
will upon all member states in the matter of planetary defense, and most
traditional Chapter VII resolutions have concerned intense military
provocations involving a single state or region, such as an international armed
attack or an act of aggression, or a profound breakdown of internal law and
order.1 65 But the Security Council in recent years has conspicuously exercised
its legislative powers and expanded the parameters of a "threat to the peace,"
applying that label to diverse types of incipient dangers, such as terrorism and
the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons, untethered to a specific
geographic site.1 66 Most tellingly, in 2014, the Security Council also labeled
the Ebola virus as a threat to international peace and security, establishing a
precedent for invoking Chapter VII powers against a natural phenomenon. 167
undertake or cooperate in an international action for planetary defense," citing G.A. Res. 51/122
at 3 (Dec. 13, 1996)); Larsen, supra note 74 (evaluating alternative models for international
decision-making regarding asteroid threats).
15 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 660 (Aug. 2, 1990) (finding a breach of international peace and security
in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait); S.C. Res. 1590 (Mar. 24, 2005) (finding that the situation in
Sudan (Darfur) constituted a threat to international peace and security); S.C. Res. 2094 (Mar.
7, 2013) (condemning North Korea's nuclear weapon test and demanding a series of remedial
actions).
166 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 2, 2004); S.C. Res. 1695 (July 15, 2006); S.C. Res. 1718
(Oct. 14, 2006) (citing proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their
means of delivery as constituting a threat to international peace and security); S.C. Res. 1787
(Dec. 10, 2007); S.C. Res. 2178 (Sept. 24, 2014) (reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security); S.C. Res. 1534
(Mar. 26, 2004) (exercising Chapter VII powers in support of the international criminal
tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia). In other cases, the Security Council has not
yet adopted the precise rhetoric and special powers of Chapter VII, but it has come close. See,
e.g., S.C. Res. 688 (Apr. 5, 1991) (gravely concerned about the repression of the Iraqi civilian
population, which has led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international
frontiers, threatening international peace and security); S.C. Res. 1208 (Nov. 19, 1998)
(addressing refugee flows); S.C. Res. 2417 (May 24, 2018) (citing food insecurity and famine).
See also Patrik Johansson, Equivocal Resolve? Toward a Definition of Chapter VII Resolutions
(Umed Working Papers in peace and Conflict Stud., no. 7) (2008); Katharina Remshardt, Under
What Conditions Has the UN Been Able to Use Its Chapter VII Powers?, E-INT'L REL.
STUDENTS (Nov. 13, 2010), http://www.e-ir.info/2010/11/13/under-what-conditions-has-the-
un-been-able-to-use-its -chapter-vii-powers/ [https://perma.cc/4398-837J]; Christopher K.
Penny, Climate Change and the Security Council: A Preliminary Framework for Implementing
Remedial Measures Through Chapter VII of the UN Charter (CISDL Legal Working Paper,
2007).
16 S.C. Res. 2177 (Sept. 18, 2014) (determining that the unprecedented extent of the Ebola
outbreak in Africa constituted a threat to international peace and security). See also S.C. Res.
1308 (July 17, 2000) recognizing that the HIV/AIDS crisis may pose a risk to stability and
security); S.C. Res. 2349 (Mar. 31, 2017) (addressing climate change).
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Arranging a mandatory, global response to an incoming large asteroid would
not stretch the prescriptive scope of Chapter VII impermissibly far.1 68
Notably, when the Security Council determines the existence of a threat,
decides on a response, and authorizes or orders countries to carry out a
mandate, its law-making powers supersede prior inconsistent treaty
obligations. Under article 103 of the UN Charter, if there is a conflict between
states' obligations under the Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement (such as the OST, LTBT, or NPT), the obligations
under the Charter shall prevail.1 69  A Security Council decision does not
"amend" the prior treaties, but it effectively displaces them, providing a new,
superior legal rule. 7 0
168 Tronchetti, supra note 67, at 1034. Some have challenged the Security Council's new
propensity to assume this type of general legislative role, arguing that international law should
be created by states via treaty. See The Security Council as Global Legislator (Vesselin
Popovski and Trudy Fraser eds., Routledge, 2014); Shirley V. Scott, Climate Change and Peak
Oil as Threats to International Peace and Security: Is It Time for the Security Council to
Legislate? 9 MELB. J. INT'L L. 495 (2008); Jos6 E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law
Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873-888 (2003); Daniel H. Joyner, Non-proliferation Law and
the United Nations System: Resolution 1540 and the Limits of the Power of the Security
Council, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 489 (2007); Eric Rosand, The Security Council as "Global
Legislator": Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 542 (2005); Matthew
Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations, 16
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 593 (2003); Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM.
J. INT'L L. 901 (2002); Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council:
Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (2008).
Note that U.N. Charter art. 42, specifies that the Security Council may act via "air, sea, or land
forces," and the non-mention of space forces could be deemed significant. U.N. Charter, supra
note 2, art. 42. Of course, in 1945 the drafters of the Charter did not also contemplate and
specify the availability of space forces, and inclusion of that component should now be implicit.
See Ricky J. Lee, The Jus ad Bellum in Outer Space: The Interrelation Between Article 103 of
the Charter of the United Nations and Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, 45 PROC. ON L.
OUTER SPACE 139, 145-47 (2002); Gerardine Meishan Goh, Keeping the Peace in Outer Space:
A Legal Framework for the Prohibition of the Use ofForce, 20 SPACE POL'Y 259, 266 (2004).
169 U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 103. But see Lee, supra note 168, at 141-42 (questioning
whether a Security Council resolution can require a state to take action in contravention of a
treaty).
170 Many people perceive a legitimacy problem or democracy deficit in the UN Security
Council, since its membership - especially the five permanent members - does not reflect the
composition of the world community as a whole. In particular, for purposes of making
decisions regarding planetary defense, it is notable that the Security Council does not include
all the countries that possess nuclear weapons, all the countries that exercise space capabilities,
or all the countries that might be strongly affected by a NEO. In addition, there is the perpetual
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As a political matter, an exercise of the Security Council would carry the
further advantage of underscoring the characterization of the future planetary
defense exercise as a unique emergency, justifying an exceptional departure
from traditional legal routines-this would be a highly unusual procedure,
reflecting the grave circumstances. In addition, going through the Security
Council would ensure that the planet's most powerful and influential states,
those most capable of undertaking this unprecedented and intricate space
mission, would be fully engaged from the outset. The veto power wielded by
the five permanent members of the Security Council, which could be viewed
as a potential impediment to swift movement, would also ensure that the
course of action ultimately selected represented a consensus among the crucial
participants. 171
In sum, a Chapter VII resolution from the UN Security Council provides
by far the fastest, most deft mechanism for dealing with treaty provisions that
stand in the way of an effective nuclear planetary defense mission. A
resolution could be tailored to the specific needs of the immediate situation,
and it could designate particular countries to perform and to support the
various necessary functions, notwithstanding their other miscellaneous
contrary prior legal obligations.172 No other body, including the UN General
Assembly, wields comparable law-making authority.1 73
C. Three Scenarios
Before proceeding to offer a model draft of a proposed Security Council
resolution enabling nuclear planetary defense, one other set of topics must be
danger that effective action might be delayed or defeated in the Security Council by the threat
or exercise of the veto power. Under the UN Charter, states that are not members of the Security
Council are sometimes allowed to participate in its deliberations, without having a vote. See
U.N. Charter, supra note 2, arts. 31-32.
171 The Security Council is organized to function continuously and to convene at very short
notice as necessary to respond to emergencies. Id. art. 28.
172 A variation - especially applicable in a non-emergency situation, such as prior to the
discovery of a large threatening NEO-would be for the Security Council to exercise its powers
under Chapter VI, rather than Chapter VII of the Charter. Those provisions are directed at
"Pacific Settlement of Disputes," rather than at a danger shared by all countries, but there are
some similarities in approach. Article 33 of the Charter addresses a situation the "continuance
of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security," and calls
for "a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means." This procedure could
be a predicate to the Security Council's invocation of its mandatory powers under Chapter VII.
Id. ch. VI.
173 See id. ch. IV (discussing the powers of the General Assembly).
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addressed: questions of timing and probability, and the concomitant need to
differentiate between emergency and non-emergency situations, and between
certainty and possibility regarding the likelihood, location and effects of an
asteroid strike. Three distinct types of planetary defense situations must be
differentiated.
First, in a genuine global emergency, when a large asteroid is bearing
down on Earth with only a short advance warning and little lead time for
careful deliberation and international negotiation, most people and countries
would surely rally behind the imperative for urgent action. They might not
immediately cede full carte blanche powers to whatever self-appointed state
volunteered to undertake a hasty nuclear planetary defense mission, but they
might relatively quickly come to a consensus about Security Council action to
authorize and plan an effective intervention. Failing agreement in the Security
Council, states might reasonably demand that those who were capable of
launching a protective operation should do so, even if it involved use of a
nuclear weapon, regardless of any treaty constraints. The instinct would be
strong to tear up or disregard the law, doing what is necessary for survival.
In the aftermath (assuming that the mission was successful) there would
be sufficient opportunity to weigh the possible legal responsibilities. Defenses
such as distress, necessity, and consent might excuse the actors' violation of
their treaty obligations, and it would be deemed absurd and unreasonable 74 to
interpret international legal standards that had been crafted for very different
purposes to stand in the way of altruistic action that was necessary to
safeguard sheer human existence. '7  This might well be an instance where
seeking forgiveness after the fact is preferable to seeking permission
beforehand. 176
174 As noted supra, text accompanying note 78, under the VCLT, recourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation (i.e., consulting the negotiating history of the treaty, in
addition to the ordinary meaning of the words used in the document) to determine the meaning
of the instrument, when the usual mode of analysis "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd
or unreasonable." VCLT, supra note 76, art. 32. However, this procedure merely allows
consultation of the earlier context of the development of the treaty; it does not provide a more
general escape hatch for disregarding the treaty's terms or rejecting its clear meaning.
175 As noted, supra note 64 states undertaking a planetary defense mission will also need to
attend to the Liability Convention, which includes absolute financial responsibility to
compensate those damaged on Earth by space activities.
176 For comparison, the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, undertaken in 1999 in
response to the atrocities in Kosovo, lacked any clear authorization under international law, but
many concluded that it should be pursued nonetheless, because it served critical humanitarian
goals. Subsequently, this war was frequently described as being "illegal, but legitimate," and
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A second scenario, however, also requires attention. What if there is
danger, but also doubt-what if the best calculations that the scientific
community can offer are hedged in probabilities, with important uncertainty
about the likelihood of an Earth impact, its location, and the magnitude and
extent of the damage? It is quite plausible that the experts may disagree about
the composition and trajectory of the asteroid, especially early in the process,
when the fateful intersection with Earth's orbit remains somewhat distant. 177
In the circumstances that may prevail in advance of any last-minute
emergency, states may well differ in their diagnoses and prescriptions. Some
may favor immediate action of one sort, while others may advocate a different
type of response or counsel more patience for the development of greater
certainty about the eventual impact and the creation of improved non-nuclear
planetary defense methods. Especially if the asteroid were projected to cause
devastation on a local or regional scale, rather than worldwide, states located
in the predicted concussion zone may view the inhibitions of international law
differently from others-and the roles might switch, if additional data led to
refined estimates of the asteroid's probable arrival point.
In these conditions, when the perceived threat is looming but not yet
imminent, states may be appreciably less willing to trust an assertive space
actor, and they may not be so willing to preemptively suspend important treaty
provisions. Especially where nuclear explosives are concerned, some may be
suspicious that a volunteering state was really attempting to develop or
maintain its weapons capabilities, and was cynically using the distant asteroid
as a pretext. 7 8
the precedential value of that experience has been widely debated. See INDEP. INT'L COMM'N
ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED
(2000); Jack Goldsmith, More on the UN Charter, Syria, and "Illegal but Legitimate,"
LAWFARE (Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-un-charter-syria-and-illegal-
legitimate [https://perma.cc/E4XS-2TUA]; Marko Milanovic, Illegal But Legitimate?, EJIL:
TALK! (Apr.10, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/illegal-but-legitimate/ [https://perma.cc/QJ5W-
M83U].
177 See, e.g., Planetary Defense Conference Exercise-2017, JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
(May 15, 2017), https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/pd/cs/pdcl7/ [https://perma.cc/9UXM-D899]
(presenting a simulation exercise that begins with substantial uncertainty about the likelihood
of a NEO impact and the projected location; knowledge about the asteroid's parameters
improves over time, demanding additional decisions from the participants); MELAMED &
MELAMED, supra note 68, at 5-7 (discussing a simulated NEO impact scenario).
178 Gerrard & Barber, supra note 32, at 38-39; Mick, supra note 80; Patrick E. Tyler, Chinese
Seek Atom Option to Fend Off Asteroids, N.Y. TIMEs 4 (Apr. 27, 1996) (reporting Chinese
opposition to the CTBT on the grounds that nuclear explosions may be needed to divert an
asteroid). Most states have observed a moratorium on nuclear testing for twenty years or more,
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Third, at an even earlier stage in the analytical process, some might argue
that if a nuclear device might ever potentially be needed for planetary defense,
we should start preparing for that eventuality now, not waiting until a
threatening asteroid is detected on the horizon. To be prudent, the argument
might run, we should not rely upon whatever nuclear explosive devices,
associated equipment, and operational techniques happened to be available in
states' inventories when the need actually arises. Instead, we should
immediately begin to design, develop, test, and manufacture the exact type (or
types) of nuclear explosives that would be optimally suitable for this most
demanding and novel mission, and we should thoroughly practice their
functioning. Even if the odds are strongly against ever needing to bank on a
nuclear device, the consequences of a lack of preparedness are extreme, and
we should not leave the planet's fate to devices that simply happened to be on
hand-we should not wait until the crisis is upon us to make sure we have the
capability to respond effectively.' 7 9
In that third scenario-roughly where the world stands today-states
might well adopt very different postures. Some might advocate abrogating
the LTBT, so as to allow the testing in space of nuclear devices intended to be
optimized for deflecting or destroying asteroids, while others might see those
actions as attempts to wreck the fragile strands of arms control.'o Some might
despite their potential interest in using explosive tests to develop new types of nuclear weapons
or to validate the continuing viability of their existing stockpiles. Some may therefore see a
nuclear planetary defense mission as an opportunity to test their weapons under the shelter of a
more legitimate cover story (and some states will be suspicious that others may be pursuing
such an opportunity). See Nuclear Testing, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY ORG.
PREPARATORY COMMISSION, https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/ [https://perma.cc/UJ8H-
2R9D] (last visited Sept. 18, 2018).
179 See NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 76 (describing adaptations that would
be necessary to convert a standard nuclear weapon into a planetary defense device and
suggesting that it would be a time-consuming process); Strauss, supra note 38 (describing
proposals for experimental nuclear interceptors to divert asteroids); Brian Kaplinger et al.,
Nuclear Fragmentation/Dispersion Modeling and Simulation of Hazardous Near-Earth
Objects, 90 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 156 (2013) (noting the lack of experimental data in evaluating
different approaches to the use of a nuclear explosion for asteroid mitigation); DEALING WITH
THE THREAT TO EARTH FROM ASTEROIDS AND COMETS, supra note 13, at 65 (positing that a
campaign involving multiple launches might be necessary to develop appropriate techniques
for use of nuclear devices against an asteroid).
so Thomas Graham Jr. & Russell L. Schweickart, NASA's Flimsy Argument for Nuclear
Weapons, Sci. Am. (Mar. 1, 2008 (criticizing the concept of using a nuclear explosive to divert
an asteroid, because it would jeopardize progress on the much greater immediate imperative,
elimination of nuclear weapons); Gerrard & Barber, supra note 32, at 18-19; SAGAN, supra
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seek to withdraw from the NPT, in order to collaborate more effectively on
the nuclear weapons aspects of a planetary defense mission, while others
might decry that as a dissolution of the consensus against the further
dissemination of nuclear weapons. Some might be eager to renounce the
OST,' in order to proceed expeditiously to develop and deploy the most
capacious planetary defense mechanisms, while others would oppose the
abrupt ruination of the foundation of space law. The array of circumstances
that might be available to preclude a finding of international legal
wrongfulness in a true emergency (such as the doctrines of necessity and
distress) would be much less availing if employed well before the "last clear
chance."
In sum, some foreseeable circumstances, involving an imminent threat to
Earth, might prompt a global consensus that tosses aside the treaty constraints
identified above, but other cases could be much more controversial. Making
momentous decisions in an emergency is not optimal; a better global strategy
would be to evaluate the options well in advance, when we have the luxury of
time and unforced legal contemplation. The next Part of the Article, therefore,
presents one such construct: a proposed Security Council resolution to be
adopted today, as a far-sighted precursor to future emergency action.
V. PROPOSED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
What follows is a candidate Security Council resolution, together with
annotations that cite the precedents and origins of some of the passages and
explain the drafter's options and choices. It is styled as a resolution that could
be adopted today, but it attempts to deal with future contingencies that could
pose either a stark emergency with worldwide consequences, or a somewhat
less certain and less global catastrophe. It resolves some controversies
immediately, and defers others for later development, depending upon the
emerging facts and planetary defense capabilities.
The Security Council,'82
note 37, at 317; Douglas Birch, The Plans to Use Nuclear Weapons to Blow Up Incoming
Asteroids, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2013) (reporting concerns that the concept of using a nuclear
device against an asteroid might have been driven by a post-cold war need to find useful
employment for U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories).
181 See Hickman, supra note 138 (arguing that the OST has disincentivized exploration of space,
by restricting sovereign claims). See also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-449,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: ACTIONS NEEDED BY NNSA To CLARIFY DISMANTLEMENT PERFORMANCE
GOAL 40-41 (Apr. 2014) (reporting that the U.S. government is delaying the dismantlement of
excess nuclear weapons, in order to retain some for possible use in planetary defense).
182 The paragraphs of the preamble of a Security Council resolution are not traditionally
142
Exoatmospheric Plowshares: Using a Nuclear Explosive Device for
Planetary Defense Against an Incoming Asteroid 143
1. Aware of the grave dangers to humanity posed by potentially
hazardous near-Earth objects (NEOs), which carry the possibility of inflicting
devastating damage upon localities, regions, and the entire planet, irrespective
of national borders, 183
2. Commending the International Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN)
and the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG) for their
contributions in research, consciousness-raising, and organizing national and
collective responses to the severe problems,18 4
3. Deeply concerned about the need to prepare for a potential catastrophe
of unprecedented scope and scale and to take extraordinary measures now and
in the future, possibly at sudden, unforeseeable times,8
4. Convinced that a coordinated, international effort will enable the most
effective response to a NEO danger,' 86
5. Strongly endorsing the continued critical importance and vitality of
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of
1967 (Outer Space Treaty), the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 1963 (Limited Test Ban
Treaty), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968
(Non-Proliferation Treaty), and other relevant international instruments, 187
numbered, but here numbers have been inserted for ease of reference.
183 This resolution would be adopted today, when there is no potentially hazardous NEO on the
horizon, but with the understanding that such a danger could be detected at any time, possibly
with little advance warning before impact. The concept is that today's action by the Security
Council would set the stage for later, more definitive action in a genuine crisis.
184 lAWN and SMPAG were acknowledged in G.A. Res. 68/75, ¶ 8 (Dec. 11, 2013), but were
not there identified by name; this resolution would be the first explicit endorsement of those
entities by the Security Council and would elevate their recognition.
15 This resolution is somewhat unusual in seeking to deal prospectively with a serious problem
that has not yet ripened; the Security Council would be recognizing that considerable additional
advance planning and preparation would be necessary to deal with the eventuality of a
hazardous NEO.
1" A critical component of the resolution is the acknowledgement of the importance of the
global nature of the necessary response. Although only a handful of states will be in a position
to participate directly in a space mission to intercept and divert or destroy an incoming large
NEO, all states will have a stake in the activity and different types of contributions may be
required from each.
17 Here, the Security Council would underscore the importance of the OST, LTBT, and NPT,
as well as other unnamed relevant international law instruments (such as those establishing
regional nuclear-weapon-free zones) and the continuing commitment to their viability. The
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6. Recognizing that traditional international legal and political
instruments and arrangements may not be sufficient to enable an effective
response to a large NEO,"
7. Mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, especially in
the face of novel and emerging global threats, 8 9
8. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 90
1. Determines that a large NEO on a collision course with Earth would
constitute a threat to international peace and security, demanding a response
that is timely, effective, and global;' 9 '
2. Decides to take action, and to authorize member states to take action,
now and in the future, to anticipate and respond to this threat;1 92
3. Anticipates that the Security Council will be prepared, as appropriate,
to authorize and require member states to use all necessary measures to
resolution could also call out the Liability Convention, supra note 64, and other components of
space law.
188 In partial contrast to preambular paragraph 5, the point here is that existing international law
instruments, for all their value, may not enable a sufficient, timely response to an incoming
NEO, so the current legal rights and responsibilities may need to be augmented, modified or
suspended.
189 This paragraph constitutes the Security Council's recognition of its special responsibilities
for dealing with global threats to the peace, including previously-unacknowledged dangers such
as NEOs. See U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 24.
190 This expression invokes the special powers of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, the source of its authority to establish binding rules for UN member states.
See id. arts. 25, 39, 48. As noted, supra note 172, the Security Council might elect to proceed
first via its Chapter VI powers, and exercise Chapter VII only when the threatening NEO is
detected.
191 This paragraph is one of the most important and precedent-setting passages of the proposed
resolution. It echoes the first preambular paragraph and translates it into operational text. A
"determination" that something constitutes a "threat to the peace" is the formal predicate for
the Security Council to exercise its Chapter VII powers. See id. art. 39. The Security Council
has never previously determined that anything like an asteroid constitutes a threat to the peace,
but it would be within the Security Council's power to expand its precedents in this way. See
supra text accompanying notes 165-68 (describing prior Security Council practice in the
exercise of Chapter VII).
192 Some of the relevant actions in response to the NEO threat will be undertaken by the Security
Council itself; in addition, the Security Council will authorize states to undertake some actions
and could in the future order states to undertake some actions, some of which might be
inconsistent with other pre -existing legal obligations.
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respond to the NEO threat;' 93
4. Understands that a future notification about a NEO danger might
provide only a short warning time, and could be accompanied by considerable
uncertainty regarding whether and where the object might strike Earth, and
regarding the scale of the damage the object might inflict, and concluding that
this uncertainty should not delay or preclude effective action; 194
5. Seeks to promote the development of enhanced capabilities for
detecting and responding to NEO dangers in a timely, effective fashion; 195
6. Calls upon IAWN and its participants to redouble their efforts,
individually and in concert, to further develop the data base of NEOs by
discovering, characterizing, tracking, and monitoring the population, to
disseminate and coordinate relevant information in a timely fashion, to alert
the world community to incipient dangers, and to coordinate campaigns for
closer inspection of key celestial bodies;1 96
193 The phrase "all necessary measures" (or "means") has become the critical term for
authorizing the use of military force. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing
states to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilians in Libya; S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29,
1990) (dealing with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait). In this resolution, the Security Council is not
yet taking that step, but is indicating its willingness to do so promptly in the future, should
circumstances warrant.
194 This paragraph reflects the persistent uncertainties about the amount of advance warning
that might be available prior to a NEO strike; about the possibly large and persistent "error
ellipse" in mapping where the NEO might hit; and about the characteristics of the NEO (e.g.,
size, composition) that will affect whether it will inflict damage of a local, regional, or global
character. Nonetheless, as an exercise of the precautionary principle, the Security Council will
not allow the incompleteness of available information to block or delay protective action. See
supra note 63 (discussing the precautionary principle).
195 This paragraph constitutes one of the core elements of the resolution: the effort to spur
greater activity toward earlier, more accurate detection, tracking and characterization of NEO
threats, and toward enhanced capabilities for remediating the dangers. The existing inventory
of NEOs is reasonably complete (but not yet perfect) for the biggest NEOs (i.e., objects larger
than about 1 km in diameter), but it is far less adequate for smaller objects that could still inflict
great damage. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24 (describing the current catalog of
NEOs).
196 IAWN is a loose confederation or a virtual network of national space agencies, non-
governmental entities, and other actors, rather than of states; it has little established
infrastructure, but serves as a clearinghouse for information and as a coordinator of diverse
actions. See supra text accompanying note 45 (describing IAWN). Note that this resolution
does not separately address the activities of private commercial actors in space, including the
incipient interest in mining asteroids to recover valuable minerals. See generally New NASA
Mission to Help Us Learn How to Mine Asteroids, NAT' L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (Aug.
8, 2013), https://www.nasa.gov/content/goddard/new-nasa-mission-to-help-us-learn-how-to-
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7. Calls upon SMPAG and its participants to likewise redouble their
efforts, individually and in concert, to develop the technologies, tools, and
techniques that would be necessary to mitigate the dangers of a NEO,
including evaluating and recommending options for timely diverting or
destroying it;197
8. Calls upon each member state to disseminate in a timely and
comprehensive fashion any information it obtains regarding NEO dangers,
taking care to ensure that the information can be understood accurately and
without inducing panic;198
9. Calls upon all member states to assist, cooperate with, and support
planetary defense activities to the best of their abilities, pursuant to their
common but differentiated responsibilities;199
mine-asteroids [http://perma.cc/RY4B-CYNQ]; Providing Resources to Fuel Industry and
Sustain Life in Space, PLANETARY RESOURCES, https://www.planetaryresources.com/
[http://perma.cc/B4HP-C2EN ] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (private corporation interested in
mining celestial bodies); Andrew Wong, Space Mining Could Become a Real Thing - and It
CouldBe Worth Trillions, CNBC (May 15, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/mining-
asteroids -could-be-worth-trillions -of-dollars.html [http://perma.cc/CB5B-W2ET]. See supra
note 143 (discussing each state's responsibility under OST art. VI for the space activities of its
nationals).
197 Like IAWN, SMPAG has few resources of its own; it functions to share information more
effectively among its participating entities and to coordinate their individual activities. See
supra text accompanying notes 46-48. (describing SMPAG). In this paragraph, the Security
Council might decide to instruct that SMPAG should concentrate specifically on developing
the array of non-nuclear planetary defense options; in the present version, that limitation is not
included.
198 Existing international law does not include a direct, comprehensive obligation for states to
share information they may obtain regarding NEO dangers; this paragraph of the resolution
calls upon them to do so, but does not constitute a legal requirement. See OST, supra note 3,
arts. I, XI. There is, of course, a grave danger that any public notification about an incoming
NEO could be subject to exaggeration and distortion, generating panic, but this resolution
proposes to disclose the information fully and to try to manage the resulting public reactions,
rather than to try to maintain secrecy.
199 In a Security Council resolution, the phrase "calls upon" is generally understood not to create
a binding legal obligation because either the term is non-legally-binding or it is ambiguous
enough that it would not be the chosen language of drafters who were endeavoring to create a
legal obligation; in contrast, use of verbs such as "demands" or "decides" connotes a legally-
binding responsibility. James D. Fry, Dionysian Disarmament: Security Council WMD
Coercive Disarmament Measures and Their Legal Implications, 29 Mich. J. Int'l L. 197, 229-
32 (2008); see also STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND IMPLICATIONS (May 17, 2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/LSB 101 34.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4W8-2BXJ]. Here, the
paragraph establishes a general call for support for planetary defense efforts, rather than any
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10. Strongly urges member states urgently to expand their efforts and to
devote additional resources to develop NEO mitigation technologies, tools,
and techniques and to accelerate their flight testing to improve the ability to
alter a NEO's trajectory under increasingly realistic and stressful conditions,
consistent with their respective treaty obligations;2 00
11. Stands ready, upon the request from a member state, to authorize, if
essential to a planetary defense test or mission, the testing of a non-nuclear
weapon against a celestial body, notwithstanding article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty, pursuant to article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations;20 '
specific commitment to a particular measure. But see Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 IC.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 108-116 (June 21)
(ICJ finds that a Security Council Chapter VII resolution that only "calls upon" states to act can
impose a legally binding duty). The phrase "common but differentiated responsibilities" is
drawn from international environmental law, where states' resources and other circumstances
enable them to provide very different types of support to global undertakings, but all states
should participate in some way. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 3.1, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), CLIMATENEXUS,
https://climatenexus.org/climate-change-news/common-but-differentiated-responsibilities-
and-respective-capabilities-cbdr-rc/_[http://perma.cc/LT6X-K223] (last visited Sept. 20, 2018);
CTR. FOR INT'L SUSTAINABLE DEV. (CISDL), THE PRINCIPLE OF COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED
RESPONSBILITIES: ORIGINS AND SCOPE (2002).
200 This paragraph of the resolution presses states to devote more urgency to the planetary
defense mission, by increasing the tempo of their space activities to counteract NEOs and
devoting additional resources to the task. In this version, the resolution concentrates on efforts
to divert an asteroid; it could also stress the possibility of destrovin2 the asteroid if changing its
trajectory proves impossible. See supra text accompanying note 38 (discussing the advantages
and disadvantages of fracturing an incoming asteroid). In addition, the resolution might address
terrestrial efforts to abate the effects of a NEO strike, such as via sheltering in place, emergency
evacuation of the area to be affected, the training of first responders, the pre-positioning of
relief supplies, etc., but those land-based routines are largely outside the scope of this Article.
This paragraph contemplates that the global effort to improve asteroid-deflection capabilities
might require a protracted campaign over many years, perhaps starting with relatively small
space objects and working up toward an ability to manipulate larger, more difficult NEOs. It
would be premature, at this point, for the Security Council to designate any particular state(s)
to prepare for or undertake a planetary defense mission, since there is no known threat and little
in situ capability. See supra text accompanying notes 53-61 (describing potential concepts for
planetary defense technologies).
201 OST art. IV, para. 2 forbids "the testing of any type of weapons" on celestial bodies. OST,
supra note 3, art. IV., para 2. It is possible that some planetary defense missions could
necessitate the use of explosives or other devices that could be construed as weapons, so this
provision might have to be abated. See supra note 101 (regarding testing of non-nuclear
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12. Stands ready, in anticipation of a possible future NEO emergency, to
convene immediately, to authorize and require particular member states to
plan, prepare, and undertake a planetary defense space mission, and to
authorize and require other member states to participate in, contribute to, and
support the mission as appropriate;202
13. Declares its readiness, in the event of future meetings addressing a
NEO threat, to invite affected member states, particularly those likely to be
affected by the impact and those capable of contributing to mitigation efforts,
to participate in the Security Council's deliberations;203
14. Contemplates that in some future extreme circumstances, it might be
necessary to employ a nuclear explosive device as a last resort for a planetary
defense mission, and in this connection declares:20 4
weapons on a celestial body). Under article 103 of the UN Charter, in the event of a conflict
between a member state's obligations under the Charter and its obligations under any other
international agreement, the Charter shall prevail. See U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 103.
The Security Council, in the exercise of its Chapter VII powers, could therefore create an
obligation under the Charter that would over-rule the OST. In this proposed resolution, the
Security Council would not currently derogate from the OST provision, but would express its
willingness to do so, if a state indicated that testing of a weapon on a celestial body was essential
for the development of an effective planetary defense capability. In this paragraph, the scenario
is confined to the testing of non-nuclear weapons. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61
and 91-101 (describing explosive interceptors for planetary defense and discussing the
definition of a weapon respectively).
202 The Security Council is structured to be able to function continuously and it can convene at
very short notice to deal with emergencies. U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 28. Another option
here would be for the Security Council to create a committee to deal with NEO issues on a daily
basis, rather than bringing every aspect to the attention of the full Security Council itself. See,
e.g., S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (creating a committee to monitor the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and implement Security Council measures); S.C. Res. 1718, ¶ 12
(Oct. 14, 2006) (establishing a committee to implement sanctions on North Korea); S.C. Res.
1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (the Counter-Terrorism Committee). In any event, there is always the
potential problem of the veto power, as any of the five permanent member states can block
action. Supra text accompanying notes 169-71 (discussing the problematic features of the
Security Council).
203 Pursuant to article 31 of the UN Charter, the Security Council may invite any member state
to participate in its discussions, without the right to vote, when the interests of that state are
specially affected. U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 31. This could implicate many states, so
each may have only limited participation, but the opportunity to hear from multiple stakeholders
could be beneficial. It is also possible that the UN General Assembly, in which all member
states are voting members, may also convene to discuss the NEO danger.
204 In this resolution, the Security Council is not yet authorizing the use of a nuclear explosive
device against an asteroid; that would be premature. But it is signaling its awareness that such
a scenario might emerge, potentially on short notice, and its willingness to engage on an
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a. that the Outer Space Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other relevant nuclear arms control
agreements are of utmost importance, and all parties shall comply with their
provisions;205
b. that the current moratoria against the conduct of any nuclear weapon
test explosions or any other nuclear explosions should be continued;206
c. that the Security Council will be prepared, in the event of an
anticipated global catastrophe caused by a NEO that cannot be diverted in any
other way, to consider the possibility of superseding the relevant treaty
provisions, in order to enable one or more member states to be designated to
carry out the necessary planetary defense mission and to enable other member
states to assist, participate in, and support that mission, notwithstanding any
other treaty commitments, pursuant to article 103 of the Charter of the United
Nations;207 and
expedited basis at that time. It is possible that the Security Council would be called upon to
adopt a series of increasingly-specific Chapter VII resolutions, as the emerging facts about an
incoming asteroid become clearer.
205 This resolution does not derogate in any way from the existing treaty obligations regarding
nuclear arms control, but signals the Security Council's willingness to consider that action,
should a NEO emergency require it.
206 No state other than North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon since 1998. See Daryl Kimball,
The Nuclear Testing Tally, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nucleartesttally [http://perma.cc/TJ4Q-PHYZ] (last
updated Sept. 3, 2017). The permanent members of the Security Council have declared that a
nuclear explosion by any state would constitute a violation of the object and purpose of the
CTBT, prior to that treaty's entry into force. See supra note 115 (regarding the CTBT).
207 In this resolution, the Security Council contemplates "superseding" the operation of the
relevant treaties, by enacting a Chapter VII resolution that would displace selected elements of
the treaty as the governing rule of law, pursuant to UN Charter art. 103. See U.N. Charter,
supra note 2, art. 103. In so doing, the Security Council does not "amend" or "suspend" those
treaties, but establishes a superior rule governing the behavior of states. This procedure would
avoid the alternatives of utilizing those treaties' provisions regarding amendment or
withdrawal. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35 and 137-41 (regarding amendment
and withdrawal provisions respectively). For the states carrying out a nuclear planetary defense
mission, the central elements of those agreements would be at stake; for the other states
participating in or supporting the operation, the relevant treaty provisions would include those
regarding assisting, encouraging, or inducing actions that would be in violation of the particular
treaty. When the time for a planetary defense mission arises, the Security Council would likely
designate the particular state(s) to conduct the mission and specify supporting roles for others
(or delegate to the leading state(s) the task of lining up the other participant(s)). It is possible
that a single state, such as the United States, would undertake the entire mission, but it is more
likely that an international coalition would be assembled, as reflected in preambular para. 4.
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d. that if a nuclear explosive device is deployed for a planetary defense
mission, it shall remain at all times under the jurisdiction and control of a
member state that is legally permitted to possess such a device, and that other
member states may participate in the mission in a way that respects their
respective legal obligations;208
15. Declares its resolve to monitor closely the problem of NEOs and to
receive regular reports on this topic from the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space and other relevant bodies;2 09 and
16. Decides to remain actively seized of the issue.210
This proposed Security Council resolution is parsimonious. It exhorts the
spacefaring countries, individually and in concert, to augment and embellish
their efforts to discover additional potentially-hazardous asteroids, to enhance
the ability to track and characterize them, and to develop and test promising
See generally Joseph N. Pelton, International Cooperation and Collaboration in Planetary
Defense Efforts, in HANDBOOK OF COSMIC HAZARDS AND PLANETARY DEFENSE 1007 (Joseph N.
Pelton & Firooz Allahdadi eds., 2015).
208 Under the NPT, five states are designated as NWS and allowed to possess nuclear weapons;
in addition, four states are not parties to that treaty. See supra text accompanying notes 118-
21 (discussing the structure of the NPT). This resolution allows NNWS to participate in a
nuclear planetary defense mission in a manner that "respects" their NPT obligations, even if it
departs from some of the specifics of that treaty (such as the provisions that inhibit the closest
interactions between NWS and NNWS).
209 This resolution does not address the important questions about who would pay for the
planetary defense mission and about possible international financial support for any states that
are impacted on Earth if the mission fails, or if it is not undertaken. There are several
possibilities here, including use of the standard United Nations formula for allocating dues. See
MELAMED & MELAMED, supra note 68, at 3 (estimating that an asteroid deflection effort would
cost $1 billion per launch); Henry R. Hertzfeld & Pierre-Alain Schieb, Economic Challenges
ofFinancing Planetary Defense, in HANDBOOK OF COSMIC HAZARDS AND PLANETARY DEFENSE
993 (Joseph N. Pelton & Firooz Allahdadi eds., 2015) (emphasizing the difficulty of raising
sufficient funds for a planetary defense initiative).
210 Another important element not included in this draft resolution and beyond the scope of this
Article concerns legal liability for damage inflicted by a planetary defense mission that
succeeded in altering the trajectory of the incoming asteroid somewhat, but did not succeed in
causing it to miss Earth or orbiting satellites altogether - so the damage was felt by states that
would not have been affected if no intervention had been undertaken. The Liability Convention
imposes absolute liability on the launching state for damage inflicted on Earth and liability for
fault for damage inflicted on space assets; a Security Council resolution might well alter that
exposure, in order to avoid deterring states from undertaking the mission. See supra note 64.
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mechanisms for diverting an asteroid, should a substantial and imminent peril
appear. It calls for greater attention to planetary defense by leadership figures
and the general public, as well as by the Security Council itself It bolsters
both IAWN and SMPAG, and elicits their even greater efforts in the future.
It reinforces the global commitment to the principal treaties in this field: the
OST, LTBT, and NPT. The resolution declares, for the first time, that a large
NEO could constitute a "threat to the peace," triggering the Security Council's
extraordinary powers pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and it
positions the Security Council to authorize and to require additional action-
including even the use of nuclear explosive devices, contrary to the standing
rules contained in applicable treaties-should the need arise.
But this resolution does not go so far as to approve the testing or conduct
of a nuclear planetary defense mission. That would be premature at this point,
when no imminent hazard looms on the horizon, and because the arms
limitation provisions of the OST, LTBT, and NPT continue to play such
essential roles underpinning global security on Earth. If the need does arise,
via some benighted twist of the orbits, the Security Council would hastily
reconvene and chart an emergency path. The optimal remedy in that future
scenario would depend heavily upon the then-applicable facts: How large and
massive is the asteroid; how certain are the experts about its trajectory and
impact point; how much time do we have to react; what planetary defense
implements have been developed, tested, and made ready? A nuclear
explosion might be the most efficacious, or even the only, recourse, but even
then we would need to know more about the readiness and the willingness of
the various nuclear- and space-capable states, and about the state of their
political relationships and their ability to collaborate effectively with each
other.
Time may then be short-perhaps too short-but at the present moment,
this is the best the Security Council can do in anticipating the various severe
contingencies and teeing up future options in an appropriate fashion. The
proposed resolution designates a mechanism that can be implemented quickly,
without eliciting the creation of a new international organization or the
promulgation of novel procedures. It employs established international legal
routines in a novel way, and respects existing treaties by formally
acknowledging and then partially superseding them rather than simply tossing
them aside.
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CONCLUSION
Astronomers are fond of observing that the real question is not "whether"
Earth will again be struck by a large asteroid, but "when." We can detect
around the planet the remnants of scores of impact craters of diverse size and
age left by previous NEOs, and the pockmarks are even more obvious on the
Moon and other celestial bodies, where erosion has not degraded their
silhouettes. As asteroids pinball around the Solar System, it is only a matter
of time before the nextjarring impact-time that might be measured in months
or in millions of years.
The potential consequences of such a collision beggar belief Prehistoric
experience demonstrates that all of human civilization, as well as most or all
other forms of life on Earth, may hang in the balance. Even a more moderately
sized asteroid could devastate a community or a country in an instant. As Igor
Ashurbeyli assesses the stakes, developing countermeasures to this
apocalyptic threat "must become the most important task that humanity must
solve in the 2 1st century. "211
But the time frame matters, too. If we knew, hypothetically, that an
extinction-level event was not going to occur for thousands or millions of
years, why would we devote time, attention, and money to it now? A known
risk of extermination, eons into the future, would pose profound philosophical
and psychological conundrums, but preemptively responding to it would not
be on anyone's active "to-do list" for generations.
Still, timing matters in another way, too. With our present state of
astronomical intelligence, we cannot be certain about our planet's prolonged
safety, and we must exhibit appropriate modesty about our confidence in the
completeness of the inventory of known NEOs. Accordingly, the planet may
not have much advance notice about the next Chicxulub, and we may be no
more able than the dinosaurs to immediately invent our way out of an
unanticipated fatal space specter. Frances Lyall and Paul B. Larsen
summarize the issue this way: "Time might be too short adequately to deal
with the crisis-missile or other technology has to be prepared." 2 12
211 Ashurbeyli, supra note 40, at 7. Stephen Hawking has also cited "overdue asteroid strikes"
as one of the reasons why human beings may have to populate a new planet within 100 years,
Julia Zorthian, Stephen Hawking Says Humans Have 100 Years to Move to Another Planet,
TIME (May 4, 2017), http://time.com/4767595/stephen-hawking-100-years-new-planet/
[http://perma.cc/FJE5-94ME].
212 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 9, at 239. See also YEOMANS, supra note 8, at 19 (imagining
a realistic scenario in which a deadly comet could not be detected until it was merely months
away from an Earth impact).
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It is difficult for humans to think rationally about this sort of problem-it
is hard to get our collective minds around such enormous consequences and
such tiny probabilities simultaneously-especially when people have so little
first-hand experience with the causal phenomenon. A 2010 study by the
National Academy of Sciences referred to this as a classic "zero times infinity"
problem that thwarts human cognitive processing.213 Cass Sunstein and
Richard Zeckhauser label the resulting bias in decision-making as "probability
neglect"-a propensity to misunderstand the fearsome risks that are so
difficult to conceptualize.2 14 Behavioral economics literature abounds with
examinations of the collective non-rationality in our species' approach to
high-severity/low-probability events, leading to extreme discounting of
remote future catastrophes, to the detriment of individuals and society.2 15
The underdeveloped state of international law on trans-border disasters
reflects this cognitive deficit. Perhaps this should not be surprising-the tasks
of preventing, responding to, and rebuilding after global catastrophes are
daunting. These are topics that sovereign states, as well as individual human
beings, shy away from addressing-they are uncomfortable to think about;
they can involve sharing resources, as well as sympathy, with foreigners; and
they seem to call for spending immense sums of money on vanishingly remote
contingencies. It will never be easy to marshal political support for
developing, improving, and sustaining planetary defense capabilities that in
all likelihood will never be exercised during any government official's term
in office or even lifetime.216 Nevertheless, planetary defense represents one
213 NAS SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 7 (noting a near-zero probability of the
event occurring in any immediate time period, but a near-infinite amount of damage inflicted if
it does occur).
214 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Zeckhauser, Overreaction to Fearsome Risks, 48 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE EcON. 435, 436 (2011); see also, POSNER, supra note 37.
215 See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther & Geoffrey Heal, Managing Catastrophic Risk, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY,NAT. RESOURCE, AND ENVTL. EcoN. 52 (Jason F. Shogren ed., 2013)
(asserting that losses from catastrophic risks have increased because behavioral biases prevent
individuals and businesses from taking appropriate protective measures); David H. Krantz &
Howard C. Kunreuther, Goals and Plans in Decision Making, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION
MAKING 137 (2007) (examining the puzzling behavior of people under-insuring against
catastrophic risks).
216 See generally, Robert L. Park et al., The Lesson of Grand Forks: Can a Defense Against
Asteroids Be Sustained?, in HAZARDS DUE TO COMETS AND ASTEROIDS 1225 (Tom Gehrels ed.,
1994) (comparing the problem of sustaining political and financial support for planetary defense
to the comparable problem of preparing against unlikely but potentially catastrophic missile
attack); Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/71/10,
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of the occasions in which these psychological barriers must be overcome.
The extended time frame in dealing with asteroids places special burdens
on the effort to think rationally about very-low-probability dangers, because
the people at risk are (likely) not ourselves but our far-distant progeny,
generations so remote that the emotional connection to them is strained. We
can appreciate that the good work of IAWN and SMPAG today may help
increase the odds of our species' survival, but we must also be aware that the
counter-asteroid technology available to earthlings a century or two from now
will surely surpass today's puny capabilities in ways we cannot imagine.2 17
One plausible formula would be to posit that a major NEO impact (a
collision with a body of 3-5 km diameter) could kill, say, half the world's
population (soon to reach eight billion people) some time in the next million
years. On an actuarial basis, that works out to 4,000 statistical deaths
annually. That is surely a significant fatality rate-enough to warrant
substantial financial investment-even though the incidents would be
extraordinarily "lumpy," in the sense that for almost all of those one million
years, there would be no deaths at all due to asteroids, but in one year there
would be an unprecedented catastrophe. At this rate, asteroids would rank
above many other natural and bizarre phenomena that people fear (and that
societies attempt to do something about), such as floods, tornados, airplane
crashes, terrorism, or choking. Asteroids, however, would still fall far below
other leading causes of death, such as automobile accidents, communicable
diseases, and tobacco use. 2 18
This weird combination of probabilities and consequences promotes what
many call the "giggle factor": humans' seemingly congenital reluctance to
discuss planetary defense seriously without retreating to the silliest tropes
about alien attacks or sci-fi thrillers. The topic seems to be ripped from
at 12-72 (2016).
217 See Michael B. Gerrard, Risks of Hazardous Waste Sites Versus Asteroid and Comet
Impacts: Accounting for the Discrepancies in U.S. Resource Allocation, 20 RISK ANALYSIS 895
(2000) (pondering why the United States allocates some $6 billion annually to the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites but only $3 million to planetary defense). Jonathan Schell has movingly
articulated how a global nuclear war could result in two distinct, intertwined tragedies: the
deaths of all currently living human beings and the prevention of the existence of all future
generations. An asteroid could likewise result in those two types of unthinkable exterminations.
See JONATHAN SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (1982). See also Seth D. Baum et al., Long-
Term Trajectories ofHuman Civilization, FORESIGHT (forthcoming Aug. 2018).
218 Chapman & Morrison, supra note 37; Gerrard & Barber, supra note 32, at 12-17; NAS
SURVEYS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 10, at 26-27; POSNER, supra note 37, at 90; DEALING
WITH THE THREAT TO EARTH FROM ASTEROIDS AND COMETS, supra note 13, at 31; YEOMANS,
supra note 8, at 123.
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kitschy movie trailers, not news headlines. 2 19
An additional fear factor here is the danger of surprise. If a significant
asteroid were to arrive without warning-as in the Chelyabinsk incident-the
afflicted country might perceive that it had been attacked by a hostile
neighbor, rather than by a fickle Mother Nature. If, by further malign luck,
the event happened to occur during a period of heightened international
tensions, the propensity to misinterpret, and to respond precipitously, would
rise. The unforeseen space object could thus catalyze a larger human-caused
tragedy.2 20
The easiest part of the policy prescription is to recommend that more
should be done to gather and disseminate the relevant data about NEOs.
NASA, IAWN, and other actors should press forward zealously to enhance
the inventory of known asteroids and should expand their efforts to track and
characterize those that might plausibly pose a threat. This survey may get
expensive: space-based telescopes may be necessary in order to detect space
objects that canbe obscured by the Sun, and long-distance space missions may
be required in order to collect more information about the structure,
composition, and flight characteristics of asteroids of interest.
Efforts should also proceed expeditiously to develop a quiver of
technologies, tools, and techniques that can be employed someday to
maneuver a threatening NEO away from Earth. These capabilities are just
emerging today; some do not yet appear even on drawing boards. Because
the world cannot now know when they would be operationally required, we
should invest in their growth and refinement now. Since future NEO threats
can be so diverse, a robust collection of capabilities could be necessary-they
should be regarded as complementary, rather than redundant.221 Nuclear
2 19 Martin E.B. France, Planetary Defense: Eliminating the Giggle Factor, AIR & SPACE POWER
J. (Aug. 7, 2000); Gerrard & Barber, supra note 32, at 17; BURROWS, supra note 33, at 91-122.
220 SECURE WORLD, supra note 43., at 18; Baum, supra note 217, at 5-6, 11-12. See also Air
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2018), http://www.foxnews.com/science/2018/08/03/air-force-remains-silent-after-huge-
meteor-hits-near-us-military-base.html [http://perma.cc/HJ8C-ZLZE] (incorrectly and
ominously reporting about a small asteroid that exploded without advance warning above
Greenland, not far from a U.S. military base); Chelsea Gohd, Fireball Explodes over Greenland
Near US Military Base, SPACE.COM (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.space.com/41393-fireball-
explodes -over-greenland-military-base.html [http://perma.cc/X7C7-UYR3].
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accompanying notes 10-19 (describing the variability in asteroid characteristics that could
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technology is today the most mature of the candidate planetary defense
methods; ironically, it is also the most legally and politically problematic.
There is no cause, at the moment, to disrupt any of the existing treaty
provisions that can constrain specific planetary defense trials or operations.
As the draft Security Council resolution suggests, at some point, it may be
opportune to experiment with a non-nuclear kinetic impactor against a NEO
in a manner that might qualify as a test of a weapon, sparking concerns under
article IV of the OST.222 Certainly anything using nuclear explosive devices
will raise the greatest sensitivities. The world, and the Security Council in
particular, should be attentive to those scenarios, but no immediate action is
required or appropriate.
When an asteroid emergency does arise, the decision about whether to
employ a nuclear explosive should be driven, in the first instance, by technical
considerations-is this the best (or only) mechanism for diverting disaster? If
it is a close call (e.g., if the NEO danger is only contingent rather than certain,
if the damage that might be inflicted is of a regional rather than a global nature,
or if the suitability of non-nuclear techniques is debatable), then political
factors will exert influence, too. How accepting will states be about breaking
the decades-long taboo against nuclear explosions, how skeptical might they
be about any covert motivations, and how amicable can the states possessing
nuclear devices be about allocating the action responsibilities among
themselves?
A principal message of this Article is that international law should play a
significant role in the global decision-making process too-and that the legal
circumstances are worth thinking through in advance so we can develop a
coherent plan, based upon solid analysis and a suitable consensus, rather than
simply tearing up treaties at the last moment. Our fidelity to the rule of law
today is undercut if we casually assume that we will all toss the treaties aside
in a future crisis. Lawyers have to be more deft than that, more poised at
anticipating and responding to a planetary emergency.
If a nuclear device is to be used against an incoming NEO, a Security
Council resolution pursuant to Chapter VII would provide the preferable
mechanism for securing legal authorization. That approach is faster than an
amendment of the relevant treaties and more targeted than a withdrawal from
those instruments. It offers global coverage, applicable simultaneously to the
concerns of all states. A Security Council resolution is, admittedly, subject to
the veto power of the five permanent members, but once that hurdle is
overcome, it avoids the tacit veto power that any other state might exert by
222 See supra note 201 (draft Security Council resolution, para. 11).
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withholding its consent to the departure from other legal instruments and
norms. Importantly, a suitable Security Council resolution avoids
"wrongfulness"-it ensures that the authorized actions enjoy full legal
sanction, needing no other excuse or justification.223
The most stressful part of the analysis here is the potential clash over the
nuclear option because two incommensurate sets of values are at stake. On
the one hand, if a nuclear device really were essential for planetary defense,
then of course it should be implemented. International law, like the U.S.
Constitution, is not a "suicide pact,"224 and if the law stubbornly gets in the
way of actions that are essential for human survival, then the law simply
cannot stand. On the other hand, it would be equally absurd to allow the very
remote possibility of an asteroid impact to undercut the foundations of
contemporary international security. The central treaties at stake here-the
OST, LTBT, and NPT-constitute the hard-won paramount pillars of nuclear
arms control; they must not be challenged by any pretextual excuses for
evasion. The pressures toward an arms race in space are already substantial
and growing; planetary defense should not further stoke those fires. 2 2 5
To be viable, the international planetary defense process must exhibit all
the criteria for legitimate decision-making: the framework should be "proper,
fair, transparent, comprehensive, workable, politically, institutionally, and
legally sound, and feasible." 2 26 Financing the necessary efforts, and resolving
potential tort liability for unsuccessful diversion efforts remain as critical
outstanding issues.227
Unlike other types of natural calamities (earthquakes and hurricanes, for
example) an asteroid represents an ur-disaster (in the sense of being primitive,
arising from original artifacts from the creation of the Universe) that can
(sometimes) be foreseen with accuracy and (sometimes) abated. The current
detection and warning network is far from leak-proof, but it can be made much
more reliable and resilient.
223 See supra, text accompanying notes 145-56 (regarding circumstances that preclude the
wrongfulness of a treaty violation).
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We are not helpless, but neither are we ready.228 Existing or near-existing
technology can suffice to detect, track, and characterize most threatening
NEOs, and one day to divert them, but the methodologies have not yet been
developed, tested, and deployed-and time may be short.
Planetary defense offers a marvelous modern opportunity for echoing the
Biblical injunction to convert swords into plowshares: the technology for
rocketry, lasers, and nuclear chain reactions, originally developed or at least
refined for military purposes, can be adapted for the purpose of safeguarding
humanity from a deadly alien threat. But doing so requires endorsement from
a higher power (in this case, the UN Security Council), and a safeguard
mechanism for ensuring that the nuclear sword will not retain its original
functionality.
228 See GLOBAL RESPONSE, supra note 13, at 3, 16.
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